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And the trial court properly instructed jurors they were to determine whether to impose the death penalty by “determin[ing] whether in [their] individual assessment the mitigation is of such quality or value that it warrants leniency in this case.” ¶ 54 n.6 (2015).

427, 437 ¶ 47 (2002) (finding no impropriety in the prosecutor’s opening statement that defendant’s actions were “terrorizing,” that he appeared “outraged, beyond control, and absolutely terrifying,” and that the victims were “cowering, hiding, and praying to God Almighty” because those remarks were based on the evidence)

ces of the crime and 29 STATE V. CHAMPAGNE Opinion of the Court the defendant’s character, which they must do to fulfill their ‘duty to evaluate all the relevant evidence when determining the defendant’s sentence.’” See, ¶ 13 (2015) ( ¶ 54 (2015)).

¶ 36 (2015) (citation omitted).

2 Because the evidence regarding the second burglary was admissible to prove Lewis’s identity in connection with the first offense, ¶¶ 16-18 (2002), ¶ 46 (2015), he cannot sustain his burden of establishing his trial was unfair or he suffered prejudice resulting from the superior court’s failure to sever the offenses for trial, ___, ¶ 21 (2018) (detailing a defendant’s burden in establishing reversible error under funda

State v. Gunches (Gunches II), ¶ 37 (2016); ¶¶ 51, 54 (2015).

See ¶ 83 (2015) (consecutive sentences permissible for kidnapping and felony murder); Gordon, 161 Ariz. at 315-16 (consecutive sentences permissible for kidnapping and sexual assault); -87 (1987) (consecutive sentences permissible for kidnapping and child molestation).

-92 ¶¶ 26-29 (2015) (upholding exclusion of expert’s testimony that defendant said he falsely confessed).

She did not advocate for the death penalty, see State v. Carlson , , 397 ¶¶ 59-61, , 1095 (2015), and her statements are no more problematic than others this Court has found permissible, see, e.g. , Burns , 237 Ariz. at 30 ¶ 141, 344 P.3d at 332 (describing victim's final moments was "not unduly prejudicial"); State v. Rose , , 513 ¶ 57, , 919

*599 State v. Phillips , , ¶¶ 45, 48, superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by State v. Carlson , , ¶ 46

¶17 A defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense, but not the right to present “that theory in whatever manner and with whatever evidence [the defendant] chooses.” ¶ 36 (2015) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

¶ 7 (2015) (noting this court will uphold a ruling if it is correct for any reason).

Even in the capital sentencing context, a sentencing court may consider two aggravators based on the same conduct because each individual aggravator “serve[s] different public policy rationales[.]” ¶ 73 (2015).

State v. Carlson , , 387 ¶ 7, , 1085 (2015) (quoting State v. Perez , , 464, , 1219 (1984) ).

¶ 7 (2015) (“We will affirm the trial court’s ruling if the result was legally correct for any reason.”).

We will uphold “a trial court’s ruling if the result was legally correct for any reason.” ¶ 7 (2015).

¶ 78 (2015) (noting that because the defendant failed to object at trial to the imposition of consecutive sentences, his claim that such sentences were illegal would 10 STATE v. BUSTILLOS Decision of the Court be review

Appellate courts are required to “affirm the trial court’s ruling if the result was legally correct for any reason.” ¶ 7

“We review constitutional issues de novo.”

Goudeau acknowledges that we rejected a similar challenge to the (F)(2) aggravator in Forde, 233 Ariz. at 569 ¶¶ 105–07, 315 P.3d at 1226; ¶¶ 45, 47–48