Cited by

such as emotion, sympathy or horror.” ¶ 40 (2012) (alteration in original) ().

“We review a trial court’s 13 STATE v. FOURNIER Opinion of the Court determination of relevance and admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion.” ().

Acknowledging that the pictures were “ostensibly” admitted to demonstrate his injured hands and thereby corroborate M.H.’s testimony, Littlehale suggests the court should have sua sponte redacted the photographs “to remove the visible handcuffs.” ¶ 54 (2012) (noting that a criminal defendant generally “has a right to appear in civilian clothing and be free from visible restraints in a courtroom during trial”).

ugh burglary and noting it would “be anomalous to conclude that first-degree murder occurs if a burglary with intent to assault results in death but not if the burglary is based on the more culpable intent to murder”); ¶ 23 n.4 (2010) (rejecting argument that “one cannot commit felony murder when one committed burglary in order to commit murder”); ¶ 26 (2012) (“Because Arizona’s felony murder statute applies when the predicate offense of burglary is undertaken with the intent to murder the victi

le for parole.”); –15 ¶ 53 (2010) (“Unlike Simmons, Hargrave was eligible for release after twenty-five years, as the jury instruction correctly stated.”); ¶ 43 (2010) (finding that jury instruction “accurately described the statutory sentencing options” and thus did not mislead the jury (citing § 13-751(A))); ¶ 58 (2012) (finding that “[n]o Simmons instruction was required” because “the possibility of a life sentence with release after twenty-five years” was “accurately stated” in the jury inst

“A Batson challenge involves three steps: (1) The defendant must make a prima facie showing of discrimination, (2) the prosecutor must offer a race-neutral reason for each strike, and (3) the trial court must determine whether the [defendant] proved purposeful racial discrimination.” ¶ 44 (2013) ( ¶ 12 (2012)).

See, e.g., Medina, 232 Ariz. at 404–05, ¶¶ 47–50 (upholding strike in part based on the similarity between mental-health conditions of juror’s husband and defendant); ¶¶ 13–15 (2012) (juror struck because brother’s drug addiction might make her sympathetic to mitigating evidence of the defendant’s familial drug abuse); (struck because juror’s sister’s conviction for one of the same charges raised against the defendant); see also

-90, ¶¶ 32, 42 (2012) (superior court "implicitly" found evidence was not unduly prejudicial when it decided to admit it).

¶ 49 (2012) (citations omitted).

¶ 38 (2012) (“Evidence of [a] prior argument with .

¶ 39 (2012) (concluding that other act evidence was admissible, in part, to rebut a defense theory); -10, ¶ 22 (2010) (concluding that other act evidence was admissible because it was relevant to rebut the defendant’s primary defense and “it made the defendant’s story less plausi

“The purpose of Rule 404(b) is to keep from the jury evidence that the defendant is prone to commit crimes or is otherwise a bad person.” ¶ 34 (2012) (citation omitted).

¶ 38 (2012) ("Evidence of prior argument with or violence toward a victim is .

Although the State’s highlighting of inconsistency in trial strategy veers toward concerns that may be associated with a defendant’s constitutional right to present a complete defense, ¶ 49 (2012) (stating that a defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense, albeit limited to evidentiary rules), the prosecutor’s comment was an attack on trial strategy and not against the defense attorneys themselves and did not directly interfere with Acuna’s right to present a defense.

See State v. Hardy , , ¶¶ 49-50, , 22-23 (2012) ; see also State v. Fleming , , 125-26, , 275-76 (1977) ("As evidence of the witness' condition becomes more remote in time, it has proportionately less bearing on the credibility of the witness.").

¶ 12 (2012) (“Although not dispositive, the fact that the state accepted other minority jurors on the venire is indicative of a nondiscriminatory motive.”) (internal citation omitted).

“We review the denial of a motion for mistrial for [an] abuse of discretion.” ¶ 52 (2012) ( ¶ 72 (2009)).