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¶33 The jury instruction is facially contradictory because the jury had to consider A.D.’s age to decide whether she was a child.2 But “we will not reverse a conviction unless the instructions, taken as a whole, misled the jurors.” –27 ¶ 35 (2015) ( ¶ 37 (2010)); –77 ¶ 17 (2000) (“[E]rror in a jury instruction is reversible if the instruction, taken as a whole, supports a reasonable presumption that the jurors would be misled.”).

¶ 9 (2015) ("statements made in response to 'questions necessary to secure the officers' own safety or the safety of the public' are admissible even if Miranda warnings have not been given" (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 (1984))).

“The threshold for relevance is a low one.” ¶ 48 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

State v. Leteve , , ¶ 33, ("A declaration of a mistrial is the most dramatic remedy for trial error and should be granted only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted."

See Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 468 ¶ 210 (“A prosecutor may properly urge the jury to give more weight to a defendant’s crimes than to the mitigation evidence.”); ¶ 47 (2015) ( ¶ 126 (2014)).

§ 13-502(A); ¶ 20 (2015).

§ 13-502 (allowing only mental disorders or defects that constitute legal insanity as a defense to criminal responsibility); Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 762 (2006) (“Mott is meant to confine to the insanity defense any consideration of characteristic behavior associated with mental disease.”); ¶ 20 (2015) (“The legislature has not provided for, and this Court has refused to allow, an affirmative defense of diminished capacity.”).

– 22 STATE V. RUSHING Opinion of the Court 29 ¶ 47 (2015); A.R.S.

¶ 11 (2015) (citation omitted).

¶ 17 (2015) ( ¶ 20 (2010)).

“In deciding whether error is harmless, the question is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” ¶ 25

¶ 7 “In deciding whether error is harmless, the question ‘is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ ” , quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 , 113 S.Ct.

-31, ¶ 59, -08 (2015) (assuming that attorneys’ fees incurred by crime victims in enforcing their victims’ rights is compensable in restitution, trial court did not abuse its discretion in including such fees in restitution order).

at 396–97, 850 P.2d at 109–10 (finding prosecutor’s statements in closing of the guilt phase about justice and protecting society proper; statements did not improperly urge jurors to convict defendant for reasons irrelevant to his guilt or innocence); –29 ¶ 47, –06 (2015) (“[T]he state may ‘rebut’ mitigation—that is, a conclusion that the defendant should be shown leniency—by introducing evidence of the ‘specific harm caused by the defendant.’” (quoting Forde, 233 Ariz. at 572 ¶ 126, 315 P.3d at

¶ 50, (limiting community impact testimony to statements by those who are “immediately and closely connected to the victim” to avoid the risk of unfair prejudice).