Cited by

¶ 6, (“When the plain text of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no need to resort to other methods of statutory interpretation to determine the [drafter’s] intent because its intent is readily discernable from the face of the statute.”); Fragoso, 210 Ariz. at 430, ¶ 7, 111 P.3d

“When a statute is clear, we do not ‘resort to other methods of statutory interpretation to determine the legislature’s intent because its intent is readily discernible from the face of the statute.’”

“When the plain text of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no need to resort to other methods of statutory interpretation to determine the legislature’s intent because its intent is readily discernible from the face of the statute.”

that was committed within the five years immediately preceding the date of the present offense.” ¶¶ 11-13, -45 (2003) (finding repetitive sentencing statute, including definition of historical prior felony conviction, clear and unambiguous).

“When the plain text of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no need to resort to other methods of statutory interpretation to determine the legislature’s intent because its intent is readily discernable from the face of the statute.”

When a statute is clear, we do not “resort to other methods of statutory 3 WYATT v. VANGUARD HEALTH/KUHFUSS v. JOHN C. LINCOLN OPINION OF THE COURT interpretation to determine the legislature’s intent because its intent is readily discernible from the face of the statute.” ¶ 6

¶8 As noted above, when interpreting a statute, we look first to the plain language of the statute as “the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning.” see A.R.S.

¶24 Viewing the conviction dates chronologically, n.8, ¶ 8, n.8 (2003), the 2000 California Offenses were Montoya’s first and second felonies.

“When the plain text of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no need to resort to other methods of statutory interpretation to determine the legislature’s intent because its intent is readily diseernable from the face of the statute.” ¶ 6

“When the plain text of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no need to resort to other methods of statutory interpretation to determine the legislature’s intent because its intent is readily discernable from the face of the statute.” , 66 ¶ 6

because the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is the plain text of the statute.” ¶ 6

“In any case involving statutory interpretation we begin with the text of the statute” because it is “the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning.” ¶ 6

le’s “in excess of one year” distinction “was expressly designed to avoid embroiling the courts in technical disputes as to whether a particular crime was a misdemeanor or a felony under state law.” Martin, 205 Ariz. at 283, ¶¶ 13-16 , 69 P.3d at 1004 (holding that the determination that offenses covered by Proposition 200 remained “felonies” for sentence enhancement purposes, , , was immaterial to the Rule 609(a) question).