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when the legal claims do not turn on disputed facts.” ¶ 11 (2017).

¶ 7, 549–52 ¶¶ 14–29 (2017).

See Martin, 102 Ariz. at 146 (court has discretion to refuse to allow a defendant to continue his own defense when he seriously disrupted court proceedings); (court properly exercised discretion by revoking defendant’s pro per status based on his refusal to proceed on scheduled trial date); ¶¶ 15-17 (2012) (court rightly exercised discretion by revoking defendant’s pro per status after his noncompliance with court rules disrupted

Greene, 192 Ariz. at 444; –51 ¶¶ 23–29.

As Robinson himself acknowledges, –52 ¶¶ 25–28 (2017), cert.

[t]he right to counsel under both the United States and Arizona Constitutions includes an accused’s right to proceed without counsel and represent himself,” ¶ 22 (2003), that right is contingent on the defendant being “able and willing to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol,” McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 173 (1984); ¶ 44 (2017) (“Self-representation may be revoked if a defendant fails to comply with court rules or orders.”).

Further, we review for an abuse of discretion the superior court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing, ¶ 7 (2017), and the denial of a motion for new trial based on alleged witness coaching

¶ 68 (2017) (defendant did not “convincingly” explain how admittedly “cruel and traumatic” childhood conditions caused murders committed by twenty-three-year-old adult).

¶ 7, 549–52 ¶¶ 14–29 (2017), cert.

¶104 Indeed, by providing statutory aggravators and constitutionally acceptable definitions to the terms “especially heinous, cruel, or depraved,” the legislature and this Court have provided juries with the means to distinguish a murder that satisfies the (F)(6) aggravator from the “norm.” See Carlson, 202 Ariz. at 582 ¶ 45; –52 ¶¶ 27–28 (2017) (noting that Arizona’s death penalty scheme provides several means of narrowing the class of death-eligible persons).

That litigation eventually led to our decision in State v. Hidalgo (Hidalgo I), –52 ¶¶ 14–29 (2017).

no path to meaningfully distinguish the few cases in which death is deserved from the many which do not.” Indeed, “[t]o be constitutionally sound, ‘a capital sentencing scheme must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.’” ¶ 14 (2017) (quoting Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988)).

¶ 43 (2017) ( ¶ 68 (2006), ¶ 50 (2005)).

¶9 “[D]ue process entitles parties to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard,” ¶ 10 (2017), and “the opportunity to offer evidence and confront adverse witnesses,” ¶ 18 (App. 2011).

¶ 7, 551–52 ¶ 28, 552–53 ¶¶ 31–32 (2017), cert.

Additionally, Scalph’s “disappointment” in counsel’s “handl[ing]” of the suppression hearing, and Scalph’s complaint of not knowing who his lawyer interviewed are not sufficient to require a formal hearing.4 ¶ 61 (2017) (noting disagreement between defendant and counsel over pretrial witness interviews is a difference in strategy), cert.

¶ 24 (2017) (“An aggravating circumstance satisfies this narrowing requirement so long as it applies only to a subclass of murders.”); –64 (1991).

at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)); –49 ¶¶ 8–12 (2017) (rejecting the argument that an evidentiary hearing was required concerning a motion in a capital case).