Cited by

¶¶ 34–35 (App. 2020) (finding alternate juror’s exposure to article relating to case did not affect verdict); ¶ 99 (2009) (restricting voir dire was harmless as to jurors that did not take part in deliberations).

¶ 67 (2009) (citation omitted).

¶ 134 (2009); ¶ 137 (2009).

(explaining the merger doctrine), –14 ¶¶ 57–63 (2009).

We defer to the trial court’s factual findings that are supported by the record and not clearly erroneous, and we “presume that a court is aware of the relevant law and applies it correctly in arriving at its rulings,”

¶ 82 (2009) (“To succeed on a conflict of interest claim, a defendant must prove the existence of an actual conflict that adversely affected counsel’s representation.”).

See, ¶¶ 81–83 (2009); Tucker, 205 Ariz. at 162–64 ¶¶ 19–33.

.”); ¶ 15 n.2 (2015) (“We reiterate that review of a ruling on a motion to suppress is limited to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.”); ¶ 17 (2009) (“A trial court ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed based solely on the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.”).

See, ¶ 27 (2009) (considering witness’s level of certainty); Alvarez, 145 Ariz. at 372 (same).

¶ 113 (2011); ¶ 121 (2009).

.”); ¶ 7 (2016); ¶ 15, n.2 (2015) (“We reiterate that review of a ruling on a motion to suppress is limited to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.”); ¶ 17 (2009) (“A trial court ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed based solely on the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.”); ¶ 9, n.1 (App. 2012).

residual doubt do[es] not constitute mitigation for sentencing purposes.” ¶ 133 (2009).

as are those who are “biased or prejudiced in favor of or against either of the parties.” Further, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 18.4(b) provides that “[o]n motion or on its own, the court must excuse a prospective juror or jurors from service in the case if there is a reasonable ground to believe that the juror or jurors cannot render a fair and impartial verdict.” ¶ 38 (2009) (stating a judge must remove a potential juror if that person’s “views may ‘prevent or substantially impair the pe

State v. Moore , , ¶ 17, ; see also State v. Leyvas , , ¶ 9, (fairness and reliability of challenged identification reviewed for clear abuse of discretion).

However, this Court has previously stated that “[o]nce a person is found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, claims of innocence or residual doubt do not constitute mitigation for sentencing purposes.” ¶ 133 (2009).

Cf. State v. Moore , , 10 ¶ 36, , 159 (2009) (finding no Morgan error when defendant "was allowed to question the jurors" and "[t]he trial court did not prevent defense counsel from asking life-qualifying questions").