Cited by

“[M]ercy is not a mitigating circumstance” but is a “concept jurors may apply in evaluating the existence of mitigating circumstances.” ¶¶ 47–49 (2007)

¶ 67 (2007) (rejecting the same argument), ¶ 20 (2012).

Undoubtedly, as Riley argues, the death penalty “should be reserved for cases in which either the manner of the commission of the offense or the background of the defendant places the crime ‘above the norm of first-degree murders.’” ¶ 45 (2002) (quoting Hoskins, 199 Ariz. at 163 ¶ 169); ¶ 43 (2007) (“[J]urors must assess whether the murder was so cruel that it rose above the norm of first degree murders.”).

¶55 Silva argues the superior court erred by failing to instruct the jurors that a deadlocked jury was acceptable and further admonishing them not to surrender their firmly held beliefs.

Arizona Rule 22.4 of Criminal Procedure permits the trial court when advised by the jury that it has reached an impasse in its deliberations, “to inquire how it can assist the jury in its deliberations.” ¶ 55

“[I]t is fundamental error for the trial court to fail to give a lesser-included offense instruction if one is supported by the evidence.” ¶ 32, (emphasis added).

The error, however, was not fundamental, considering the strength of the aggravators proved, ¶ 90, (“multiple homicides aggravator is of extraordinary weight”), and the weakness of the good inmate mitigator, ¶ 74, (weak mitigator), abrogated on other grounds by Ferrero, 229 Ariz. at 243 ¶ 20, 274 P.3d at 513; see also Roque, 213 Ariz. at 222 ¶ 117, 141 P.3d at 397 (“To warrant reversal, any error [in excluding mitigating evidence] must also have prejudiced [the defendant].”).

We will affirm the jury’s finding “if there is any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it,” Morris, 215 Ariz. at 341 ¶ 77, 160 P.3d at 220 (internal quotation marks omitted), and view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the jury’s finding, ¶ 41 n.5, n.5 (2007).

¶ 66, (finding cruelty where “[d]efensive wounds on [the victim’s] hands and wrists indicate that he was conscious for at least some of the attack and thus knew his wife was attacking him”), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Ferrero, 229 Ariz. 239, 274

¶ 17, abrogated in part on other grounds by Ferrero, 229 Ariz. at 243 ¶ 20, 274 P.3d at 513.

State v. Andriano, 215 Ariz. 497, 510

¶15 We previously said that “evidence is ‘intrinsic’ when [1] evidence of the other act and evidence of the crime charged are ‘inextricably intertwined’ or [2] both acts are part of a ‘single criminal episode’ or [3] the other acts were ‘necessary preliminariesʼ to the crime charged.” ¶ 18, ( n.7, n.7 (1996)); see Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. at 248 ¶ 56, 25 P.3d at 736 (also quoting Dickens).

“We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.” ¶ 17

State v. Andriano, 215 Ariz. 497, 510, ¶¶ 61–62

-59 ¶ 26 n.3, -10 (2008); ¶¶ 42-43, Tucker, 215 Ariz. at 310-11 ¶¶ 30, 33, 160 P.3d at 189-90.

-46 (2007) (“Even though not intrinsic to the crime charged, ‘other act’ evidence may nonetheless be admissible” under a different evidentiary rule “as long as its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”).

¶ 67, (citing Trostle, 191 Ariz. at 18, 951 P.2d at 883).

¶ 43, see also Johnson, 212 Ariz. at 431-32 ¶ 20, 133 P.3d at 741-42.

State v. Andriano, 215 Ariz. 497, 502 ¶ 17