Cited by

§ 13-2508(A)(3), (C); ¶¶ 22–23 (2016) (noting that “a person who simply does not open the door when officers attempt to arrest him commits passive resistance” under § 13-2508(C); it “does not require action directed against an officer, but serves to punish anyone who impedes the arrest, which is a function of the state’s authority”)

¶ 8 Matthews recognizes our holding in Sorkhabi but argues that it should be limited in light of additions to the resisting arrest statute, and because of the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in State v. Jurden

¶ 11 (2016) (explaining the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against multiple convictions for the same offense based on “the same conduct”).

Generally, “if multiple violations of the same statute are based on the same conduct, there can be only one conviction if there is a single offense.” ¶ 11 (2016).

“If the statutory language is unambiguous, we apply it as written without further analysis.” ¶ 15 (2016).

“[I]f multiple violations of the same statute are based on the same conduct, there can be only one conviction.” ¶ 11 (2016).

¶ 6 (2018); ¶ 15 (2016); ¶ 6 (App. 2011).

The court noted Jurden did not exclude officers as victims under the Victims’ Bill of Rights, and that “nowhere in the case did they specifically overrule that prior finding of the Court of Appeals, [in State v. Sorkhabi] which basically held that victim status [was] appropriate.” Jurden, Sorkhabi

¶7 “This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.” ¶ 7 (2016).

¶35 Payan argues a police officer cannot qualify as a victim of a resisting arrest charge because the offense is “event-directed,” not “victim-directed.” In Jurden, our supreme court analyzed whether a defendant could be convicted of “multiple counts of resisting arrest resulting from a single, continuous act of r