Cited by

§ 13-701(C); –55 ¶¶ 21–22 (App. 2011) (as amended), aff’d, (“trial court may use prior convictions to both enhance and aggravate a sentence”).

¶19 In support of his assertion that the court erred in “fail[ing] to enumerate the aggravating and mitigating factors on the record,”

Courts are prohibited from imposing a greater- than-presumptive sentence based solely on “catch-all” aggravators, but once one of the enumerated aggravators have been properly identified, courts are then free to use the “catch-all” provision “to impose a sentence up to the statutory maximum.” ¶¶ 9-10 (2013).

¶ 11 (2013); (“[D]ouble punishment principles do not preclude the trial court from using the prior conviction to impose an enhanced sentence .

¶¶ 8–9 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting A.R.S.

Section 13-701(D)(24) is the so- called “catch-all” aggravator, which permits the trier of fact to consider “[a]ny other factor that the state alleges is relevant to the defendant’s character or background or to the nature or circumstances of the crime.” ¶ 8 (2013).

§ 13-701(D)(1)-(23), it may rely on the “catch-all” aggravator in § 13-701(D)(24) to increase the sentence “even if the court does not expressly use the specific statutory aggravator as a basis for increasing the sentence.”12 ¶ 1

¶ 14 (2013) (noting that superior court should “clearly articulate at sentencing the factors the judge considered to be aggravating or mitigating and explain how those factors led to the sentence imposed”).

¶ 21, affirmed, P.3d 948 (2013) (noting, “[a] trial court may use the same convictions to enhance or increase the sentencing range and to aggravate a defendant’s sentence within the enhanced range”); (concluding that there was no vindictive prosecution whe

-74, ¶¶ 10-11, -51 (2013).2 Turner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails for the same reason.

When discussing burglary of a truck in State v. Zinsmeyer, this court suggested a truck’s cabin was included in the statutory definition of “vehicle,” concluding “a truck is plainly a vehicle” and “the legislature must have intended third-degree burglary to include burglary of a truck.” ¶¶ 6, 15, -51 (2013).

(sufficiency of evidence claim not raised below reviewed for fundamental error), P.3d 948 (2013).

“This court has stated that instructing a jury on a non-existent theory of criminal liability is fundamental error.” James, 231 Ariz. at 493, ¶ 13 , 297 P.3d at 185 ( ¶ 27 , , Ontiveros, 206 Ariz. at 542, ¶ 17 , 81 P.3d at 333 ; , 392 n. 7, ¶ 12, , 447 n. 7 (App. 2000)).

to find a law unconstitutionally vague simply because it has not been “‘drafted with absolute precision,’” lacks an “‘explicit definition,’” or is “‘susceptible to different interpretations.’” P.3d 948 (2013).