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¶17 The state argues, however, that § 13-4504 was “combined” with § 13-4503 “into Rule 11.2 in 2017.” It contends the rule therefore “clarifies that, procedurally, the dismissal provisions of [§] 13-4504 apply after reasonable grounds to question competency to stand trial have been found.” ¶¶ 35-37 (2021), it argues the rule must control.

We review the summary dismissal of a PCR proceeding for an abuse of discretion, “which occurs if the court makes an error of law or fails to adequately investigate the facts necessary to support its decision.” ¶ 6 (2021).

DISCUSSION ¶9 A defendant proves IAC by showing both “that counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he was prejudiced thereby.” ¶ 8 (2021) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984)).

A defendant establishes an IAC claim by showing both “that counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he was prejudiced thereby.” ¶ 8 (2021) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687– 88 (1984)).

As a result, this court analyzes Williams’ claim under Rule 33.1(g).2 ¶6 Rule 33 “does not define ‘a significant change in the law.’ But plainly a ‘change in the law’ requires some transformative event, a ‘clear break from the past.’” ¶ 15 (2009) (); ¶ 28 (2021); ¶ 13 (2021); cf. Slemmer, 170 Ariz. at 182 (“a significant change in the law” is “a ‘sharp break’ with the past”).

¶5 We review the superior court’s denial of post-conviction relief for an abuse of discretion, “which occurs if the court makes an error of law or fails to adequately investigate the facts necessary to support its decision.” ¶ 6 (2021).

defendant must show “there has been a significant change in the law that, if applicable to the defendant’s case, would probably overturn the defendant’s judgment or sentence.” The defendant’s showing has three components: (1) there has been a change in the law that constitutes a “clear break from the past,” such as “when an appellate court overrules previously binding case law,” ¶ 28 (2021) (citations and internal quotation 5 STATE v. LOWERY Decision of the Court marks omitted); (2) the change a

¶17 We evaluate counsel’s reasonableness by examining the “practice and expectations of the legal community, and ask[], in light of all the circumstances, whether counsel’s performance was reasonable under prevailing professional norms.” ¶ 10 (2021) ( ¶ 5 (2017)).

See Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. at 63, ¶ 27 (applying harmless-error review to the refusal of a requested jury instruction); ¶ 17 (App. 2012) (); ¶ 44 (App. 2014).

Thus, Strickland stands for the proposition “that suggestive identification procedures occurring as part of formal court proceedings, like those arranged by police, may trigger the procedural protections set forth in Dessureault.” ¶ 8 (App. 2012), ¶ 25 (2021).