State v. Crawford

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc

STATE OF ARIZONA, ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CR-06-0205-PR
Appellee, )
) Court of Appeals
v. ) Division One
) No. 1 CA-CR 04-0999
JOHN DAVID CRAWFORD, )
) Maricopa County
Appellant. ) Superior Court
) No. CR2004-011318-001 DT
)
)
) O P I N I O N
__________________________________)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Thomas W. O'Toole, Judge

VACATED; REMANDED
_______________________________________________________________

Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One
Filed Feb. 16, 2006

VACATED
________________________________________________________________

John David Crawford Buckeye
In Propria Persona

TERRY GODDARD, ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL Phoenix
By Randall M. Howe, Chief Counsel,
Criminal Appeals Section
Joseph T. Maziarz, Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for the State of Arizona
________________________________________________________________

H U R W I T Z, Justice

¶1 Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 13-604 (Supp.

2004) subjects a criminal defendant who has a “prior historical

felony conviction” to enhanced sentences. See A.R.S. § 13-

604(W)(2) (defining “prior historical felony conviction”). If

the prior conviction occurred “in any court outside the

jurisdiction of this state,” it is treated as a prior historical

felony conviction only if it involves “an offense which if

committed within this state would be punishable as a felony.”

A.R.S. § 13-604(N). The issue in this case is how a court

determines whether a foreign conviction involves an offense that

would be punishable as a felony under state law if committed

here.

I.

¶2 John David Crawford was convicted after a jury trial

of one count of burglary in the first degree, a class 2 felony

under A.R.S. § 13-1508 (2001), and two counts of aggravated

assault, class 3 felonies under A.R.S. § 13-1204 (Supp. 2004).

The State sought enhanced sentences under A.R.S. § 13-604(D),

alleging that Crawford had two historical prior felony

convictions.

¶3 Crawford admitted the prior convictions, but claimed

that one did not qualify as a historical prior felony under

A.R.S. § 13-604(N). That conviction occurred in the United

States District Court for the District of Arizona in 2003, after

Crawford pled guilty to one count of an indictment alleging that

he had violated 18 United States Code (“U.S.C.”) § 1708 by

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possessing a credit card stolen from the United States mail.

Crawford contended that the federal conviction did not meet the

statutory definition of a prior historical felony conviction

because 18 U.S.C. § 1708 can be violated by conduct that would

not constitute a felony under Arizona law.

¶4 The State did not contest that the federal statute can

be violated by conduct that would not constitute a felony under

Arizona law. The State argued, however, that Crawford’s

actions, as described in the relevant count of the federal

indictment, would have violated either A.R.S. § 13-1802(a)(5)

(2001) (theft) or A.R.S. § 13-2102(a)(1) (2001) (credit card

theft), both felonies. After reviewing the allegations in the

federal indictment, the superior court agreed. Finding that

Crawford had two historical prior felony convictions, the court

imposed the presumptive sentences in A.R.S. § 13-604(D). 1

¶5 The court of appeals affirmed. State v. Crawford, 1

CA-CR 04-0999 (Ariz. App. Feb. 16, 2006) (mem. decision). We

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Because Crawford had committed the crimes for which he was
convicted while on probation, the superior court was required
under A.R.S. § 13-604.02 (2001) to impose no less than the
presumptive sentences specified in A.R.S. § 13-604(D) -- 15.75
years for the burglary conviction and 11.25 years for each of
the aggravated assault convictions.

If the superior court had found only one prior historical
felony conviction, sentencing would have been imposed pursuant
to § 13-604(B). The presumptive sentences would have been 9.25
years for the burglary and 6.5 years for the aggravated
assaults. Id.

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granted Crawford’s petition for review because defining the

method by which a court determines whether convictions in other

jurisdictions should be treated as historical prior felony

convictions involves a recurring issue in our criminal

jurisprudence. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section

5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 31.19.

II.

¶6 “[W]hether a foreign conviction constitutes a felony

in Arizona . . . raises an issue of law,” which we review de

novo. State v. Heath, 198 Ariz. 83, 84 ¶ 4, 7 P.3d 92, 93

(2000). The defendant’s admission of the prior conviction is of

no consequence in that legal analysis. “Although an admission

by a defendant at trial dispenses with the necessity of proof of

prior convictions, such an admission does not constitute proof

that the foreign conviction would have been a felony under

Arizona law.” Id.

A.

