Cited by

¶24 “[E]vidence that is inadmissible during the guilt phase may be admissible during the penalty phase if it rebuts the defendant’s mitigation and is not unfairly prejudicial.” ¶ 130 (2015).

to speak truthfully, among other things.” ¶ 69 (2015) (quotation omitted).

at 285; McKoy, 494 U.S. at 438–39, 443; ¶ 144 (2015) (holding that jury instructions restricting mitigation to the Lockett/Eddings categories were proper); ¶ 44 (2007) (to same effect); ¶ 72 (2007) (providing that the “so long as” mitigation instruction allowed the jury to consid

¶ 152 (2015); ¶ 15 (App. 2013).

¶11 In State v. Burns, our supreme court held that “[a]bsent an appropriate factual nexus, trial courts generally should not join a misconduct-involving-weapons charge, or any charge that requires evidence of a prior felony conviction, unless the parties have stipulated to a defendant’s status as a prohibited possessor.” ¶ 39 (2015).

That has never come out ever, not even in the slightest.” ¶83 “A party is entitled to any jury instruction reasonably supported by the evidence.” ¶ 48 (2015).

Supra ¶¶ 16–22; see, –35 ¶¶ 169–71 (2015) (affirming a death sentence despite a “difficult childhood” and “dysfunctional family”); ¶ 111 (2008) (“Also, Bocharski committed this offense when he was thirty-three years old, lessening the relevance of abuse and neglect that occurred during his childho

he asserts joinder of the charges deprived him of his right to a fair trial because Count 1 required proof of his two prior domestic violence convictions, evidence he argues would not have been otherwise admissible at a separate trial on the remaining counts.

A prosecutor may also “make arguments and may draw inferences that are reasonably supported by the evidence.” ¶ 152 (2015).

We have previously rejected the argument that double jeopardy prohibits the use of predicate felonies as “capital sentencing aggravators.” ¶ 219 (2016) ( ¶ 86 (2015)); ¶ 130 (2008).

State v. Burns , , 11 ¶ 10, , 313 (2015) ("We will not find that a trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance unless the defendant shows prejudice.").

State v. Burns , , ¶ 146, quoting State v. Hughes , , ¶ 26