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More recently, our Supreme Court noted that “voluntariness is ultimately a legal question” and explained that “[w]e review de novo whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be present at trial.” ¶ 8 (2011); ¶ 23 (2013) (quoting Lehr).

“Even a single partial juror violates a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.” ¶ 49 (2011) (quotation omitted).

Under the Due Process Clause, a criminal defendant is entitled to a “meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984); ¶ 39 (2011); U.S. Const. amend.

See Williams, 144 Ariz. at 442; ¶¶ 69–70 (2011) (finding the state's procedural error did not prejudice the defendant because the defendant "had notice of the prior convictions the State intended to use as aggravating circumstances").

¶ 39 (2011) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that ‘criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’”) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)).

¶ 19 (2011) (prior bad acts); ¶ 10 (App. 2015) (motion to suppress).

¶ 51 (2011) ( ¶ 27 (2009)).

The court, however, need not find that the other acts are “perfectly similar in order for evidence of them to be admitted under Rule 404.” 6 STATE v. OSBORNE Decision of the Court ¶ 21 (2011).

¶18 The failure to preserve potentially useful evidence, on the other hand, “does not constitute a denial of due process of law unless the defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police.” ¶ 41 (2011) (quotation omitted).

“Acts need not be perfectly similar in order for evidence of them to be admitted under Rule 404[c].” ¶ 21 (2011) (concluding, inter alia, that other act evidence with “extensive similarities” were admissible despite other differences in circumstance, including varied age of victims, involved in such acts).

But acts “need not be perfectly similar in order for evidence of them to be admitted under Rule 404.” ¶ 21 (2011).

P. 32.1(a) (conviction obtained in violation of United States or Arizona Constitution); ¶ 115 (2009) (“[J]uror misconduct warrants a new trial [only] if the defense shows actual prejudice or if prejudice may be fairly presumed from the facts.” (alteration in original) ()); ¶ 49 (2011).

¶20 The collateral estoppel component of double jeopardy does not prohibit the State “from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 349 (1990); ¶ 26 (2011) (“[A]dmission of evidence of other acts for which a defendant has been acquitted does not violate double jeopardy.”).

¶ 24 (2011) (finding harmless error when court failed to give a limiting instruction, focusing on State’s closing urging the jury to consider the evidence only for its proper purpose).

See, ¶ 21 (2011) (noting “[a]cts need not be perfectly similar in order for evidence of them to be admitted under Rule 404.”); ¶ 15 (2011) (noting similarities of victims; that “[i]n each case, a knife was used, the victim was restrained, and homicide was either threatened or occurre

¶22 A defendant has a due process right to have “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” ¶ 39 (2011).

so 2 McCormick on Evidence § 253 at 248 (Kenneth S. Broun, ed., 7th ed. 2013) ("Under the influence of the Confrontation Clause, a 6 STATE v. STONEHAM Decision of the Court higher standard of disability may be required in criminal cases for witnesses testifying against the accused."); ¶ 33 (2011) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68) ("The Confrontation Clause allows the admission of testimonial hearsay that satisfies the common law requirements of 'unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-

–54 (2011) (analyzing an amendment to a notice of aggravators under 13.5(a) and 13.5(b) when the time requirement under Rule 16.1(b) had not been met, the amendment would only be allowed if it was technical or to correct mistakes of fact).

Mueller has a due process right to have “’a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense,’” ¶ 39 (2011) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)), including to testify on her own behalf if she elects to do so, Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987); see also Ariz. Const. art 2, § 24