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¶43 A prosecutor may not vouch for the State’s case by “plac[ing] the prestige of the government behind its evidence” or “suggest[ing] that information not presented to the jury supports the evidence.” ¶ 29 (2012) (citations omitted).

103(a)(2); ¶ 57 (2012) (noting court was “unable to find prejudice” without offer of proof).

See State v. (Gilbert) Martinez, ¶ 31 (2012).

Because we pay substantial deference to the superior court’s firsthand observations of a prosecutor’s behavior, ¶¶ 30–31 (2012), we find no support from the record that the prosecutor’s error barred retrial under the double jeopardy clause, Pool, 139 Ariz. at 108–09.

¶ 25 (2012) ( ¶ 35 (2010)).

4 STATE v. TUCKER Decision of the Court demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 133 (2019) ( ¶ 24 (2012)).

Where multiple claims of misconduct occurred, we consider their “cumulative effect.” ¶ 42 (2012).

¶ 25 (2012) ( ¶ 35 (2010)).

¶ 23 (2012) (stating jurors must make an individualized decision whether a defendant deserves the 17 STATE V. ALLEN Opinion of the Court death penalty “based on the ‘character and record of the individual offender

ferences to his employment history also constitute a “campai[g]n of prosecutorial misconduct.” To warrant reversal, “prosecutorial misconduct must be present, and a ‘reasonable likelihood must exist that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying the defendant a fair trial.’” ¶ 66 (2018) ( ¶ 24 (2012)).

5 Ariz. at 143, ¶ 27 (reasoning that improperly admitted evidence “permeated the 4 STATE v. ESHAYA Decision of the Court trial” when it was “elicited from eight officers over three days and referred to by the prosecutor in both the opening statement and closing argument”), ¶ 32 (2012) (noting the misconduct in Pool was “continuous and well-documented” and declining to reverse when misconduct was “confirmed only twice by the trial judge”), –30 (1994) (“Whatever prejudice this line of questioning

¶¶ 30-32 (2012) (concluding the prosecutor’s “courtroom demeanor was inappropriate,” but deferring to the superior court’s “firsthand observations and assessments” as to whether such conduct amounted to “pervasive misconduct”).

See, , 306 ¶ 21, (declining to address issues “[t]he parties did not brief’); , 212 ¶ 10 n.2, (refusing to address Arizona constitutional issues *600 “not separately argued”).

¶ 25 (2012) (citation omitted).

The superior court’s view of the prosecutor’s motives and credibility is entitled to deference, ¶¶ 30–31 (2012), and the court did not abuse its discretion by denying DeMocker’s motions to dismiss.3 And because DeMocker’s prosecutorial misconduct claim is unavailing, his double jeopardy claim premised on that alleged misconduct likewise fails.

State v. (Gilbert) Martinez, ¶ 40

When a defendant objects to alleged misconduct, as McKeever did, we review each instance of alleged misconduct for harmless error, ¶ 25 (2012), and consider the cumulative effect of the alleged misconduct.

See, e.g., State v. (Gilbert) Martinez, ¶ 54, ¶ 40–41, ¶ 67, State v. (Cody J.) Martinez, ¶ 44

“Prosecutorial vouching” occurs (1) when “the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind its evidence” and (2) “where the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the evidence.” ¶ 29, (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).