Cited by

404(b); ¶¶ 13-14 (2012).

ath penalty “should be reserved for cases in which either the manner of the commission of the offense or the background of the defendant places the crime ‘above the norm of first-degree murders.’” ¶ 45 (2002) (quoting Hoskins, 199 Ariz. at 163 ¶ 169); ¶ 43 (2007) (“[J]urors must assess whether the murder was so cruel that it rose above the norm of first degree murders.”).

–12, ¶ 9 (App. 1998), – 42, ¶¶ 8–13 (2012); see also Fed.

be dealt with as the circumstances of the particular case might indicate.’”); ¶ 10 (App. 1998) (upholding the trial court’s ruling admitting the victim’s interview statements when “[t]he offenses occurred between November 1, 1994, and March 17, 1995[,]” and the interview occurred in “early April 1995”), 1 2.

eviewing evidence presented at trial to determine whether clear and convincing evidence supported other act evidence when the trial court admitted evidence based on the parties’ briefs and oral argument); ¶ 57 (2001) (concluding the evidence at trial satisfied Terrazas’ clear and convincing evidence standard), ¶ 20 (2012).

en if a defendant does not contest certain issues, photographs are still admissible if relevant because the 'burden to prove every element of the crime is not relieved by a defendant's tactical decision not to contest an essential element of the offense.'" (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 69 (1991))

He contends the recordings should have been suppressed according to the exclusionary rule codified at 2 Because we must affirm the trial court’s ruling if legally correct for any reason, ¶ 7 (App. 2012), we do not address Stamm’s

¶ 15 (App. 2006); ¶ 7 (App. 1998), –42, ¶¶ 8–13 (2012).

Although the court arguably erred in concluding that the evidence also was admissible under Rule 404(b) and as intrinsic evidence, (intrinsic); (Rule 404(b)), because the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(c), any error caused Gallagher no prejudice.

Rule 404(b); ¶ 13 (2012).

p the trier of fact’s (ie., the jury’s) role.” ¶ 13 We reject the state’s argument for several reasons, Our supreme court has repeatedly stated that, as a prerequisite for admitting evidence under Rule 404(c), “the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the other act.” , n.1 , , 511 n.1 (2012) (noting “[t]he state must prove *131 that the defendant committed the other act” , as source of heightened standard of proof); ¶¶ 30, 34 , 875 (2004) (citi

dence seized pursuant to a warrant if a defendant proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the affiant knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth made a false statement to obtain the warrant and that the false statement was necessary to a finding of probable cause.” ¶ 42 (2001)

ntest certain issues, photographs may still be admissible if relevant because the State’s “burden to prove every element of the crime is not relieved by a defendant’s tactical decision not to contest an essential element of the offense.” (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 69 (1991)), P.3d 509 (2012).

unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict[.]"); –23 (1996), -43 (2012).

“Even if a defendant does not contest certain issues, photographs are still admissible if relevant because the ‘burden to prove every element of the crime is not relieved by a defendant’s tactical decision not to contest an essential element of the offense.’” (citation omitted) (abrogated on other grounds, -43, ¶¶ 15-20 (2012)).

¶17 Other-act evidence is admissible if (1) the evidence is admitted for a proper purpose, (2) the evidence is relevant, (3) the evidence is not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403, and (4) the judge gives “an appropriate limiting instruction upon request.” ¶ 54 (2001), ¶ 20 (2012).

105, 402, 403 & 404(b); ¶ 54, P.3d 509 (2012).