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“Whether a prosecutor’s comment is improper depends upon the context in which it was made and whether the jury would naturally and necessarily perceive it to be a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify.” ¶ 33 (2003).

In considering whether a prosecutor's argument is misconduct, this court "looks at the context in which the statements were made as well as 'the entire record and to the totality of the circumstances.'" ¶ 39 (2012) ( ¶ 33 (2003)).

“Whether a prosecutor’s comment is improper depends upon the context in which it was made and whether the jury would naturally and necessarily perceive it to be a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify.” ¶ 13 (App. 2014) ( ¶ 33 (2003)).

–13 ¶¶ 28–30, –56 (2003); ¶ 19

¶¶ 29-30 (2003) (holding “the objection ‘shifting the burden’ did not preserve the issue of prosecutorial misconduct”).

¶22 Foshay’s objection did not “give[] the [trial] court an opportunity to correct any error and allow[] opposing counsel a chance to ‘obviate the objection.’” Lopez, 175 P.3d at 683

(“‘The purpose of an objection is to permit the trial court to rectify possible error, and to enable the opposition to obviate the objection if possible.’”)

“[W]e review the trial court’s determination of the relevancy and admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.” ¶ 15 (2003) ().

“[W]e review the trial court’s determination of the relevancy and admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.” ¶ 15 (2003).

of such magnitude that defendant could not possibly have received a fair trial.” ¶ 32, ( ¶ 62, ).

§ 13- 117; see Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (stating that the Fifth Amendment “forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt”)

1 “We view the evidence presented at trial in a light most favorable to sustaining the verdicts.” n.1, ¶ 2, n.1 (2003).

] ”); Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 13- 117(B) (”The defendant’s neglect or refusal to be a witness in his own behalf shall not in any manner prejudice him, or be used against him on the trial or proceedings.”); see also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-14 (1965); ¶ 26

“Fundamental error is clear, egregious, and of such dimension that it denied the defendant a fair trial.” ¶ 32

¶ 30, “Harmless error review places the burden on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict or sentence.” ¶ 18

“the protection against self-incrimination includes freedom from adverse consequences flowing from defendant’s exercise of his right,” it is reversible error to refer to a defendant’s “protected silence,” if jurors would “naturally and necessarily perceive it to be a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify,” ¶ 33

See, ¶ 25 , (“A defendant is not required to prove an alibi; rather, the jury must acquit a defendant if the alibi evidence raises a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant committed the crime.”); ¶ 11 , (similar for misidentification).

This Court looks at the context in which the statements were made as well as “the entire record and to the totality of the circumstances.” ¶ 33

(claim reviewed only for fundamental error when objection below not on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct).

[§ ]' 13-117(B) prohibit any comment, direct or *406 indirect, by a prosecutor about the failure of a defendant to testify.”

This gives the court an opportunity to correct any error and allows opposing counsel a chance to “ ‘obviate the objection.’”