State of Arizona v. Ian Mitcham

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

STATE OF ARIZONA,
Appellant,

v.

IAN MITCHAM,
Appellee.

No. CR-23-0236-PR
Filed December 17, 2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Roy C. Whitehead, Judge
No. CR2018-118086-001

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals,
Division One
256 Ariz. 104 (App. 2023)

VACATED

COUNSEL:

Rachel H. Mitchell, Maricopa County Attorney, Nick Klingerman (argued),
Special Deputy County Attorney, Ryan Green, Deputy County Attorney,
Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of
Arizona

Gary Kula, Maricopa County Public Defender, Mikel Steinfeld (argued),
Martha Barco Penunuri, Jeffrey A. Kirchler, Richard D. Randall, Deputy
 STATE V. MITCHAM
Opinion of the Court

Public Defenders, Phoenix, Attorneys for Ian Mitcham

David J. Euchner (argued), Pima County Public Defender’s Office, Grant D.
Wille, Ralls, Wille, & Coomer, P.C., Tucson, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, Alice M. Jones, Deputy
Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals, Michael O’Toole,
Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona
Attorney General

Jared G. Keenan, Lauren K. Beall, American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Arizona; Vera Eidelman, American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation, New York, NY, Attorneys for Amici Curiae American Civil
Liberties Union of Arizona and American Civil Liberties Union

CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER authored the Opinion of the Court, in which
VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ, JUSTICES BOLICK, BEENE, KING,
BRUTINEL (RETIRED), and JUDGE SKLAR joined. *

CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 After police arrested Ian Mitcham for driving under the
influence of alcohol (“DUI”), he consented to a blood test to determine
alcohol concentration or drug content. Years later, police suspected
Mitcham of committing a murder, and they still had Mitcham’s blood from
the DUI arrest. Without obtaining a warrant, they extracted a DNA profile
from that blood, which linked Mitcham to the murder.

* Justice Brutinel retired after oral argument in this case but nevertheless
participated in deciding this opinion. Justice Montgomery is recused from
this matter. Pursuant to article 6, section 3 of the Arizona Constitution,
Judge Jeffrey Sklar of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, was
designated to sit in this matter.

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Opinion of the Court

¶2 We decide that the police violated Mitcham’s Fourth
Amendment rights by conducting the warrantless search. Because the
inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule applies, however,
we hold that the trial court erred by suppressing the DNA evidence.

BACKGROUND

¶3 In January 2015, Scottsdale Police arrested Mitcham for DUI.
A police officer advised Mitcham that Arizona law required him to submit
to a blood test to determine alcohol concentration or drug content. The
officer explained that if Mitcham refused to consent to testing, the state
would suspend his driver’s license for twelve months. Mitcham
consented.

¶4 The police drew two vials of blood from Mitcham and used
one vial for their test. They made the second vial available to Mitcham to
allow him to independently test his blood. Mitcham signed a
“Destruction Notice,” acknowledging that police would destroy the second
vial if he did not ask for it within ninety days. Mitcham never asked for
the second vial, but the police did not destroy it. Mitcham was ultimately
convicted of a misdemeanor DUI.

¶5 Tragically, one month after Mitcham’s DUI arrest, Allison
Feldman was found murdered in her Scottsdale home. The police
collected biological swabs from the scene, developed a male DNA profile,
and uploaded it into the National DNA Index System (“NDIS”) using the
Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”). See A.R.S. § 41-2418(A)
(establishing Arizona’s DNA identification system). CODIS is a software
program maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that “link[s]
DNA profiles culled from federal, state, and territorial DNA collection
programs,” United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 944 (9th Cir. 2007), and
searches the NDIS database of DNA profiles taken from convicted
offenders, among others. See 34 U.S.C. § 12592(a) (authorizing the
establishment of a national DNA index); see also Lockett v. Wray, 271 F. Supp.
3d 205, 209 (D.D.C. 2017) (relating expert descriptions of NDIS and CODIS).
CODIS did not return a match, and Feldman’s murder remained unsolved
for several years.

¶6 In 2017, police initiated a “familial DNA” investigation on the
unknown-male DNA profile by asking the Arizona Department of Public
Safety (“DPS”) to search Arizona’s DNA identification system to determine

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Opinion of the Court

whether anyone incarcerated by the state is related to that unknown male.
See § 41-2418(A). Through this investigation, DPS identified Mitcham’s
incarcerated brother as closely related—most likely through a parent-child
or sibling relationship—to the man whose DNA was collected at the
murder scene. The police then discovered that the inmate had two sons
and three brothers, including Mitcham. Only Mitcham and one other
brother lived in the Phoenix area.

¶7 The police focused their investigation on Mitcham. An
investigating officer reviewed Mitcham’s 2015 DUI arrest records and
learned that both vials of blood taken from Mitcham were still in police
possession. Without obtaining a warrant, the police analyzed the blood in
the second vial and created Mitcham’s DNA profile. On April 5, 2018, the
police crime lab determined that Mitcham’s profile matched the
unknown-male DNA profile taken from Feldman’s house.

