Cited by

¶ 32 (2003) (jury instructions should not mislead or confuse the jury).

§ 13- 1101; ¶ 31 (2003).

“[W]e avoid constructions that would render statutes invalid or parts of them meaningless.”

(in construing statutes, we “avoid constructions that would render statutes invalid or parts of them meaningless”).

Premeditation requires proof that a defendant “reflected on the decision before killing.” ¶ 32 (2003); see A.R.S.

§ 13-1105(A)(1) (premeditated murder); -80, ¶¶ 32-34 (2003) (explaining that premeditation requires proof of actual reflection, which may be established solely by circumstantial evidence).

¶¶ 27, 29, 31 (2004) (construing premeditation statute, A.R.S.

4 STATE v. MARTIN Decision of the Court ¶11 On appeal, Martin does not challenge the court’s findings.2 Indeed, he concedes that evidence of his premeditation—the element that distinguishes first from second-degree murder, ¶ 27 n.6 (2003)—would have been admissible to rebut his justification defenses had he been tried solely on second-degree murder.

The State provided to the grand jurors all applicable 2 STATE v. HON BLAIR/–80, ¶ 32 (2003).1 ¶6 The State presented evidence in support of the four charges.

¶39 Premeditation requires proof that, after forming an intent to kill, the defendant “reflected on the decision before killing.” ¶ 32 (2003).

¶ 10 (2003) (stating that “we avoid constructions that would render statutes invalid or parts of them meaningless”).

State v. Thompson , , ¶ 32

Instead, due process requires the prosecutor to instruct the jury as the supreme court mandated in State v. Thompson , , 479-80, ¶¶ 32, 34

¶ 15 (2003) (“[F]or the first degree murder statute to be constitutional, the definition of premeditation must provide a meaningful distinction between first and second degree murder.”).

¶ 14 (2013) (“There is no prescribed period of time which must elapse between the formation of the intent to kill and the act of killing, but the record must at least circumstantially support that a defendant considered his act and did not merely react to an instant quarrel or in the heat of passion.”); ¶ 31 (2003) (noting that the passage of time is one factor among others that can show 6 STATE V. RUSHING Opinion of the Court actual reflection).

¶ 27 (2003) (stating courts have a duty to construe statutes in a way that “not only gives effect to the legislature’s intent, [] but also in a way that maintains its constitutionality”).

It is not necessary to delineate the precise contours of these different terms if it can reasonably be said that “masturbatory contact” is something 7 STATE v. FLOREZ Opinion of the Court more than mere “direct or indirect touching.” See § 13-1401(A)(3)- (4); ¶¶ 15, 26, 427 (2003) (first-degree murder statute constitutional only if definition of premeditation “provide[s] a meaningful distinction” between first- and second-degree murder).

§ 13-1105(A)(1) (former § 13-452), “in terms of intention or knowledge that precedes the killing by enough time to allow reflection and exclude[d] killings that occur as a result of a sudden quarrel.” ¶ 18, (discussing A.R.S.