¶7 Before using a foreign conviction for sentencing

enhancement purposes under § 13-604, the superior court must

first conclude that the foreign conviction includes “every

element that would be required to prove an enumerated Arizona

offense.” State v. Ault, 157 Ariz. 516, 521, 759 P.2d 1320,

1325 (1988). The court makes this determination by comparing

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the statutory elements of the foreign crime with those in the

relevant Arizona statute. Id. (comparing California and Arizona

rape statutes to determine if prior California rape convictions

constituted “serious” crimes under previous version of A.R.S. §

13-604(S)); State v. Benenati, 203 Ariz. 235, 242 ¶¶ 24-26, 52

P.3d 804, 811 (App. 2002) (comparing Florida and Arizona robbery

statutes to determine if prior Florida robbery convictions

“constituted a prior felony conviction for sentencing purposes”

under A.R.S. § 13-604(N)). “[T]here must be strict conformity

between the elements of the [foreign] felony and the elements of

some Arizona felony before [A.R.S. § 13-604(N)] can apply.”

State v. Clough, 171 Ariz. 217, 219, 829 P.2d 1263, 1265-66

(App. 1992) (comparing Montana bad check statute with various

Arizona theft and fraud statutes).

¶8 The cases interpreting § 13-604 are consistent with

our case law involving the use of foreign convictions in capital

sentencing. The capital cases make plain that only the

“statutory definition of the prior crime, and not its specific

factual basis” can be considered in determining whether a

foreign conviction is treated as a “serious offense” and thus an

aggravating circumstance under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2). State v.

Henry, 176 Ariz. 569, 587, 863 P.2d 861, 879 (1993) (reviewing

California involuntary manslaughter statute to determine if a

statutory element of that crime involved violence in order to

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determine whether the California conviction was an aggravating

circumstance under previous version of A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2));

accord State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 216-17 ¶¶ 82-88, 141 P.3d

368, 391-92 (2006) (refusing to “look beyond the language of the

[foreign] statutes” to the complaint describing the defendant’s

conduct in determining whether prior California robbery

conviction constituted a “serious offense” under A.R.S. § 13-

703(F)(2)); State v. Schaaf, 169 Ariz. 323, 334, 819 P.2d 909,

920 (1991) (reviewing Nevada attempted murder statute to

determine if that crime involved violence and holding that

sentencing courts “may consider only the statute that the

defendant [was] charged with violating; it may not consider

other evidence”).

¶9 Under our precedents, the sentencing court focuses

solely on the elements of the foreign statute under which the

defendant was convicted, a purely legal issue, and is freed from

the burden of making factual determinations about the

defendant’s underlying conduct. We thus conserve judicial

resources by avoiding, “in effect, a second trial on defendant’s

prior conviction.” State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 511, 662

P.2d 1007, 1018 (1983) (involving previous version of § 13-

703(F)(2)); see also Schaaf, 169 Ariz. at 333, 819 P.2d at 919

(affirming the approach taken in Gillies).

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B.

¶10 The State acknowledges the general rule that prior

foreign convictions are to be analyzed for enhancement purposes

under § 13-604 only by comparing the elements of the foreign

statute to Arizona law, but nonetheless argues that State v.

Thompson, 186 Ariz. 529, 924 P.2d 1048 (App. 1996), supports the

result below. In Thompson, the court of appeals held that

“charging documents” could be examined to “pinpoint the

statutory basis of a prior conviction.” Id. at 532, 924 P.2d at

1051. Such documents could be used for “establishing that the

defendant was convicted under a particular subsection of a

foreign statute, if that subsection encompasses only conduct

that would constitute a felony in Arizona.” Id.

¶11 Thompson is of no avail to the State here. As we made

clear in Roque, Thompson allows use of a charging document “only

to narrow the foreign conviction to a particular subsection of

the statute that served as the basis of the foreign conviction”

and not to establish “the factual nature of the prior

conviction.” 213 Ariz. at 217 ¶ 88, 141 P.3d at 392. The

federal statute at issue here, 18 U.S.C. § 1708, has no

subsections. The courts below used the charging documents not

to “pinpoint” the subsection describing the crime for which

Crawford was convicted, but instead to establish the “factual

nature of the conviction.”

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III.

¶12 The courts below erred in using the federal indictment

to determine whether Crawford’s 2003 federal conviction was a

prior historical felony conviction under § 13-604(N). We

accordingly vacate Crawford’s sentence and the memorandum

decision of the court of appeals and remand to the superior

court for further sentencing proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

_______________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice

CONCURRING:

_______________________________________
Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice

_______________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice

_______________________________________
Michael D. Ryan, Justice

_______________________________________
W. Scott Bales, Justice

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