Cited by

–19 ¶¶ 15–17 (2009) (noting that, for a Rule 32 PCR petition to be granted on the basis of “a significant change in the law,” the new law must: (1) clearly break from past law and (2) have retroactive application); ¶ 5 (2003) (noting that for purposes of a Rule 32 PCR petition, the court must determine whether the new law “applies retroactively to the [defendant’s] sentences).

393–94, ¶¶ 6–7, 25, 30 (2003) (concluding that Ring does not apply retroactively).

¶¶ 6-7 (2003) (following Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)).

e past,” such as “when an appellate court overrules previously binding case law,” ¶ 28 (2021) (citations and internal quotation 5 STATE v. LOWERY Decision of the Court marks omitted); (2) the change applies retroactively to the defendant’s case, ¶ 5 (2003); and (3) application of the new law “would probably overturn the defendant’s judgment or sentence,” Ariz. R. Crim.

¶ 6 (2003) (explaining that new constitutional rules apply retroactively to cases on direct review).

¶15 Generally, “[n]ew constitutional rules apply to cases on direct review.” ¶ 6 (2003) (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987)).

prompt and final conclusion of the case after the conviction and sentence.”) (emphasis added); ¶ 14 (2003) (recognizing victims’ right to finality); (same); (noting in capital case that Rule 32 PCR proceedings are “not designed to afford a second appeal” and that “there must be an end to litigation”).

-32 (2003) (“A defendant‟s case becomes final when „a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally denied.‟”), quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987).

(determining sua sponte if new statute applied to ease); , -32 (2003), quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , 321 n. 6, 107 S.Ct.

See Roseberry, 210 Ariz. at 364-65 ¶ 18, 111 P.3d at 406-07; ¶ 11

¶ 11 A conviction is final when “a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally denied.” -90, ¶ 8 , -32 (2003) (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , 321 n. 6, 107 S.Ct.

- 6 - v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2524 (2004); ¶ 12

2519 , 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) *85 (finding that right to jury sentencing in Ring II context is procedural right, not substantive); , (same).

2906 , — L.Ed.2d — (2004); Ring III, 204 Ariz. at 552, 555, ¶¶ 44, 53 , 65 P.3d at 933, 936 ; -91, ¶¶ 12-13 , -33 (2003); accord Schriro v. Summerlin, — U.S. —, —, 124 S.Ct.

Summerlin further states the jury guarantee does not rise to the level of a “watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” 4 The Supreme Court’s decision in Summerlin is fully consistent with this court’s P.3d 828, cert.