Cited by

¶77 We agree the references to “aggravating circumstances” and “cruel” were misstatements because the jury found one aggravating circumstance and rejected “especially cruel.” See State v. Lynch (“Lynch I”), ¶ 84 (2010) (explaining “the (F)(6) aggravator is a single aggravating circumstance that can be established in alternative ways”).

State v. (Shawn P.) Lynch, ¶ 77 (2010).

o stand trial despite his mental health history, and Moore’s participation in the hearing on his motions to represent himself and to waive a jury trial gave the court no reason to suspect he was unable to understand the nature and consequences of the waivers or make “reasoned choice[s] among the alternatives presented.” See Cornell, at 322-23 (internal quotation omitted); ¶ 18 (2010) (finding the trial court did not err in denying a request for a second competency evaluation when prior experts c

¶14 Under Tison’s “reckless indifference” inquiry, the state must prove the defendant “subjectively appreciated that [his] acts were likely to result in the taking of innocent life.” ¶ 43 (2010) (quoting Tison, 481 U.S. at 152).

¶ 73 (2010) (“[T]he [pecuniary gain] aggravator requires only that the desire for pecuniary gain motivated the murder.”).

The State must prove that the defendant “subjectively appreciated that [his] acts were likely to result in the taking of innocent life.” ¶ 43 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tison, 481 U.S. at 152).

¶14 A trial court does not err in refusing to order a second competency hearing where a defendant proffers “no new information to call into question the court’s previous finding of competency.” ¶ 18 (2010).

He relies on State v. Lynch (Lynch I), P.3d 595 (2010), in which we held that the trial court’s erroneous instruction that the (F)(6) aggravator was three separate aggravating factors and the prosecutor’s highlighting of that instruction during arguments constituted reversible error.

We remanded for a new penalty-phase proceeding on the murder conviction in State v. Lynch (Lynch I), ¶ 89

¶ 28, –05 ¶¶ 18–20, –80 (2006).

In assessing whether to strike a juror, the judge must consider “the entirety of [the juror’s] answers and demeanor.” ¶ 28

¶61 Finally, -43 ¶¶ 82-88, -11 (2010), Miller argues that the trial court committed fundamental and structural error by failing to sua sponte instruct the penalty phase jury not to double count Miller’s motivation.

¶ 79, (finding mental anguish when conscious victim was bound to chair).

¶43 Although Juror 51 indicated at times that she could set aside her religious beliefs about the death penalty, the judge must consider “the entirety of [the juror’s] answers.” ¶ 28

¶¶ 69-73, (finding on independent review that use of the victim’s bank cards after the murder, along with other evidence, was sufficient to establish the (F)(5) aggravator).

The court may not strike a juror because he or she “voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.” Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968); -35 ¶ 26, -03 (2010).

See State v. Lynch, 225 Ariz. 27, 41 ¶ 79, State v. Djerf, 191 Ariz. 583, 596 ¶ 49, –05, –08 (1993) (“The fact that [the victim’s] hands were bound indicates that she was conscious and tied-up to prevent