Cited by

See Rule 32.2(a); ¶¶ 12-13 (2009) (holding untimely claims regarding the legality of a sentence are precluded under Rule 32.2(a)).

§ 13-4234(G)) (internal quotations omitted); P.3d 1175 (2009) (post-conviction claims must be timely presented).

Id.; ¶ 13 (2009) (noting "few exceptions" to "general rule of preclusion" for claims in untimely or successive petitions).

Id.; see also State 2 ¶ 13 (2009) (noting "few exceptions" to "general rule of preclusion" for claims in untimely petitions).

requires some transformative event, a ‘clear break from the past.’” ¶ 5 (App. 2015) ( ¶ 15 (2009)).

P. 32.2(a); ¶ 12 (2009).

Id.; ¶ 13 (2009) (noting “few exceptions” to “general rule of preclusion” for claims in untimely or successive petitions).

As our supreme court has explained, “[a]fter the legislature abolished direct appeals for pleading defendants” in 1992, “Rule 32.1 was amended to provide for an ‘of-right’ [post-conviction relief] proceeding” for such defendants, to be heard “in the court that rendered the challenged conviction or sentence.” , see also 1992 Ariz. Sess.

A “significant change in the law” is “a clear break from the past.” , 118 ¶ 15

P. 32.2(a) (defendant precluded from post-conviction relief based upon a ground that could have been raised on direct appeal); ¶ 12, (“Rule 32.2(a) precludes collateral relief on a ground that either was or could have been raised on direct appeal .

P. 32.4(a); ¶¶ 6–8 (App. 2014); ¶ 13 (2009) (noting “few exceptions” to “general rule of preclusion” for claims in untimely or successive petitions).

P. 32.2(a); ¶ 12 (2009).

“Any notice not timely filed may only raise claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h).” Id.; ¶ 13, (noting “few exceptions” to “general rule of preclusion” for claims in untimely or successive petitions).

“Any notice not timely filed may only raise 2 STATE v. VASQUEZ Decision of the Court claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h).” Id.; ¶ 13 (2009) (noting "few exceptions" to "general rule of preclusion" for claims in untimely or successive petitions).

P. 32.4(a); ¶ 13 (2009) (noting “few exceptions” to “general rule of preclusion” for claims in untimely or successive petitions).

A significant change in the law “requires some 2 STATE v. SOUCH Decision of the Court transformative event, a clear break from the past.” ¶ 15, (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

P. 32.2(a); ¶ 13 (2009) (holding that claims not excepted by Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g), or (h) were waived if not timely raised).

A significant change in the law is a “transformative event, a ‘clear break from the past.’”

A significant change in the law is a “transformative event, a ‘clear break from the past.’ ”

P. 32.4(a); ¶¶ 12–13 (2009) (other than claims excepted under Rule 32.2(b), post- conviction claim is waived if not timely raised); ¶ 4 (2008) (same).

¶5 “Rule 32 does not define ‘a significant change in the law.’”

“Any notice not timely filed may only raise claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h).” Id.; ¶ 13, (noting “few exceptions” to “general rule of preclusion” for claims in untimely or successive petitions).

“An appellate decision is not a significant change in the law simply because it is the first to interpret a statute.” State v. Shrum, 220 Ariz. 2 STATE v. BUSTOS Decision of the Court 115, 120, ¶ 21

P. 32.4(a); ¶ 13, (noting “few exceptions” to “the general rule of preclusion” for claims in untimely or successive petitions).

-20, ¶¶ 3-23, -80 (2009) (finding that a sentencing issue regarding the legality of a sentence was precluded as untimely even though no lawful authority allowed the sentence to be imposed).