¶8 Days later, the trial court issued search warrants permitting
officers to search Mitcham’s home and seize certain items; place a GPS
tracking device on his car; and obtain buccal samples from Mitcham for
purposes of DNA profiling. The affidavits supporting the warrant
applications described the circumstances leading the police to Mitcham and
stated that officers had used the blood sample taken in the 2015 DUI arrest
to match Mitcham’s DNA with the unknown-male DNA profile from the
murder scene.

¶9 On April 10, police collected buccal swabs from Mitcham
pursuant to the search warrant. The police created another DNA profile
from this sample, which again matched the unknown-male DNA profile
taken from the murder scene. On April 18, a grand jury indicted Mitcham
for first degree murder, second degree burglary, and sexual assault.

¶10 On July 7, 2022, Mitcham moved the trial court to suppress
both (1) the DNA evidence gathered from the second vial taken during his
2015 DUI arrest; and (2) the DNA evidence extracted from the buccal swabs
collected pursuant to the 2018 search warrant. After an evidentiary
hearing, the court granted the motion, reasoning that the warrantless search
of the second vial of blood violated the Fourth Amendment, and no
exceptions to exclusion applied. It also suppressed the DNA evidence
gathered from the buccal swabs pursuant to the warrant, reasoning that the
evidence was “the direct result of the improper DNA extraction [in 2018].”
The court subsequently stayed proceedings to permit the State to appeal its
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ruling. See A.R.S. § 13-4032(6) (permitting the state to appeal “[a]n order
granting a motion to suppress the use of evidence”).

¶11 The court of appeals unanimously reversed, but the judges
had different reasons for doing so. See State v. Mitcham, 256 Ariz. 104
(App. 2023). The majority concluded that although the police had violated
Mitcham’s Fourth Amendment rights, excluding the DNA evidence was
not warranted because the evidence would inevitably have been
discovered, and it had an independent source. See id. at 115 ¶¶ 46–47, 51.
The concurring judge found no Fourth Amendment violation, explaining
that Mitcham did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the second
vial of blood because it was lawfully in police possession. See id. ¶ 53
(Catlett, J., concurring).

¶12 We granted Mitcham’s subsequently filed petition for review
to determine (1) whether the sequencing of Mitcham’s DNA profile from
the second vial of blood taken during the 2015 DUI arrest constituted a
search and violated Mitcham’s rights under the Fourth Amendment; and
(2) if so, whether the DNA evidence should be suppressed. These are
potentially recurring issues of statewide importance and therefore merit
our review. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the
Arizona Constitution.

DISCUSSION

¶13 We review a trial court’s factual findings on a motion to
suppress for an abuse of discretion. State v. Smith, 250 Ariz. 69, 80 ¶ 16
(2020). In doing so, we consider “only the evidence presented at the
suppression hearing and [view such evidence] in the light most favorable
to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.” State v. Thompson, 252 Ariz. 279, 290
¶ 26 (2022) (quoting State v. Primous, 242 Ariz. 221, 223 ¶ 10 (2017)). But
we review de novo the trial court’s legal determination about whether a
search complied with the Fourth Amendment. State v. Jean, 243 Ariz. 331,
334 ¶ 9 (2018).

A. The Police Violated Mitcham’s Fourth Amendment Rights By
Sequencing A DNA Profile From The Second Vial Of Blood Taken
During The 2015 DUI Arrest.

¶14 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
“safeguard[s] the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary

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invasions by governmental officials.” Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S.
296, 303 (2018) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)).
Although Fourth Amendment violations were formerly “tied to
common-law trespass,” United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012), the
Supreme Court has recognized that “the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places,” Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 304 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). Thus, when an individual “seeks to preserve
[something] as private,” and that expectation of privacy is “one that society
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable,’” Fourth Amendment protections
will apply. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (alteration in
original) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 361); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500
U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness.”).

¶15 A search occurs when the government infringes a privacy
interest that society considers to be reasonable. See State v. Mixton, 250
Ariz. 282, 286 ¶ 13 (2021). Such an intrusion “generally . . . requires a
warrant supported by probable cause.” Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 304.
Warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (footnote omitted).

1. A search occurred here.

¶16 The State argues that sequencing Mitcham’s DNA from the
second vial of blood collected during his 2015 DUI arrest was not a “search”
for Fourth Amendment purposes because it already lawfully possessed the
blood. To resolve this argument, we begin with this Court’s opinion in
Mario W. v. Kaipio, 230 Ariz. 122 (2012). There, we considered the
constitutionality of an Arizona law requiring juveniles accused of
committing enumerated offenses to provide law enforcement with a buccal
swab for DNA profiling. Id. at 123–24 ¶ 1. After sequencing, the DNA
profiles were entered into CODIS and Arizona’s DNA identification
database. See id. at 124 ¶ 5. If not ultimately adjudicated delinquent, the
juvenile could petition the court for expungement of the profile from the
databases. Id.

