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JUSTICE LOPEZ, opinion of the Court: ¶1 We here consider whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, in a prosecution for driving under the influence ("DUI"), to admit blood evidence unconstitutionally obtained after State v. Butler , , but before State v. Valenzuela ( Valenzuela II )

¶ 10 (2016); see U.S. Const. amend.

IV; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 8, and “any evidence collected in violation” of these provisions “is generally inadmissible in a subsequent criminal trial,” ¶ 10 (2016).

IV.; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 8, and “any evidence collected in violation” of these provisions “is generally inadmissible in a subsequent criminal trial.” ¶ 10 (2016).

After his arrest, he was given an administrative admonition like that rejected by our supreme court in State v. Valenzuela , , including the language, "Arizona law requires you to submit to and successfully complete tests of breath, blood or other bodily substance ...

to upset established precedent when no party has raised or argued such issues”); ¶ 21 (2016) (declining to address issues “[t]he parties did not brief”); cf. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) (stating that “stare decisis carries enhanced force when a decision .

See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974); State v. Cañez, ¶ 62 (2002), ¶ 11, n.1 (2016); (“The right [of confrontation] does not confer .

De Anda argues the procedure provided by statute and approved in State v. Valenzuela , , ¶ 29, , 636 (2016), required the advising officer to give him an opportunity to consent to testing prior to advising him of the consequences of refusal.

*159 ¶ 3 Alsarraf filed a motion to suppress the results of the test, arguing that his agreement to the test had been coerced by the officer's admin per se admonition, quoted above, citing State v. Valenzuela

It asserted that the admonition given to Diaz was different from that deemed coercive in State v. Valenzuela , , and was not coercive.

¶ 10 (2016); ¶ 9 (2016) ("A warrantless search is per se unreasonable .

“Although the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits warrantless searches, they are permitted if there is free and voluntary consent to search.” ¶ 1 (2016).

" State v. Valenzuela , , ¶ 3, ( Valenzuela II ), quoting State v. Hausner , , ¶ 23

“[A]ny evidence collected in violation” of these provisions “is generally inadmissible in a subsequent trial.” ¶ 10 (2016).

See, , 306 ¶ 21, (declining to address issues “[t]he parties did not brief’); , 212 ¶ 10 n.2, (refusing to address Arizona constitutional issues *600 “not separately argued”).

¶ 3 (2017) ( ¶ 3 (2016)).

e superior court was in the best position to evaluate the prosecutor’s credibility, and concluded the delay was not attributable to “bad faith or maliciousness.” ¶ 28 (2002) (“We give great deference to the trial court’s ruling, based, as it is, largely upon an assessment of the prosecutor’s credibility.”)

309 ¶ 31, (“[Wlhen law enforcement officers act with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful, deterrence is unnecessary and the exclusionary rule does not apply.”).

Now, , , retroactively and vacate his convictions.

I. BACKGROUND ¶3 In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, “we consider only evidence presented at the suppression hearing and view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.” ¶ 3, (citation and internal quotations omitted).

Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 347 (“[A] state court need not make detailed findings addressing all the evidence before it.”); ¶ 28 (2002) (“the trial court ruled against [defendant’s] challenge, implicitly finding that he had not carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination”)