Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Viramontes, 64 P.3d 188.

46 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. Jerry Charles Holle 379 P.3d 197 Ariz. 2016
State of Arizona v. Jerry Charles Holle Ariz. 2016
State of Arizona v. Jerry Charles Holle 379 P.3d 197 Ariz. 2016
§ 13-205(A)) (the legislature, not the judiciary, has “constitutional authority to define crimes and defenses”); , 362 ¶ 12, (“It is not our place to pass on the wisdom of’ legislative decisions concerning criminal procedure).
State of Arizona v. Jerry Charles Holle Ariz. 2016
§ 13-205(A)) (the legislature, not the judiciary, has “constitutional authority to define crimes and defenses”); ¶ 12, (“It is not our place to pass on the wisdom of” legislative decisions concerning criminal procedure).
State of Arizona v. Kyle Evan Smith Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
State of Arizona v. Kyle Evan Smith Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
If the language of a statute is plain, “we must give effect to that language and may not employ other means of statutory interpretation.”
State v. Montes 245 P.3d 879 Ariz. 2011
State v. Montes 245 P.3d 879 Ariz. 2011
8 aggravating facts in a case which arose before the amendment and to overrule” P.3d 188 (2003), which “limit[ed] the aggravators [that] could be applied under the law in effect at the time of the crime.” Rios, 225 Ariz. at ___ n.7, 237 P.3d at 1060 n.7.
State of Arizona v. Alvin Edward Williams Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
State of Arizona v. Alvin Edward Williams Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
Thereafter, P.3d 188 (2003), Williams successfully petitioned for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim.
State of Arizona v. Francisco Lazaro Gonzalez, Jr. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
State of Arizona v. Francisco Lazaro Gonzalez, Jr. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
“In the absence of ambiguity, we must give effect to [the] language [of the statute] and may not employ other means of statutory interpretation.”
Scott Douglas Nordstrom v. State of Arizona 142 P.3d 1247 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
Scott Douglas Nordstrom v. State of Arizona 142 P.3d 1247 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
Sess., ch. 1, § 7; n.1, n.1 (2003) (acknowledging amendments to death penalty statutes were in response to Ring II ).
State of Arizona v. Juan Manuel Molina Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
State of Arizona v. Juan Manuel Molina Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
At the time the trial court sentenced Molina, such factors needed only be supported by “reasonable evidence.” (holding that aggravating circumstances need only be true and supported by reasonable evidence); but see 2005 Ariz. Sess.
State of Arizona v. Samuel Phillip Viramontes 118 P.3d 630 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
State of Arizona v. Samuel Phillip Viramontes 118 P.3d 630 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
State v. Viramontes, 204 Ariz. 360
State v. Fell 115 P.3d 594 Ariz. 2005
State v. Fell 115 P.3d 594 Ariz. 2005
State of Arizona v. Matthew Erich Manzanedo 110 P.3d 1026 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
State of Arizona v. Matthew Erich Manzanedo 110 P.3d 1026 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
(“In non-capital cases, aggravators need only be supported by reasonable evidence.”).
State of Arizona v. Jesus Antonio Aleman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
State of Arizona v. Jesus Antonio Aleman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
Alire, 105 P.3d at 166; (“In non-capital cases, aggravators need only be supported by reasonable evidence.”).
State v. Cleere 109 P.3d 107 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
State v. Cleere 109 P.3d 107 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
105 P.3d at 166 ; , ("In non-capital cases, aggravators need only be supported by reasonable evidence.”).
State v. Chiappetta 107 P.3d 366 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
State v. Chiappetta 107 P.3d 366 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
("In non-capital cases, aggravators need only be supported by reasonable evidence.").
State v. Timmons 103 P.3d 315 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
State v. Timmons 103 P.3d 315 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
¶ 15 In addition, the trial court’s aggravating-circumstance findings could have been based merely on *398 “reasonable evidence in the record,” , , and not satisfied the higher, beyond-a-reasonable-donbt standard Blakely and Apprendi mandate for jury findings.
State v. Resendis-Felix 100 P.3d 457 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
State v. Resendis-Felix 100 P.3d 457 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
Indeed, the trial court’s aggravating-circumstance findings could have been based merely on “reasonable evidence in the record,” , , and not satisfied the higher, beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard Blakely and Apprendi mandate for jury findings.
State v. Estrada 100 P.3d 452 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
State v. Martinez 100 P.3d 30 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
State v. Martinez 100 P.3d 30 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
State v. Estrada 100 P.3d 452 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
(court should construe statute to further legislative intent).
State v. Fell 97 P.3d 902 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
State v. Fell 97 P.3d 902 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
The state argues that § 13-703.01(Q), which requires a judge to consider the aggravating factors in § 13-702, applies to Sanders’s sentencing because it is not a change in the existing law but, rather, clarifies what the legislature had always intended § 13-703 to mean, notwithstanding our supreme court’s
State v. Viramontes 93 P.3d 536 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
State v. Viramontes 93 P.3d 536 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. 78 P.3d 1056 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. 78 P.3d 1056 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
But if a statute’s language is clear, we simply apply it without reference to any tools of statutory construction, “assuming that the legislature has said what it means.” Hughes v. Jorgen *339 son
State v. Casey 71 P.3d 351 Ariz. 2003
State v. Casey 71 P.3d 351 Ariz. 2003
.’” quoting 4 (“It is not our place to pass on the wisdom of” legislative decisions concerning criminal procedure.); (“The authority to define crimes and fix the penalties for such crimes rests with the legislature, not the judiciary.”).
State v. Brown 70 P.3d 454 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
State v. Brown 70 P.3d 454 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
("The statutes limit sentencing procedures in a non-capital first degree murder case to those set forth in section 13-703.").