Cited by

Brock, ( ¶¶ 6, 14 (App. 2003), n.1 (2014)).

See Est. of Winn v. Plaza Healthcare, Inc., ¶ 16 (2007) (describing the rule of statutory construction that a more recent, specific statute will govern over a conflicting older, more general statute); ¶¶ 8, 11 (2014) (holding that when two statutes conflict, the more recent, specific statute governs over the older, more general statute).

Although a more specific statute will govern over a more general statute when they conflict, ¶ 8 (2014), we first “will attempt to harmonize their language to give effect to each,” UNUM Life Ins.

6 ¶ 8 (2014) (discussing the general/specific canon and noting that “[w]hen ‘two conflicting statutes cannot operate contemporaneously, the more recent, specific statute governs over an older, more general statute’” (quoting UNUM Life Ins.

When statutes conflict, “we adopt a construction that reconciles them whenever possible, giving force and meaning to each.” ¶ 6 (2014).

¶ 8 (2014) (“When ‘two conflicting statutes cannot operate contemporaneously, the more recent, specific statute governs over an older, more general statute.’”) (quoting UNUM Life Ins.

Section 13-705 requires “that sentences imposed on a defendant convicted of certain dangerous crimes against children run consecutively even when the underlying convictions arise from a single act.” ¶¶ 1, 7 (2014); see also A.R.S.

.”); ¶ 13 (2014) (“The same conduct may result in different offenses .

(“the more recent and specific statute applies”); see also Owner- Operator Indep.

That canon applies “[i]f there is a conflict between a general provision and a specific provision,” in which case “the specific provision prevails.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 183 (2012); ¶ 8 (2014) (“When ‘two conflicting statutes cannot operate contemporaneously, the more recent, specific statute governs over an older, more general statute.’” (quoting UNUM Life Ins.

E.g., State v. (Michael J.) Carlson, ¶ 84 (2015); State v. (Shawnte S.) Jones, – 04 ¶ 13 (2014).

¶ 6 (2014); Hall, 234 Ariz. at 376, ¶ 8; ¶ 6 (App. 2003).

he statute prohibiting double punishment for single criminal acts, took precedence over Subsection (M)’s requirement that sentences for certain dangerous crimes against children convictions be consecutive to other sentences: “Section 13–705(M) allows a concurrent sentence only for child molestation and sexual abuse involving one victim and when the ‘other’ crime is not dangerous.” ¶ 7 n.1 (2014).

See, 503-04, ¶¶ 1, 13 (2014) (double jeopardy); -75, 478, 483, ¶¶ 3, 6, 22, 25, 51 (2006) (cruel and unusual punishment); (separation of powers); -80, ¶¶ 1-19 (App. 2003) (vagueness).

Bisbee III, 52 Ariz. at 10, 78 P.2d at 985; ¶ 11, P.3d 191 (2014) (noting that “the legislature has often used language such as ‘notwithstanding any other statute’ .

§ 13-705(M) (permitting concurrent sentencing for a dangerous crime against children only when the offense involves child molestation or sexual abuse of a single victim and the other offense is not a dangerous crime against children); n.1, ¶ 7 (2014) (-80, ¶¶ 11-17 (App. 2003)).

¶ 1, 334 9 The two exceptions—established within § 13-705(M) allowing a crime involving child molestation pursuant to § 13-705(D) or sexual abuse pursuant to § 13-705(F) to be served concurrently with other sentences if the offense involved only one victim—do not apply here.

¶ 6, (“When two statutes conflict, we adopt a construction that reconciles them whenever possible, giving force and meaning to each.”).

§ 12-552.7 Consistent with the commonly understood meaning of the phrase, “[t]he legislature has often used language such as ‘notwithstanding any other statute’ or ‘notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary’ to indicate that a particular provision will trump any conflicting statutes.” ¶ 11 (App. 2013) (citing examples), vacated on other grounds, ¶ 7 (App. 2001) (holding that a statute containing the phrase “notwithstanding any law to the contrary” operated to “explicitly and comprehens

“When two statutes conflict, we adopt a construction that reconciles them whenever possible, giving force and meaning to each.” ¶ 6