Cited by

6 STATE V. RUSHING Opinion of the Court judge ‘must have grounds for ordering restraints and should not simply defer to the prosecutor’s request, a sheriff’s department’s policy, or security personnel’s preference for the use of restraints.’” ( ¶ 119 (2008))); ¶ 30 (2013) (upholding a trial court’s finding of case-specific concerns warranting non-visible restraints at a capital trial where the court had relied on an “individualized security risk assessment” of the defendant, “the potential for i

See, ¶ 56 (2013) (“Arizona law does not make [the defendant] ineligible for parole.”); ¶ 42 (2008) (“No state law would have prohibited [the defendant’s] release on parole after serving twenty-five years, had he been given a life sentence.”).

“We will reverse a conviction for prosecutorial misconduct only if (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the prosecutor’s misconduct could have affected the verdict.” ¶ 40 (2013).

5 STATE v. BOTCH Decision of the Court affected the verdict.” ¶ 91 (2017) ( ¶ 40 (2013))

Brady Claim ¶5 The State violates “a defendant’s right to due process [under Brady] if it withholds evidence that is favorable to the defense and material to the defendant’s guilt.” See Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 75 (2012); ¶ 24 (2013) (same).

“We will reverse a conviction for prosecutorial misconduct only if (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the prosecutor’s misconduct could have affected the verdict.” ¶ 40 (2013).

Tell him by your verdict that his life is not more valuable than [A.D.’s].” A prosecutor’s conduct warrants reversal of a conviction or sentence when “(1) the prosecutor committed misconduct and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the prosecutor’s misconduct could have affected the verdict.” ¶ 40 (2013).

A conviction will be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct “if (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the prosecutor’s misconduct could have affected the verdict.” ¶ 40 (2013).

¶ 24 (2013); ¶ 21 (App. 2002).

to 1997 amendment; ¶ 14 (2013) (noting “attacks did not have to precisely align” to be admissible).

¶13 In criminal cases, “generally, a defendant has the right to appear before the jury free of shackles or other restraints.” Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482, 1484 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added); ¶ 29 (2013) (“Although a defendant generally has the right to be free from restrains in the courtroom, the court may order their use if, in the court’s discretion, the restraints are needed for courtroom security and safety.”).

“Evidence is ‘material’ for purposes of Brady ‘when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” ¶ 24 (2013) (quoting Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 75 (2012)).

similarity.”); (the two acts “did not have to precisely align” to be admissible under Rule 404).

¶7 A conviction will be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct “if (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the prosecutor’s misconduct could have affected the verdict.” ¶ 40 (2013).

Compare Gunches, 225 Ariz. at 26 ¶ 20 (finding insufficient evidence where the defendant fired three shots in quick succession on a dark night before the final shot), ¶ 26 (2012) (finding insufficient evidence where the defendant hit the victim multiple times with a baseball bat before putting the bat through her neck as she moaned), –65 ¶ 50 (2013) (finding sufficient evidence where the defendant admitted that the victim’s body was getting cold when he dragged her into his car, drove somewhere,

¶ 15 (2013) (concluding that two years and nine months’ interval between charged offenses was not too remote); Ariz. R. Evid.

¶ 44, (finding no error in trial court’s overruling objection to prosecutor’s closing argument that accurately stated the law).

–62 ¶¶ 31–32, –29 (2013).

27 STATE V. ESCALANTE-OROZCO Opinion of the Court ¶91 This Court will reverse a conviction for prosecutorial misconduct when “(1) the prosecutor committed misconduct and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the prosecutor's misconduct could have affected the verdict.” ¶ 40

A conviction will be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct only if “(1) the prosecutor committed misconduct and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the prosecutor’s misconduct could have affected the verdict.” ¶ 40

¶28 Second, the late disclosure cannot be said to rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct because it did not “so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 26 (1998) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)); ¶ 40 (2013) (“We will reverse a conviction for prosecutorial misconduct only if (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the prosecutor's misconduct could have affect