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¶ 22 n.8 (2009) (stating argument raised for first time in reply brief was waived because “opening briefs must present significant arguments, supported by authority, setting forth an appellant’s position on the issues raised” ()).

¶ 51 (2011) ( ¶ 27 (2009)).

See, ¶ 157 (2013); ¶ 89 (2009); ¶ 141 (2009).

233 Ariz. at 554 ¶ 14, 315 P.3d at 1211 ; see also State v. Kiles , , 35-36 ¶¶ 46-50, , 184-85 (2009) (change of venue denied despite ten years of media coverage).

is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel.” ¶ 45 n.13 (2009) (quoting Ariz. R. Crim.

Effective Assistance of Counsel ¶11 A criminal defendant’s claim that she was completely denied her right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings is cognizable on direct appeal, as illustrated above.3 See, ¶¶ 3, 39-45, 183-84 (2009); Moody, ¶¶ 1, 23, 968 P.2d at 578-79, 582.

¶¶ 41- 42, (rejecting claim of complete deprivation of counsel under Cronic, reasoning “[t]he most that can be said is that there were delays [in appointment of counsel] and allegations of poor professional conduct.”); ¶¶ 62–64, (200

State v. Kiles (Kiles II), ¶ 92 n.20, n.20 (2009) (quoting Andriano, 215 Ariz. at 510 n.9, 161 P.3d at 553 n.9).

See ¶¶ 21-22, (although prosecutor noted time required to premeditate could be “instantaneous,” argument properly focused on premeditation evidence).

¶78 Naranjo has not argued that “he was effectively deprived of counsel” at a critical stage of the proceedings, ¶ 42, and the record does not establish that his trial counsel “entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing,” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659.

equires only that the defendant intend to engage in illegal conduct and that he take a step to further that conduct”); (travelling to intended victim’s house while armed under circumstances inferring intent to assault victim sufficient to establish attempted aggravated assault under §§ 13-1001 and 13- 1204(A)(2)); ¶¶ 51-52, (capital defendant’s conviction for attempted aggravated assault not prior felony conviction involving use or threat of violence “because Arizona’s attempt statute permits a

Section 13-503 therefore precludes evidence of voluntary intoxication when considering premeditation.6 ¶ 29, (rejecting argument under former § 13-503 that defendant “may 6 Boyston also argues, in a footnote, that the trial court erred in precluding evidence of his voluntary intoxication during the aggravation phase.

See State v. Kiles, 222 9 Ariz. 25, 31 ¶ 21, (finding no fundamental error in prosecutor’s arguments “that the time required to actually premeditate could be ‘instantaneous,’” because “he made clear that such was not the case in this matter [and h]is argument focused on the circumstant

“The Court reviews de novo whether a jury instruction accurately reflects the law.” ¶ 27

We “consider the quality and the strength, not simply the number, of aggravating and mitigating factors.” ¶ 50, (quoting State v. Kiles (Kiles II), ¶ 62, ).

¶ 53 , (explaining “that the decision of an appellate court in a case is the law of the case ...