Cited by

¶ 12 (2010) (stating that “a conviction precludes review of the finding of probable cause made by a grand jury” ( n.3 ¶ 31 (2004))); A.R.S.

¶32 “A defendant alleging prosecutorial misconduct in a grand jury proceeding generally must seek relief from an adverse trial court ruling through special action rather than waiting to raise such issues on appeal.” ¶ 11 (2010).

to enhance charges.” “A defendant alleging prosecutorial misconduct in a grand jury proceeding generally must seek relief from an adverse trial court ruling through special action rather than waiting to raise such issues on appeal.” ¶ 11 (2010) (citing cases).

Although the court’s admission of expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 18 (2010), rulings involving the Confrontation Clause are reviewed de novo, ¶ 42 (2006).

Allen correctly notes that “death by asphyxiation is not per se especially cruel.” ¶ 33 (2010).

See Joseph, 230 Ariz. at 298-99, ¶ 10; ¶ 21 (2010).

Although a special action is the only means of obtaining appellate review of such a ruling, see State v. Snelling , , ¶ 11, Crosby has not provided this court with a copy of the motion or a transcript of the hearing on the motion.

if the expert reasonably relied on these matters in reaching his own conclusion.”); ¶¶ 19– 21, (holding no Confrontation Clause violation occurred because the medical examiner testified that she formed her own opinions after reading the autopsy report, was confronted and cross- examined about her opinions, and the autopsy report was not admitted into evidence).

¶ 10 We agree with Smith that this case is analogous to Bullcoming and that Smalling *102 acted only as a “conduit for another non-testifying expert’s opinion.” , ¶ 22

We review the trial court’s admission of expert testimony for abuse of discretion, ¶ 18, but review for 42 STATE V. GOUDEAU Opinion of the Court fundamental error any arguments raised for the first time on appeal.

See Joseph, 230 Ariz. at 298–99, ¶ 10; ¶ 21 (2010) (defendant’s confrontation rights not violated when autopsy report not admitted into evidence).

¶ 8; ¶¶ 19-20, Rogovich, 188 Ariz. at 42, 932 P.2d at 798.

¶83 A murder is especially cruel if the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that “‘the victim consciously experienced physical or mental pain prior to death, and the defendant knew or should have known that suffering would occur.’” ¶ 25, ( ).

at 170 ¶¶ 23–24, 244 P.3d at 1168; ¶ 20, (finding no Sixth Amendment violation when a testifying medical examiner offered opinions about cause of death based on review of photographs of the victim and autopsy report prepared by another pathologist).

n. 8 , , 417 n. 8 (2010) (when one issue dispositive, court need not reach other issues).

(F)(6) Aggravator 36 ¶77 To show that a murder is especially cruel, the state must “prove[] beyond a reasonable doubt that ‘the victim consciously experienced physical or mental pain prior to death, and the defendant knew or should have known that suffering would occur.’” ¶ 25, ( ).

1145, 1168 (2011) ( ¶ 25, ).

the death sentences imposed on the two convictions relating to Anna and Gabriel’s murders and impose life sentences for each of those convictions.7 See State 7 In view of this disposition, we do not address Wallace’s mitigation evidence, his various other issues raised on appeal, 20 v. Snelling, ¶ 38, (noting that a “death penalty may be imposed only if the state has proved the existence of at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted

Although the passage of time is a relevant factor for evaluating the victim’s uncertainty about her fate, ¶ 27, we have never required an instruction to this effect.

We have held that a medical examiner may offer an expert opinion based on review of reports and test results prepared by others, as long as the testifying expert does not simply “act as a conduit for another non- testifying expert’s opinion.” ¶ 19, (internal quotation marks omitted) ( ¶ 23, ).