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“The admission of third-party culpability evidence is governed by the standards of Rules 401 through 403 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence, not by Rule 404(b),” the central purpose of which is to “protect criminal defendants from unfair use of propensity evidence.” –84, ¶¶ 14, 16 (2011).

the relationship between the issues of ‘causation’ and ‘involvement’ in the accident, especially in light of the prosecutor’s [closing] argument explicitly conflating those two concepts.” ¶69 Under appropriate circumstances, a defendant may be permitted to introduce so-called “third-party culpability” evidence at trial “to show that someone else committed the crime.” ¶ 1 (2011).

10 STATE v. BORQUEZ Decision of the Court uncharged wrongful conduct “can easily tip the balance against the defendant,” ¶ 15 (2011) (cleaned up), evidence of “prior bad acts” is “usually inadmissible at trial,”

Our jurisprudence sets forth this elevated standard because the “central purpose” of that rule is to “protect criminal defendants from unfair use of propensity evidence.” ¶¶ 1, 7-9, 14-16 (2011) (considering other acts by a third party to support third-party culpability defense).

’ to subject the declarant to criminal liability.” ¶ 46 (1998) (quoting LaGrand, 153 Ariz. at 27) (holding that a person’s letter suggesting that he had committed a homicide, was against his interest but was not admissible because no other evidence linked him to the murder and therefore was not corroborated)

¶54 Moreover, is inapposite.

¶ 14 (2011) (“The admission of third- party culpability evidence is governed by the standards of Rules 401 through 403 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence.

“Although the details need not be identical, there must be similarities between important aspects where one would normally expect to find difference.” ¶ 17 (2011).

“The admission of third-party culpability evidence is governed by the standards of Rules 401 through 403 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence, not by Rule 404(b).” ¶ 16 (2011).

See Smith , 123 Ariz. at 252 , 599 P.2d at 208 ; Delgado , 174 Ariz. at 257 , 848 P.2d at 342 ; cf. State v. Machado , , ¶¶ 12-13, , 1166-67 (App. 2010), aff'd , , ¶ 26, , 637 (2011), and abrogated in part on other grounds as recognized by State v. Nottingham , , n.4, , 954 n.4 (App. 2012).

¶ 3 (App. 2004) (citation omitted).5 In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion we acknowledge that the United States Constitution guarantees defendants “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” ¶ 36 (App. 2016) ( ¶ 12 (App. 2010), aff’d, (internal quotation omitted)).

¶ 16, Prion, 203 Ariz. at 161, ¶ 22, 52 P.3d at 193.

Moreover, the superior court has discretion to exclude third-party culpability evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” n.2, ¶ 16 (2011) (quoting Ariz. R. Evid.

¶ 16 (2011); Prion, 203 Ariz. at 161, ¶ 22.

Because credibility questions traditionally fall within the jury’s province, a court should “examine any evidence that corroborates or contradicts the statement to find whether a reasonable person could conclude that the statement is true.” ¶ 21, (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

More specifically, ¶ 16, affirming –56, ¶¶ 29–32, –71 (App. 2010), Murrieta argues Rule 404(b) “was designed to protect defendants,” not “witnesses such as the victim,” and thus this evidence should have been admitted.

804(a), (b)(3); -85, ¶ 18, -36 (2011).

See, aff’d, P.3d 632 (2011); review dismissed, P.2d 1269 (1997)