Cited by

We will find an abuse of discretion for a discovery violation only when “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.” ¶ 29 (2014) ( ¶ 40 (2004)).

The trial court is “in the best position to ‘assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose it.’” ¶ 12 (2014) (quoting Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9 (2007)).

¶ 40 (2017) (conjunctive); ¶ 12 (2016) (same); ¶ 12 (2009) (same), ¶ 58 (2014) (disjunctive); ¶ 16 (2014) (same); ¶ 13 (2010) (same); ¶ 21 (2009) (same).

“We must uphold a jury’s determination that death is the appropriate sentence if any ‘reasonable juror could conclude that the mitigation presented was not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.’” ¶ 89 (2014) ( ¶ 52 (2010)).

¶20 "We review a trial court's decisions regarding the use and content of jury questionnaires for abuse of discretion," State v. Naranjo , , 241 ¶ 24, , 406 (2014), and "will not disturb the trial court's selection of the jury in the absence of a showing that a jury of fair and impartial jurors was not chosen," State v. Moody , , 451 ¶ 93, , 1146 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Walden

¶16 The superior court has broad discretion in admitting expert testimony, ¶ 25 (App. 2006), and we will not disturb its decision to allow expert testimony absent an abuse of discretion, ¶ 65 (2014).

We review a trial court’s choice and imposition of sanctions for a violation of the discovery rules for an abuse of discretion, and “we will find an abuse of discretion only when no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.” ¶ 29 (2014).

¶ 29 (2014) ( ¶ 40 (2004)).

We must uphold a death sentence “if any reasonable juror could conclude that the mitigation presented was not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” ¶ 89 (2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

See State v. Naranjo, 234 Ariz, 233, ¶ 17, see also Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 639 (9th Cir. 1968) (bias “should not be adjudged on that juror’s own assessment of self-righteousness without something more”).

§ 13-756(A), viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, ¶ 81

“In assessing a waiver, courts examine the totality of the surrounding circumstances, ‘including the defendant’s background, experience, and conduct.’ The defendant’s prior interactions with law enforcement are relevant to this inquiry.” (citation omitted), quoting State v. 1 Voluntariness and Miranda typically present distinct legal issues.

§ 13-756(A), we review the jury’s finding that a murder was especially cruel for abuse of discretion, ¶ 72, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, ¶ 81, and resolving all inferences against the defendant, Davolt, 207 Ariz. at 212 ¶ 87, 84 P.3d at 477.

(precluding sole witness supporting defense theory due to unexcused, untimely disclosure).

44 STATE V. BURNS Opinion of the Court ¶170 “We must uphold a jury’s determination that death is the appropriate sentence if any ‘reasonable juror could conclude that the mitigation presented was not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.’” ¶ 89, (quoting Gallardo, 225 Ariz. at 570 ¶ 52, 242 P.3d at 169).

In March 2011, after reviewing the reports and hearing argument, the court determined that Young was not competent to stand trial, but could be restored to 1 Although Dr. Harvancik used different terminology, we use the term “intellectual disability” “in keeping with current Arizona law and contemporary medical and ethical standards.” ¶ 39, n.3, n.3 (2014).