Cited by

(rejecting interpretation that would “draw arbitrary distinctions based merely on whether a prior charge was by information or indictment”); Wheeler v. Yuma Sch.

¶ 11 (2006) (explaining that a court’s “primary objective in construing statutes adopted by initiative is to give effect to the intent of the electorate”); ¶ 9 (2018) (explaining that “courts must not intrude on the people’s power to legislate” and that voter-enacted laws are “

of Pima, –96 ¶ 18 (2021) (“[W]hen the relevant text allows, we construe statutes to comply with constitutional requirements.”); ¶ 12 (2015) (“If the statute is subject to only one reasonable interpretation, we apply it without further analysis.”); ¶ 11 (2006) (“When the language is clear and unambiguous, and thus subject to only one reasonable meaning, we .

When interpreting statutes adopted by initiative, our primary objective is “to give effect to the intent of the electorate.”

¶8 Likewise, a trial court has no inherent power to impose probation, but it is “a matter of legislative grace.” n.6 (2006).

(quoting State v. (Melissa J.) Gomez, ¶ 11 (2006)).

for Magma Copper Co., and we “construe statutes, when possible, to avoid constitutional difficulties,” ¶ 28 (2006).

¶11 In considering the text of the Rule, “[w]hen the language is clear and unambiguous, and thus subject to only one reasonable meaning,” the court applies “the language without using other means of statutory construction.” ¶ 11 (2006); see also A.R.S.

¶ 12 (2018); ¶ 31 (2006).

“Our primary objective in construing statutes adopted by initiative is to give effect to the intent of the electorate.” ¶ 11 (2006).

Because AMMA was voter-initiated, our primary objective is “to give effect to the intent of the electorate.” ¶ 6 (2015) ( ¶ 11 (2006)); ¶ 7 (2012) (“[C]ourts liberally construe initiative requirements and do not interfere with the people’s right to initiate laws ‘unless the Constitution expressly and explicitly makes any departure from initiative filing requirements fatal.’”) (quotin

¶10 “Our primary objective in construing statutes adopted by initiative is to give effect to the intent of the electorate.” ¶ 11 (2006); ¶ 10 (App. 2015).

16, ¶¶ 11–12 (App. 2017) (absent from the definition of “owner,” a concept around which the Prompt Pay Act is framed, is “any form of government, government agency, or political subdivision”); ¶ 35 (2006) (“In construing statutes, we apply their plain language unless doing so would lead to an absurd, illegal, or unconstitutional result.”).

A reviewing court’s “primary objective in construing statutes adopted by initiative is to give effect to the intent of the electorate.” ¶ 11

“‘Our primary objective in construing statutes adopted by initiative is to give effect to the intent of the electorate.’” Id.

¶ 3 (2006) ( ¶ 15 (2001)).

§ 13–901.01(B) excludes violent offenders from the mandatory probation otherwise afforded by Proposition 200.” ¶ 20 (2006); see A.R.S.

4 STATE v. MATLOCK Opinion of the Court This case requires us to determine whether a transfer between registered qualifying patients for something of value is improper.2 ¶10 “Our primary objective in construing statutes adopted by initiative is to give effect to the intent of the electorate.”

“Our primary objective in construing statutes adopted by initiative is to give effect to the intent of the electorate.” ¶ 11

Concluding the State and city must be considered a single entity 2 “Arizona law allows a prosecuting attorney to proceed with felony charges by way of an indictment, which reflects a grand jury’s determination that probable cause exists to believe the defendant has committed the charged offense, or by information.” -60, ¶ 25, -78 (2006) (citing Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 30; ).