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3 STATE v. NAVARRO Decision of the Court ¶9 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, we view facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdict to determine “whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict.” ¶ 22 (2007).

“The relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 22 (2007) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)) (emphasis omitted).

When reviewing the evidence, the question is whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶22 (2007) (internal citation and quotations omitted).

Specifically, Dulin argues he is not the man in the surveillance video.3 ¶7 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “[t]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 22 (2007) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 2 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite the current version of statutes and ru

verdict.” ¶ 22 (2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Robinson argues insufficient evidence supports his conviction and, therefore, his sentence is excessive and illegal.2 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “[t]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 22 (2007) (citation omitted).

¶ 22 (2007); Rule 20(a).

Comm’n, ¶ 28 (2015) (); ¶ 20 (2007) ( and A.R.S.

“[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 22 (2007) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

¶ 22 (2007) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

“[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 22 (2007) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

Absent material revision after the date of an alleged offense, we cite a statute's current version.

“We review the sufficiency of evidence presented at trial only to determine whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict, ‘viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury verdict.’” ¶ 22 (2007) (citation omitted).

“In the absence of statutory definitions, we give words their ordinary meaning.” ¶ 20 (2007) (); see also A.R.S.

Because the superior court did not err in finding she was competent and her testimony was admissible, her credibility and “the weight and value to be given to [her] testimony are questions exclusively for the [fact-finder].” ¶ 27

¶¶ 17-21 (2007) (declining to interpret an “intent to use” mental state into the charge of possession).

“Substantial evidence is evidence that reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 22 (2007) (citation omitted).

The statute does not define “objects” or “goods.” Absent statutory definitions, courts generally apply common meanings, ¶ 20, and may resort to dictionary definitions, State ex rel.

Absent statutory definitions, courts generally give words their ordinary meaning, ¶ 20, and may look to dictionary definitions, State ex rel.