Cited by

ing circumstances any factors “relevant in determining whether to impose a sentence less than death, including any aspect of the defendant’s character, propensities or record and any of the circumstances of the offense”); Rushing, 573 P.3d at 87 ¶ 43 (“[A] jury cannot consider ‘mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.’” ( ¶ 84 (2005))).

And a jury cannot consider “mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.” ¶ 84 (2005) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 540 (1987)); see also Brown, 479 U.S. at 545 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant’s background, character, and crime rather than mere sympathy or emotion.” (emphasis

¶ 36 (2005) (“[T]he main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross- examination.”) (cleaned up).

The court also minimized any risk of unfair prejudice by instructing the jury it “[m]ust not be influenced by sympathy or prejudice.” ¶¶ 85–87 (2005).

¶¶ 40–43 (2005), supplemented by (describing circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer a conscious disregard of a substantial risk of harm).

¶ 37, supplemented, (finding no Confrontation Clause violation and explaining that unrelated information sought through cross-examination could have confused the jury).

¶ 42 (2005); ¶ 7 (App. 1998)

cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.’” ¶ 36 (2005) (quoting State v. Cañez, ¶ 62 (2002)).

cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.’” ¶ 36 (2005) (citations omitted).

¶ 36 (2005) (citation omitted).

We rejected a –71 ¶¶ 81–87 (2005), –87 ¶¶ 51–56 (2010), and Johnson provides no reason to revisit those decisions.

State v. Carreon , , ¶ 36, (quoting State v. Cañez , , ¶ 62, ).

¶ 39 (2005) (“[A] defendant places a person in substantial risk if he places the victim in actual substantial risk of imminent death.”) (quotation omitted).

See Phillips, 208 Ariz. at 286 ¶ 20; ¶¶ 79–80 (2006); –69 ¶ 74 (2005).

¶9 In any event, Murphy's argument disregards the fact that the State's burden of proof at a suppression hearing – by a preponderance of the evidence, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.2(b) – is a lower burden than its burden at trial – beyond a reasonable doubt, ¶ 46 (2005) (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)).

Thus, “‘convictions [must] rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.’” quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995) (alteration in Carreon).

194, ¶¶ 11, 28, 89 (2005) (“Absent a showing that the prosecution was aware of any false testimony, the credibility of witnesses is for the jury to determine.”); ¶ 46, (noting that a person is convicted only if a jury finds the defendant guilty of each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt), supplemented by P.3d 1192 (2005).

¶ 46, (noting that a conviction requires that a jury find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on every element of the offense charged), supplemented by P.3d 1192 (2005).

-75 ¶¶ 101-09, -21 (2005) (applying Gordon analysis); ¶ 6, (consecutive sentences proper where crime of disorderly conduct committed against multiple victims); -81, -86 (App. 1989

The instruction appropriately directed the jury “‘to ignore only the sort of sympathy that would be totally divorced from the evidence.’” ¶ 84, (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542 (1987)).

-71 ¶¶ 81-87, -17 (2005).

-71 ¶¶ 81-87, -17 (2005).

-71 ¶¶ 81-87, -917 (2005).