Cited by

¶ 14 (2013) (citation omitted).

See, –53 ¶¶ 67–68 (2013) (rejecting proposed instruction that life imprisonment meant defendant “would be sentenced to natural life and would ‘never be eligible to be released from prison for any reason for the rest of his life’”).

010) (finding that jury instruction “accurately described the statutory sentencing options” and thus did not mislead the jury (citing § 13-751(A))); ¶ 58 (2012) (finding that “[n]o Simmons instruction was required” because “the possibility of a life sentence with release after twenty-five years” was “accurately stated” in the jury instruction); −53 ¶ 68 (2013) (finding no 1 This provision was further amended by 2012 Ariz. Sess.

But premeditation may be shown through circumstantial evidence, ¶ 60 (2013), and the State did so here through proof of a gang-related retributive motive, the proximity in time between J.S.’s act of disrespect and the murder, and Vargas’s shooting behavior.

We clarified that § 13-753(K)(1), Arizona’s intellectual disability statute, “differs from a clinical definition, which bases an impairment in adaptive functioning on deficits in at least two life-skill categories without considering strengths.” Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. at 267 ¶ 16 ( ¶ 34 (2013); Grell II, 212 Ariz. at 529 ¶ 62)

Premeditation is an element of first-degree murder under paragraph 13-1105.A.1 and therefore part of the mens rea of the offense.1 ¶ 50 (2013).

See State 9 ¶¶ 82–84 (2013) (stating the jury could conclude, based on the number of stab wounds, which included a 3.5-inch deep cut to the pericardium and heart, that the victim suffered physical pain and mental anguish while being stabbed to death and that the defendant knew or should have known that).

§ 13-1105(A)(1), ¶ 50 (2013).

(emphasis added); ¶ 149 (2013) (stating that § 13-503 prohibits the jury from using voluntary intoxication to negate the state of mind needed to prove an aggravating circumstance); ¶¶ 52, 54 (2013) (holding that the trial court did not err by excluding voluntary-intoxication evidence to challenge premeditation).

See State v. Boyston , , 543, ¶ 14, , 892-93 (2013).

¶ 62, (“Grell II”); ¶ 34

3 LARMER v. LARMER Opinion of the Court “the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered”); -42, ¶ 14, - 92 (2013) (appellate court interprets statutes de novo).

¶ 14, (reviewing admissibility of expert evidence for abuse of discretion).