Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Maldonado, 223 P.3d 653.
- Ader v. Estate of Felger 375 P.3d 97 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
-
Ader v. Estate of Felger
375 P.3d 97
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
Older case law has used the phrase subject matter jurisdiction “somewhat loosely,” for instance, to describe a “court’s inability to enter a valid judgment.” ¶¶ 15-16
- Glass v. Classis Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
-
Glass v. Classis
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Subject matter jurisdiction “refers to a court’s statutory or constitutional power to hear and determine a particular type of case.” ¶ 14
- Nicholas v. Nicholas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- Nicholas v. Nicholas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- Johnson v. Swing Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
-
Johnson v. Swing
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the particular proceedings belong,” ¶ 7, ( ) (internal quotation marks omitted), and is conferred by our constitution or statutes, ¶ 14
- Sheets v. Hon. mead/reynolds 356 P.3d 341 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
-
Sheets v. Hon. mead/reynolds
356 P.3d 341
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Though in the past courts have referred to “subject matter jurisdiction” to describe their authority under a specific controlling statute, ¶ 17 (App. 2014), “[i]n current usage, the phrase ‘subject matter jurisdiction’ refers to a court’s statutory or constitutional power to hear and determine a particular type of case,” ¶ 14 (2010).
- Swett v. Brown Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
-
Swett v. Brown
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
¶7 Subject matter jurisdiction concerns “a court’s statutory or constitutional power to hear and determine a particular type of case.” ¶ 14
- In Re the Marriage of Thorn 330 P.3d 973 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
-
In Re the Marriage of Thorn
330 P.3d 973
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
§§ 25-311 and 25-318(A).1 “In current usage, the phrase ‘subject matter jurisdiction’ refers to a court’s statutory or constitutional power to hear and determine a particular type of case.” see also United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002).
- State of Arizona v. Reuben Renee Cota 319 P.3d 242 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
-
State of Arizona v. Reuben Renee Cota
319 P.3d 242
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
3 STATE v. COTA Opinion of the Court 1 Contrary to Cota’s assertion, a defendant’s personal waiver is not required in order to proceed in his absence.
- Church of the Isaiah 58 Project of Arizona, Inc. v. La Paz County 314 P.3d 806 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
-
Church of the Isaiah 58 Project of Arizona, Inc. v. La Paz County
314 P.3d 806
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
Subject matter jurisdiction “refers to a court’s statutory or constitutional power to hear and determine a particular type of case.” ¶ 14
- State of Arizona v. Pierre Banda 307 P.3d 1009 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
-
State of Arizona v. Pierre Banda
307 P.3d 1009
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
And that policy justification does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction because it does not involve the court’s “statutory or constitutional power to hear and determine a particular type of case,” but instead only creates a legislative presumption that the state would be unable to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Glover v. Glover 289 P.3d 12 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
- Glover v. Glover 289 P.3d 12 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
- Sierra Tucson Crc Health Group v. Louise Litwack 282 P.3d 1275 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
-
Sierra Tucson Crc Health Group v. Louise Litwack
282 P.3d 1275
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
¶¶ 14-18, - 9 therefore lacked the authority to consider, much less grant, Litwack’s motion for leave to file the amended complaint and did not have the discretion to make a decision about venue based on the amended complaint and his consideration of th
- State of Arizona v. Jaime Rene Espinoza Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
-
State of Arizona v. Jaime Rene Espinoza
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
¶¶ 15-18, -56 (2010) (concluding reasoning of two prior supreme court cases, which found jurisdictional error arising from mere procedural defects in charging process, “no longer tenable”); Marvin Johnson, P.C.
- BNSF Railway Co. v. Buttrick 268 P.3d 400 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
-
BNSF Railway Co. v. Buttrick
268 P.3d 400
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
169 , 182 A.2d 682 (1962)); see also, ¶ 14
- AD HOC COMMITTEE OF PARISHIONERS v. Reiss 224 P.3d 1002 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010