Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State of Arizona v. Johnathon Bernard Serna, 331 P.3d 405.

32 citing documents.

State v. Foster 559 P.3d 1139 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
State v. Foster 559 P.3d 1139 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
Police officers may not “involuntarily detain individuals even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so.” ¶ 12 (2014) (cleaned up).
State of Arizona v. Asalia Guadalupe Alvarez-Soto Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2024
State of Arizona v. Asalia Guadalupe Alvarez-Soto Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2024
(describing reasonable suspicion as “a low standard, readily established in many search settings”).
State v. Shwar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
State v. Shwar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
Police officers may not “involuntarily detain individuals even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so.” ¶ 12 (2014) (cleaned up).
State v. Dazen Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
State v. Dazen Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
¶¶ 21-22 (2014); ¶ 6 (App. 2015) (discussing Serna).
State v. Mason Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Mason Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
¶12 In his argument, ¶ 1 (2014), which held that even if an encounter begins as a consensual one, "an officer must have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot before frisking the individual."
State v. Thomas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Thomas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Bateman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Bateman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶ 8 (2014) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)).
State of Arizona v. Anthony Benard Primous 394 P.3d 646 Ariz. 2017
State of Arizona v. Anthony Benard Primous 394 P.3d 646 Ariz. 2017
P.3d 405 (2014), which neither the State nor the court of appeals cited.
State v. Valdespino Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Valdespino Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
which held that before an officer may frisk a suspect, he or she “must reasonably suspect both that criminal activity is afoot and that the suspect is armed and dangerous.” 235 Ariz. at 275, ¶ 21.
State of Arizona v. Christian Adair 383 P.3d 1132 Ariz. 2016
State of Arizona v. Christian Adair 383 P.3d 1132 Ariz. 2016
State v. Martin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Martin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
¶ 21, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
State v. Holguin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Holguin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
¶ 8, United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2007), ¶¶ 20-22, see also Wyman, 197 Ariz. at 13, ¶ 8, 3 P.3d at 395 (noting that an agreement to an officer’s initial request to speak to a defendant was consensual, in part because the officer “did not draw his gun or otherwise physically compel a response” (citation omitted)).
State v. Morlan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Morlan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
¶ 21, (concluding that a frisk is only permissible if officers reasonably suspect both that criminal activity is afoot and that the suspect is armed and dangerous).
State v. Condiff Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Condiff Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
A consensual encounter between a citizen and a police officer “will not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature.” ¶ 8 (2014) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)).
State v. Williams Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Williams Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326-27 (2009); ¶ 21 (2014).
Gastelum v. Hegyi 348 P.3d 907 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Gastelum v. Hegyi 348 P.3d 907 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
OPINION SWANN, Judge: ¶ 1 , the supreme court established a new rule limiting some Terry stops to those occasions when officers reasonably suspect that criminal activity is afoot and that an individual is armed and dangerous.