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If “the elements of one offense materially differ from those of another—even if the two are defined in subsections of the same statute—they are distinct and separate crimes.” ¶ 16 (2009).

¶ 24 (2009); see also Ariz. R. Crim.

¶ 16 (2009) (“When the elements of one offense materially differ from those of another—even if the two are defined in subsections of the same statute— they are distinct and separate crimes.”); cf. Luviano, 255 Ariz. at 229, ¶ 13 (reasoning that language joining different subsections of a statute “indicates an in

“[T]he touchstone of the Sixth Amendment notice requirement is whether the defendant had actual notice of the charge, from either the indictment or other sources.” ¶ 29 (2009).

¶30 When considering the appropriateness of an amendment to an indictment, courts should not conflate Rule 13.5(b) and the notice requirement of the Sixth Amendment.3 ¶ 24 (2009).

¶ 16 (2009) (“When the elements of one offense materially differ from those of another—even if the two are defined in subsections of the same statute— they are distinct and separate crimes.”); (“An offense which requires different evidence or elements than the principal c

(finding the late allegation of prior convictions did not prejudice the defendant when pretrial disclosure materials gave notice of the State's intent to enhance his sentence with prior convictions); Benak, 199 Ariz. at 337, ¶ 17 (considering "discovery materials" in assessing whether notice was sufficient); ¶¶ 24, 27 (2009) (explaining "courts look beyond the indictment to determine whether defendants received actual notice of charges" for due process purposes and may consider pretrial disclosu

Defendants must receive “actual notice of the charges, from either the indictment or other sources.” ¶ 29 (2009).

To determine whether notice was adequate, “courts look beyond the indictment to determine whether defendants received actual notice of charges, and the notice requirement can be satisfied even when a charge was not included in the indictment.” ¶ 24 (2009) (considering whether Sixth Amendment notice requirement was satisfied by actual notice).

¶ 16 (App. 2003), –15, ¶¶ 21–28 (2009).

because it did not change either the nature of the offense charged nor did it prejudice [the defendant] in any way”); ¶ 24 (2009) (“[F]or Sixth Amendment purposes, courts look beyond the indictment to determine whether defendants received actual notice of charges, and the notice requirement can be satisfied even when a charge was not included in the indictment.”).

¶ 24 (2009); see also U.S. Const. amend.

¶ 24 (2009) (“[F]or Sixth Amendment purposes, courts look beyond the indictment to determine whether defendants received actual notice of charges, and the notice requirement can be satisfied even when a charge was not included in the indictment.”); (finding, under

-68, ¶¶ 19-20 (2005); ¶ 23 (2009) (violations of Rule 13.5(b) "do not fall into [the] category" of structural error).

to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations”); ¶ 29 (2009) (citations omitted) (“[T]he touchstone of the Sixth Amendment notice requirement is whether the defendant had actual notice of the charge, from either the indictment or other sources.”).

§ 13- 1203(A)(2) and (A)(3) have different elements and are therefore “distinctly different crimes”), they could be charged as three separate crimes without constitutional implications.

“We review for an abuse of discretion a court’s decision to permit the amendment of an indictment.” ¶ 16 (App. 2013).2 ¶7 The dates of the count 3–5 offenses are not elements of the charged crimes, so amending the date range did not lead to substantively 2 ¶ 26 (2009), Defendant contends we should apply a harmless error standard of review.

Instead, , which held that the assault offenses set forth in different subsections of A.R.S.

The rule itself limits this, however, “to correct mistakes of fact or remedy formal or technical defects.” Id.; ¶ 18, ¶ 5

3 STATE v. MENDOZA-SARAVIA Decision of the Court actual notice of charges[.]”2 ¶ 24 (2009).