Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Sepahi, 78 P.3d 732.

80 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. Hon. marner/haniffa Ariz. 2026
State of Arizona v. Hon. marner/haniffa Ariz. 2026
¶ 12 (2003) (“[T]he defendant need not know the victim’s age to be subject to sentencing under [the DCAC statute], but rather .
State of Arizona v. Dominick Cooke 562 P.3d 44 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2024
State of Arizona v. Dominick Cooke 562 P.3d 44 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2024
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Indeed, a DCAC conviction requires a finding not required for dangerous offenses, namely, that the defendant “focused on, directed against, aimed at, or target[ed] a victim under the age of fifteen.” ().
State v. Osborne Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Osborne Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
¶ 19 (App. 2004) ( substantially rejected the reasoning behind Samano).
State of Arizona v. Allyn Akeem Smith 475 P.3d 558 Ariz. 2020
State of Arizona v. Allyn Akeem Smith 475 P.3d 558 Ariz. 2020
–23 ¶¶ 10, 12, 324 ¶ 19 (2003) (holding that defendant committed a DCAC where he shot a fourteen-year-old in the stomach; the court concluded that such conduct was “directed, aimed at, and targeted .
State v. Mora Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Mora Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
324, ¶¶ 8, 19 (2003) (quotation omitted); A.R.S.
State v. Crews Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Crews Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. McMorris Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. McMorris Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Farnsworth 389 P.3d 88 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
State v. Farnsworth 389 P.3d 88 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
State of Arizona v. Pamela Jacqueline Williams 343 P.3d 470 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
State of Arizona v. Pamela Jacqueline Williams 343 P.3d 470 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
5 STATE v. WILLIAMS Opinion of the Court turns out to be a child, even if the defendant quite reasonably believed to the contrary at the time the crime was committed.” quoting Williams, 175 Ariz. at 103, 854 P.2d at 136 (“We hold only that the victim must be the person against whom the crime is directed, not that the accused must know the person is under fifteen.”) (emphasis omitted).
State v. Rodriguez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Rodriguez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
¶21 In order for a defendant to be sentenced under the DCAC statute, his criminal “conduct must be focused on, directed against, aimed at, or target a victim under the age of fifteen.” ¶ 19
State of Arizona v. Kyle Evan Smith Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
State of Arizona v. Kyle Evan Smith Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
“[A] statute‟s language is the most reliable index of its meaning.”
State v. Villegas 258 P.3d 162 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
State v. Villegas 258 P.3d 162 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
Neeme Systems Solutions, Inc. v. Spectrum Aeronautical, LLC 250 P.3d 1206 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Neeme Systems Solutions, Inc. v. Spectrum Aeronautical, LLC 250 P.3d 1206 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
(declining to “expand the clear language of [Rule 55(a)(1)(i) ]”); ¶ 15 , (“It is a universal rule that courts will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a statute [or rule] to matters not falling within its express provisions.”) (citation omitted).
STATE EX REL. INDUS. COM'N v. Galloway 230 P.3d 708 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
STATE EX REL. INDUS. COM'N v. Galloway 230 P.3d 708 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
In Re Casey G. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
In Re Casey G. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
T.P. Racing, L.L.L.P. v. Arizona Department of Racing 222 P.3d 280 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
T.P. Racing, L.L.L.P. v. Arizona Department of Racing 222 P.3d 280 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State v. Gurrola 199 P.3d 693 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. Gurrola 199 P.3d 693 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. Aguilar 178 P.3d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
State v. Aguilar 178 P.3d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s construction.’ ”
State of Arizona v. James Prentiss Coghill Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
State of Arizona v. James Prentiss Coghill Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
State v. Fernandez 169 P.3d 641 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Fernandez 169 P.3d 641 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
In State v. Sepahi, our supreme court reaffirmed its holding in Williams that the sentencing enhancement applied only when defendant’s conduct was “focused on, directed against, aimed at, or target[ed] a victim under the age of fifteen.” ¶ 19
State of Arizona v. Thomas Giles Connolly 163 P.3d 1082 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
State of Arizona v. Thomas Giles Connolly 163 P.3d 1082 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
(“[A] statute’s language is the most reliable index of its meaning.”).
State of Arizona v. Francisco Lazaro Gonzalez, Jr. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
State of Arizona v. Francisco Lazaro Gonzalez, Jr. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
“[A] statute’s language is the most reliable index of its meaning.”
Picaso v. Tucson Unified School District 154 P.3d 364 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
Picaso v. Tucson Unified School District 154 P.3d 364 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
Rent-A-Car & Leasing, Inc.
State of Arizona v. Walter James Mangum Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
State of Arizona v. Walter James Mangum Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
apply[] the language without using other means of statutory construction”), (“In the end, a statute’s language is the most reliable index of its meaning.”).
Robbins v. Darrow 148 P.3d 1164 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Robbins v. Darrow 148 P.3d 1164 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
When a statute is clear and unambiguous, “we apply its plain language and need not engage in any other means of statutory interpretation.” ¶ 14 , ¶ 16 , (statutory language “is the most reliable index of its meaning.”).