Cited by

" State v. Prince , , ¶ 77, (citation omitted) (quoting State ex rel.

¶ 121 (2011) (stating a defendant’s expression of remorse is a non-statutory mitigating factor); ¶ 35 (2003) (same).

See State v. Prince , , 537 ¶ 80, , 1166 (2011).

¶ 80 (2011) (“Jurors are presumed to follow jury instructions.”).

¶3 In State v. Prince, our supreme court defined impermissible "stakeout questions" as questions that "'ask a juror to speculate or precommit to how that juror might vote based on any particular facts.'" ¶ 35 (2011) (quoting U.S. v. Fell, 372 F. Supp. 2d.

The prosecutor attempted to ascertain whether any of the jurors would be inclined not to follow the law because Nichols had “already suffered enough,” and stopped short of asking the panel “to speculate or precommit to how [they] might vote based on any particular facts.” ¶ 35 (2011) (citation omitted).

¶ 109, 542 ¶ 113, –71 (2011).

¶ 17, (observing that “§ 13-752(G) permits any evidence probative on [whether the defendant should be shown leniency], subject only to due process limitations”).

On appeal, Rivera argues that the questions were improper “stakeout questions” that sought to obtain some sort of commitment from the jurors about the outcome of the case, and relies on our supreme court’s P.3d 1145 (2011).

¶ 97, supplemented P.3d 1219 (2005); ¶ 90, (no fundamental error where prosecutor argued that defendant’s bad temper was not sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency but rather “should be aggravation” where State was precluded from retrying aggravators).

– 27 ¶¶ 16–18, –56 (2011); see also A.R.S.

¶23 A court may not strike a juror merely because he or she “voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.” State v. Prince (Prince II), ¶ 27, (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 68, (rejecting argument that victim impact evidence is irrelevant in the penalty phase because it focuses on the victim rather than the defendant).

“We review de novo whether jury instructions correctly state the law.”

13 PARKER v. CITY OF TUCSON Opinion of the Court ¶23 Thus, we hold that in order to circulate initiative petitions in Arizona, the circulator’s civil rights must have been restored by the state in which he or she was convicted.8 (“A juror convicted of an out-of- state felony whose civil rights have not been restored is disqualified from jury service by [A.R.S.]

4 STATE V. REEVES Opinion of the Court aggravation-phase evidence during a second penalty phase,” we recently held that “during a second penalty phase, the state and the defendant may introduce evidence pertaining to the aggravating circumstances previously found, subject to § 13–752(G)‘s general relevance standard.” ¶¶ 15, 18

“We review the record de novo and do not defer to the jury’s findings or decisions.” ¶ 93

State v. Prince (Prince II), ¶ 84

¶¶ 99-101, (finding especial cruelty supported by 39 evidence that victim saw the assailant attack her mother immediately before the murder).