Cited by

¶22 As this Court explained in State v. Villalobos, a “jury cannot be precluded from hearing mitigation evidence because it lacks a causal nexus to the murder,” but once the jury has heard all mitigation evidence, “‘there is no constitutional prohibition against the State arguing that evidence is not particularly relevant or that it is entitled to little weight.’” ¶ 38 (2010) ( ¶ 97 (2005)).

¶ 20 (2010) (citing authority).

¶ 36 (2010) (rejecting challenge to superior court’s refusal to permit expert testimony due to appellant’s failure to make offer of proof).

¶196 –83 ¶¶ 37–40 (2010), we addressed a similar claim.

¶ 39 (2010) (“[T]he state may fairly argue that the lack of a nexus to the crime diminishes the weight to be given alleged mitigation.”); State v. Pandeli (Pandeli II), ¶ 32 (2007) (“[T]he State never told jurors that they could not consider mitigation unrelated to the crime; it merely suggested

105 (requiring that, upon request, a superior court must give a limiting instruction when evidence is admissible for one purpose but not another); ¶ 20 (2010) (holding that any prejudice from the admission of other act evidence was “appropriately mitigated by the [limiting] instruction .

DISCUSSION ¶7 As applicable here, the decision to admit evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion, ¶ 19 (App. 2013) ( ¶ 18 (2010)), viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect,”

See Mott, 187 Ariz. at 545; Kuhs, 223 Ariz. at 387 ¶ 55; ¶ 20 (2010) (instructing the jury on the “limited purposes for which it could consider” other-acts evidence “appropriately mitigated” any prejudice).

Further, any prejudice caused by the testimony was mitigated by the court’s specific instruction to the jurors that they could not consider other-acts evidence “to determine the defendant’s character or character trait or to determine that the defendant acted in conformity with the defendant’s character or character trait and therefore committed the charged offenses.” ¶ 20 (2010) (concluding that limiting instruction reminding the jury “of the limited purposes for which it could consider” other-

A jury may only consider relevant mitigation factors, which “includ[e] any aspect of the defendant’s character, propensities or record and any of the circumstances of the offense.” § 13-751(G); ¶ 40 (2010) (“Relevance .

¶ 44 (2010); ¶ 10 (2003).

¶ 18 (2010) (citation omitted).

The admitted other act evidence was probative of the relevant issues at trial, and, thus, “was adversely probative in the sense that all good relevant evidence is.” ¶ 20 (2010) (concluding that other act 14 STATE v. CASTRO Decision of the Court evidence was not unfairly prejudicial in light of the defendant’s defenses, which made the other act evidence highly relevant); Stat

See supra ¶¶ 8–10; ¶ 22 (2010) (finding autopsy photographs 2 The State sought to introduce a total of eleven photographs.

¶ 14 (2010) (“The polygrapher’s request that Villalobos tell the truth to ‘get out of this hole’ was also permissible.”); (“Mere advice from the police that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth when unaccompanied by either a threat or a promise does n

¶36 Furthermore, the superior court properly instructed the jurors that they could not “convict [Gehon] of the crimes charged simply because [they found] that he committed these [other] acts, or that he had a character trait that predisposed him to commit the crimes charged.”8 ¶ 20 (2010) (explaining a final instruction reminding the jury of the “limited purposes for which it could consider” other-acts evidence “appropriately mitigated” any prejudice).

¶ 17 (2015) ( ¶ 20 (2010)).

asserts his statements were inadmissible because he did not answer the detectives’ questions or spontaneously speak to the officers; instead, he merely responded to a law enforcement command to tell his side of the story, which he characterizes as an “inherently coercive order.” ¶6 We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion, and defer to the court’s factual determinations.

¶¶ 19-20 (2010) (other-act evidence is admissible to rebut a defense).

¶¶ 37–39, (reasoning that prosecutor’s remark that “there is absolutely nothing mitigating about who he is in light 14 STATE V. LYNCH Opinion of the Court of what you’ve seen him do” was not