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Though viewing a prospective juror’s demeanor in-person is useful, see Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 386 (2010), criminal defendants are entitled to a “fair trial, not a perfect one,” ¶ 18 (2003) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986)).

¶ 48 (2003) (we presume juries follow curative instructions).

“[B]ecause the trial judge is in the best position to assess the impact of a witness’s statements on the jury, we defer to the trial judge’s discretionary determination.” ¶ 43 (2003).

Although Callirgos’s testimony arguably violated the court’s motion in limine ruling, “[t]he trial judge viewed the improper statement in the context of the evidence in the case as a whole, assessed its effect on the jury, and, in light of all the circumstances, determined that a limiting instruction would cure the error.” ¶ 46 (2003).

Jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions, ¶ 48 (2003), and Kleinman does not suggest they failed to do so here.

And because a mistrial is “the most dramatic remedy for trial error,” it should be granted “only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.” ¶ 43 (2003).

A mistrial is the “most dramatic remedy for trial error and should be granted only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.” ¶ 72 (2009) ( ¶ 43 (2003)).

“To prevail under this standard 1 “We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict[s].” ¶ 1, n.1 (2013) ( ¶ 2 (2003)).

Mistrial, which is “the most dramatic remedy for trial error,” should only be granted when “justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.” ¶ 43 (2003) (internal quotations omitted).

Mistrial is “the most dramatic remedy for trial error and should only be granted when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.” ¶ 43 (2003).

An error is harmless if the State demonstrates “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict or sentence.” ¶ 18 (2005); –66, ¶ 18 (2003) (stating harmless error analysis is applied to erroneous jury instructions).

¶5 A declaration of mistrial is “the most dramatic remedy for trial error and should be granted only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.” ¶ 43 (2003) (citation omitted).

“Article 6, Section 27 of the Arizona Constitution prohibits judges from commenting upon evidence presented at trial.” ¶ 50 (2003), supplemented

¶65 Declaring a mistrial is “the most dramatic remedy for trial error and should be granted only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.” ¶ 43 (2003).

A declaration of mistrial is “the most dramatic remedy for trial error and should be granted only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.” ¶ 43 (2003).

¶ 46 (2003) supplemented

¶ 61 (2003) (“[B]ecause the conferences involved entirely procedural matters and [the defendant] has not shown that he was entitled to attend or that he could have contributed to his defense had he been present, we do not find that [defendant]’s right to be present was violated.”)

We presume the jury followed these instructions, ¶ 46 (2003), and Snethen has not rebutted this presumption.

Mistrial is “the most dramatic remedy for trial error and should be granted only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.” ¶ 43 (2003) (citation omitted).

¶ 46 n.8 (2003) (failure to develop a legal argument constitutes waiver of that argument on appeal), opinion supplemented by (“Failure to [sufficiently] argue a claim on appeal constitutes waiver of that claim.”).