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“Error, be it constitutional or otherwise, is harmless if we can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict.” ¶ 39 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

7 Although the court also must “give upon request an appropriate limiting instruction,” Hargrave, 225 Ariz. at 8 ¶ 10 ( ¶ 33 (2008)), Hanley does not challenge the appropriate Rule 404(b) limiting instruction given by the superior court in this case.

¶ 39 (2008) (“Error, be it constitutional or otherwise, is harmless if we can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict.”).

¶ 8 (App. 2009) (finding an error is harmless if “the actual verdict rendered ‘was surely unattributable to the error’” ( ¶ 39 (2008))).

¶ 39 (2008) (“The State has the burden of convincing us that any error was harmless.”); ¶ 18 (2005) (noting harmless error analysis, applicable where a timely objection was improperly overruled, “places the burden on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the er

¶ 33 (2008) (quoting Ariz. R. Evid.

is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.”

¶ 16 (2009) (“In assessing the impact of an erroneous instruction, we also consider the attorneys’ statements to the jury.”); ¶ 40 (2008) (explaining that the child molestation allegation that was improperly admitted “was not a passing reference, but rather a repeated theme of the State’s closing argument”).

(state’s burden exceeds “whether the jury was justified in its verdict”).

¶ 41 (2008) (“We can find error harmless when the evidence against a defendant is so overwhelming that any reasonable jury could only have reached one conclusion.”).

or he would take [her] somewhere into — on the stage,” she would “get on the floor,” and Blythe would “get on top of [her] and go up and down.” sexual propensity to commit the offense charged.” Before a court admits prior act evidence, it must find “clear and convincing proof both as to the commission of the other bad act and that the defendant committed the act.” ¶ 33 (2008).

§ 13-3987 (disallowing reversal for error that did not actually, or did not tend to, prejudice the defendant in respect to a substantial right); ¶ 39, (stating error is harmless if we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict).

is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” ¶ 39, ( ).

Under that standard, the question “‘is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’”

is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” ¶ 39, (citation omitted).

¶5 “[W]here a motion in limine is made and ruled upon, the objection raised in that motion is preserved for appeal, despite the absence of a specific objection at trial.” ¶ 38, ( ).

(erroneous admission of unreliable other-act evidence not harmless, despite limiting instruction, where state repeatedly asserted other-act allegation).