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We review the interpretation of rules de novo, “apply[ing] ‘fundamental principles of statutory construction, the cornerstone of which is the rule that the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s construction.’” ¶¶ 6–7 (2007) (citation omitted).

¶ 11 (2020); ¶ 6 (2007).

“[T]he best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s construction.” ¶ 7 (2007) (citations omitted).

¶21 provides an example of a valid exercise of legislative authority regarding restitution pursuant to § 2.1(D).

¶ 7 (2007) (stating a statute’s language is “the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning” (quoting Deer Valley Unified Sch.

The legislature possesses authority to enact substantive laws, ¶¶ 9–10 (2007), but may also enact “procedural laws to define, implement, preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to victims” by the Victim’s Bill of Rights, Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1 (“VBR”).

“[T]he best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s construction.” ¶ 7 (2007).

¶¶ 7–8 (2007) (holding that if the court is unable to harmonize an apparently conflicting statute and rule, it must determine whether the matter regulated is procedural or substantive, and if substantive, then the statute prevails).

To construe statutes, “we apply fundamental principles of statutory construction, the cornerstone of which is the rule that the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s construction.” ¶ 7 (2007).

State v. Hansen , , 289 ¶ 7, , 168 (2007) (citation omitted).

3 DIGNITY v. FARMERS Decision of the Court ¶6 “[T]he best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s construction.” ¶ 7 (2007) (citation omitted).

Seisinger , , ¶ 24, ; see also State v. Hansen , , ¶ 7, ("Rules and statutes 'should be harmonized wherever possible and read in conjunction with each other.'

289 ¶ 8, 291 ¶ 18, , 168, 170 (2007).

See State v. Hansen , , 289, ¶ 7, (Wherever possible, rules and statutes should be harmonized and read in conjunction with one another.).

¶ 8 (2014) ( ¶ 7 (2007)).

“Rules and statutes should be harmonized wherever possible and read in conjunction with each other.” ¶ 7 (2007) (quotation omitted).

¶21 In addition to making part of Rule 66(D)(2) meaningless, Brenda’s interpretation contravenes the principle that “[r]ules and statutes should be harmonized wherever possible and read in conjunction with each other.” ¶ 7 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Phoenix of Hartford, Inc. v. Harmony Rests., Inc., ).

Thus, our legislature—as well as this Court, see Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 5; ¶ 9 (2007)—has clearly recognized the importance of a meaningful resolution of all claims in a capital defendant’s first post-conviction proceeding.

¶ 7 (2007) (“Rules and statutes should be harmonized wherever possible and read in conjunction with each other.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).