Cited by

Aegis of Ariz., ¶ 44 (App. 2003); accord Alpha, ¶ 23 (App. 2013).

And no action taken before the Interpretation issued was an appealable “final decision.” See Aegis of Ariz., ¶ 33 (App. 2003) (zoning administrator’s initial decision whether a proposed use is permitted in a zone is not a final decision).

See Aegis of Ariz., ¶ 16 (App. 2003) (standing); –56, ¶¶ 7–8 (2012) (dismissal).

See Aegis of Ariz., ¶ 16 (App. 2003) (standing); –56, ¶¶ 7–8 (2012) (dismissal).

rial court’s ruling on the ground that “Othon does not have standing to contest the trial court’s prior order of default” because “issues of notice and service are personal to a defendant (Ms. Carreon), and cannot be validly asserted by a third party (Mr. Othon).” This is a question of law, and “we review the trial court’s standing determination de novo.” Aegis of Ariz.

See Aegis of Ariz., ¶ 16 (App. 2003).

¶7 “[T]o have standing, a plaintiff must have suffered injury in fact, economic or otherwise.” Aegis of Ariz., ¶ 18 (App. 2003) (internal quotation omitted).

Aegis of Ariz., ¶ 44 (App. 2003) (quoting Wedges/Ledges of California, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994)).

¶34 We ordinarily review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 6 (2018), but questions of standing and ripeness are reviewed de novo, –84 ¶ 11 (App. 2012) (ripeness); Aegis of Ariz., ¶ 16 (App. 2003) (standing).

Aegis of Ariz., -63, ¶ 18 (App. 2003).

Aegis of Ariz., ¶ 16 (App. 2003).

Aegis of Ariz., ¶ 34 (App. 2003).

See Aegis, L.L.C., v. Town of Marana, ¶ 34 (App. 2003).

of Maricopa Cty., ¶ 14 (App. 2009) (citing Aegis of Ariz., ¶ 34 (App. 2003)).

see also Aegis of Ariz., ¶ 54, (“To establish an equal protection violation, a party must .

Aegis of Ariz., ¶ 16 (App. 2003).

Aegis of Ariz., –63 ¶ 18, –22 (App. 2003).

See Aegis of Ariz., ¶ 54, (party asserting equal protection violation must first demonstrate treatment different from others in similarly situated class).

“To establish an equal protection violation, a party must____ show that it was treated differently than other people in the same ‘similarly situated’ class.” Aegis of Ariz., ¶54 , , (“The equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions have the same effect and generally require that all persons subject to state legislation shall be treated alike under similar ci

See Aegis of Ariz., -71, ¶ 54, -30 (App. 2003); see also United States v. Horton, 601 F.2d 319, 323-324 (7th Cir.), cert.

Aegis of Ariz., -71, ¶ 54, -30 (App. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

See Aegis of Ariz., ¶ 44 , (threshold requirement for procedural and substantive due process claims is “the plaintiffs showing of a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution”).

See Aegis of Ariz., ¶ 34 , Trustmark Ins.

As Mayor Smith stated during the meeting, however, the Council “has not heard any evidence that the tattoo business is detrimental to a neighborhood other than the perception.” Although we agree with Mesa it can appropriately consider citizens’ viewpoints in deciding whether a commercial business is appropriately located in a particular neighborhood, see Aegis of Ariz., ¶ 49 , we do not agree Mesa can constitutionally deny a Permit for a tattoo parlor, thereby restricting the exercise of free ex

If a decision does not ‘conclusively determine’ an issue but, rather, ‘leaves open the possibility’ that the decision is subject to change, then it is not final or ripe for review and cannot support a § 1983 claim.” , 567-68, , 1026-27 (App.2003) (citing Williamson, 473 U.S. at 193-94 , 105 S.Ct.

Aegis of Ariz., , ¶ 16, , 1021 (App. 2003).

Aegis of Ariz., -63, ¶ 18 , -22 (App.2003) (quotations and citations omitted).

"In reviewing a judgment based on a jury verdict, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the judgment.” Aegis of Ariz, ¶ 2 , (citation omitted).

Aegis of Ariz., , 562-63, ¶ 18, , 1021-22 (App. 2003) (quotations omitted).

¶14 AWC also argues “[t]he City failed to seek administrative recourse before the Commission and thus the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.” “Generally, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before appealing to the courts.” Aegis of Ariz.

Aegis of Ariz., -71, ¶54 , -30 (App.2003); Lindsay v. Cave Creek Outfitters, L.L.C., ¶25

See, e.g., Aegis of Ariz., Golonka v. Gen.