Cited by

¶ 51 (2011) ( ¶ 27 (2009)).

See, ¶ 157 (2013); ¶ 89 (2009); ¶ 141 (2009).

233 Ariz. at 554 ¶ 14, 315 P.3d at 1211 ; see also State v. Kiles , , 35-36 ¶¶ 46-50, , 184-85 (2009) (change of venue denied despite ten years of media coverage).

is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel.” ¶ 45 n.13 (2009) (quoting Ariz. R. Crim.

Effective Assistance of Counsel ¶11 A criminal defendant’s claim that she was completely denied her right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings is cognizable on direct appeal, as illustrated above.3 See, ¶¶ 3, 39-45, 183-84 (2009); Moody, ¶¶ 1, 23, 968 P.2d at 578-79, 582.

¶¶ 41- 42, (rejecting claim of complete deprivation of counsel under Cronic, reasoning “[t]he most that can be said is that there were delays [in appointment of counsel] and allegations of poor professional conduct.”); ¶¶ 62–64, (200

State v. Kiles (Kiles II), ¶ 92 n.20, n.20 (2009) (quoting Andriano, 215 Ariz. at 510 n.9, 161 P.3d at 553 n.9).

See ¶¶ 21-22, (although prosecutor noted time required to premeditate could be “instantaneous,” argument properly focused on premeditation evidence).

¶78 Naranjo has not argued that “he was effectively deprived of counsel” at a critical stage of the proceedings, ¶ 42, and the record does not establish that his trial counsel “entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing,” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659.

equires only that the defendant intend to engage in illegal conduct and that he take a step to further that conduct”); (travelling to intended victim’s house while armed under circumstances inferring intent to assault victim sufficient to establish attempted aggravated assault under §§ 13-1001 and 13- 1204(A)(2)); ¶¶ 51-52, (capital defendant’s conviction for attempted aggravated assault not prior felony conviction involving use or threat of violence “because Arizona’s attempt statute permits a

Section 13-503 therefore precludes evidence of voluntary intoxication when considering premeditation.6 ¶ 29, (rejecting argument under former § 13-503 that defendant “may 6 Boyston also argues, in a footnote, that the trial court erred in precluding evidence of his voluntary intoxication during the aggravation phase.

See State v. Kiles, 222 9 Ariz. 25, 31 ¶ 21, (finding no fundamental error in prosecutor’s arguments “that the time required to actually premeditate could be ‘instantaneous,’” because “he made clear that such was not the case in this matter [and h]is argument focused on the circumstant

“The Court reviews de novo whether a jury instruction accurately reflects the law.” ¶ 27

We “consider the quality and the strength, not simply the number, of aggravating and mitigating factors.” ¶ 50, (quoting State v. Kiles (Kiles II), ¶ 62, ).

¶ 53 , (explaining “that the decision of an appellate court in a case is the law of the case ...