Cited by

ed and whether the ‘cumulative effect of the 6 STATE V. ROMERO Opinion of the Court [errors] shows that the prosecutor intentionally engaged in improper conduct and did so with indifference, if not a specific intent, to prejudice the defendant.’” (alterations in original) ( ¶ 46 (2010))); ¶ 68 (2022); ¶ 67 (2007); ¶ 31 (1998).

As discussed, Miller does not support a mistrial on this record

The superior court has discretion in determining whether a mistrial is appropriate, ¶ 6 (2010), and this court will not reverse the denial of a motion for mistrial absent an abuse of discretion, ¶ 32 (2000).

¶ 35 (2010) (citing cases).

“The trial court’s decision whether to grant a mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, as is the admission of victim impact evidence.” ¶ 26 (2010) (internal citations omitted).

¶¶ 151–52 (2004) (concluding a statement did not require reversal where it “was promptly objected to, and was rendered less harmful by instructions by the court”); ¶ 40 (2010) (stating that this Court presumes “that jurors follow the court’s instructions”).

¶16 The jury instructions listed the elements required for aggravated assault—including the requirement that Mendoza used a dangerous instrument—along with the definition of “dangerous instrument.” Because we presume that juries follow the instructions given, ¶ 44 (2010), we presume the jury understood its task in deliberating before returning a verdict.

¶ 40 (2010) (conviction affirmed when the trial court’s instructions cured any possible prejudice from the prosecutor’s statements).

¶ 13 (2010) (“Other minority jurors were ultimately selected for the panel, and although not dispositive, the fact that the state accepted other minority jurors on the venire is indicative of a nondiscriminatory motive.” (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted)).

This Court must uphold a death sentence “if any ‘reasonable juror could conclude that the mitigation presented was not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.’” Naranjo, 234 Ariz. at 250 ¶ 89 ( ¶ 52 (2010)).

¶ 25 (2012) ( ¶ 35 (2010)).

¶¶ 12–13 (2010); –91 (App. 1989); see also United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1163 (4th Cir. 1995) (prospective juror’s husband “had been involved in criminal activity”); United States v. Jackson, 914 F.2d 1050, 1052– 53 (8th Cir. 1990) (prospective juror’s nephew was incar

“The defendant must show that the offending statements were so pronounced and persistent that they permeate[d] the entire atmosphere of the trial and so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 34 (2010) (internal quotations omitted).

“The defendant must show that the offending statements were so pronounced and persistent that they permeate[d] the entire atmosphere of the trial and so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 34 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“The defendant must show that the offending statements were so pronounced and persistent that they permeate[d] the entire atmosphere of the trial and so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 34 (2010) (alteration in original) (quotations omitted).

This Court must uphold a death sentence “if any reasonable juror could conclude that the mitigation presented was not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” Naranjo, 234 Ariz. at 250 ¶ 89 (internal 41 STATE V. SMITH Opinion of the Court quotation marks omitted) ( ¶ 52 (2010)).

We review the superior court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 61 (2018), reversing only if defendant shows a reasonable likelihood that comments could have affected the jury’s verdict, ¶ 40 (2010), and affording great deference to the superior court, ¶ 40 (2003).

¶ 25 (2012) ( ¶ 35 (2010)).

ent to narrow the aggravator because it allowed the jury “to begin with the assumption that there are premeditated first degree murders that are not cold and calculating and that any evidence of the cold and calculating component would be sufficient to find the aggravator.” ¶90 Although we generally “review de novo whether jury instructions adequately state the law,” ¶ 30 (2010) ( ¶ 27 (2007)), “absent an objection by the defendant, we review for fundamental error,” Velazquez, 216 Ariz. at 309–1

" State v. Gallardo , , ¶ 34, (alteration in Velazquez ) (quoting State v. Velazquez , , ¶ 45, ).