Cited by

§ 13-701(D)(27), the catch-all provision, which broadly encompasses factors “relevant to the defendant’s character or background or to the nature or circumstances of the crime.” ¶ 1 (2009) (“[A] court may not, consistent with due process, increase a defendant’s maximum potential sentence based solely on a so-called ‘catch-all’ aggravator .

If we adopted it, the resulting uncertainty for licensed physicians who provide abortion services would violate due process, which requires that “the law must be sufficiently definite to avoid arbitrary enforcement.”

.’” Allen, 248 Ariz. at 368 ¶ 63 ( ¶¶ 9–10 (2009)).

¶¶ 10-11 (2009) (application of any “catch-all” aggravators without a finding of an enumerated aggravator is a violation of due process).

–66, ¶¶ 7, 11 (2009) (holding a superior court may rely on a “catch-all aggravator” to sentence the defendant within a range that does not exceed the presumptive sentence).

¶ 8-10 (2009) (finding a catch-all aggravator, “[a]ny other factors which the court may deem appropriate to the ends of justice,” “patently vague”).

¶ 7 (2009); State v. Dunbar, 2 CA-CR 2018-0064, 2020 WL 2060275, at *10, ¶ 41 (Ariz. App. Apr.

The “catch-all” aggravator is “patently vague” and would “give[] the sentencing court virtually unlimited post hoc discretion to determine whether the defendant’s prior conduct is the functional equivalent of an element of the aggravated offense.” ¶¶ 9–10 (2009).

Moreover, abundant evidence established 5 for the proposition that the catch-all aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague.

Aggravating a sentence based solely on the catch-all provision is improper, ¶ 12 (2009), but after the court identifies one of the factors in A.R.S.

¶16 To ensure due process of law, a criminal statute must not be “so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.” Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015); see U.S. Const. amend.

¶ 10 (2009) (holding that use of the catch-all provision as the sole factor to increase a defendant’s statutory maximum sentence violates due process).

¶4 P.3d 214 (2009), P.3d 1016 (App. 2009), are significant changes in the law that require us to grant relief.

Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 757 (1974).4 ¶10 Finally, this is not a case where Coulter received an aggravated sentence based on “‘[a]ny other factors which the court may deem appropriate to the ends of justice.’” 4 Coulter claims such a reading of the statute would “run afoul of Arizona’s ‘complex, multi-step sentencing scheme,’ under which the presumptive sentence ‘is to be imposed on the vast majority of first offenders who commit the crime.’” Here

¶¶ 10-11, (only aggravating factors specifically enumerated in A.R.S.

(citing State v. Schmidt, 220 Ariz. 563, 566 ¶ 10, ).

the functional equivalent of an element of an aggravated offense.”

¶ 10, (holding that use of vaguely defined statutory aggravator as sole factor to enhance sentence violated due process).

We recognize that pursuant to our supreme court’s , the trial court would have been prohibited from sentencing appellant to an aggravated prison term based solely on this catch-all factor.

On appeal, P.3d 214 (2009), to argue the court improperly sentenced him to an aggravated term.