¶17 The Court recognized that the challenged law intruded on a
juvenile’s privacy by authorizing law enforcement to both physically collect
the buccal sample and then process it to extract a DNA profile. Id.
at 126–27 ¶ 18. We therefore addressed each intrusion separately. See id.

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at 127 ¶ 20 (noting that a two-tiered analysis was particularly appropriate
because DNA profiling is much more intrusive than collecting buccal cells).

¶18 We first concluded that collecting the buccal sample was
constitutionally permissible. Id. at 128 ¶ 25. We reasoned that the buccal
swab was minimally intrusive, and the state was justified in collecting the
sample for identification purposes before the juvenile was adjudicated
delinquent because it would lose its chance at collection if the juvenile
absconded. See id. at 127–28 ¶¶ 22–25.

¶19 We then reached a different conclusion about the
constitutionality of extracting a DNA profile from the buccal sample before
the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent. See id. at 129 ¶ 32. We
recognized that “[t]his second search presents a greater privacy concern
than the buccal swab because it involves the extraction (and subsequent
publication to law enforcement nationwide) of thirteen genetic markers
from the arrestee’s DNA sample that create a DNA profile effectively
unique to that individual.” Id. at 128 ¶ 27. Further, we could not
perceive any governmental interest in processing the sample and creating
the DNA profile before adjudication. Id. at 129 ¶ 28. Thus, we concluded
that the state’s interest in processing the sample before adjudication did not
justify the serious intrusion on a juvenile’s privacy interest in the DNA
profile. Id. ¶ 32. Notably, we remarked that:

[O]ne accused of a crime, although having diminished
expectations of privacy in some respects, does not forfeit
Fourth Amendment protections with respect to other offenses
not charged absent either probable cause or reasonable
suspicion. An arrest for vehicular homicide, for example,
cannot alone justify a warrantless search of an arrestee’s
financial records to see if he is also an embezzler.

Id. ¶ 31. We therefore disallowed processing the buccal cells to extract a
DNA profile before a delinquency adjudication as an unreasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment. See id. ¶ 32.

¶20 Although Mario W. seemingly resolves that the police in this
case conducted a “search” by extracting Mitcham’s DNA profile from the
second vial of blood taken during his 2015 DUI arrest, the State argues that
the Supreme Court in Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013), overruled Mario
W. The State describes King as concluding that “sequencing a DNA profile
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from lawfully obtained evidence is not a second ‘search’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” With that characterization, the State
argues that King overruled Mario W. to the extent the latter case concluded
that creating a DNA profile from a buccal swab is a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment. We disagree.

¶21 In King, the Supreme Court held that a Maryland law
authorizing law enforcement officials to “collect DNA samples” from
persons arrested for specific felony offenses—committing or attempting to
commit violent crimes or burglaries—did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. 569 U.S. at 443, 465. The Court found that “using a buccal
swab on the inner tissues of a person’s cheek in order to obtain DNA
samples is a search.” Id. at 446. But it noted that “[t]he expectations of
privacy of an individual taken into police custody ‘necessarily [are] of a
diminished scope.’” Id. at 462 (second alteration in original) (quoting Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979)). It characterized that search as
minimally intrusive and outweighed by substantial government interests
in identifying arrestees and determining whether they had committed other
crimes. Id. at 461, 463–64. And the DNA analysis did not reveal any
information about the arrestee other than mere identification. Id.
at 464–65.

¶22 Importantly, the Court never addressed whether creating a
DNA profile from the buccal sample was a separate “search.” Instead, the
Court examined as a set whether collecting and analyzing a DNA sample
taken from felony arrestees violates the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 442.
Because the collection and analysis occurred in short order as part of “a
routine booking procedure” after a suspect’s arrest, the Court had no need
to address whether the analysis itself was a “search.” See id. at 465.

¶23 The conclusion we take from King is that “taking and
analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and
photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 465–66 (“Upon these considerations
the Court concludes that DNA identification of arrestees is a reasonable
search that can be considered part of a routine booking procedure.”
(emphasis added)). Thus, King overruled Mario W. to the extent the latter
case held that processing buccal swabs before adjudication violated the
juveniles’ Fourth Amendment rights. See Mario W., 230 Ariz. at 129 ¶ 32.
But King did not address whether creating a DNA profile from an arrestee’s
cell sample itself constitutes a separate search. Thus, we do not view King
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as overruling Mario W.’s conclusion that processing a sample to extract a
DNA profile is a search. Cf. Birchfield v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 579 U.S. 438,
464 (2016) (recognizing that blood can reveal information beyond alcohol
and drug content); Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617–18
(1989) (referring to “the collection and subsequent analysis [of urine
samples]” as separate searches under the Fourth Amendment).

¶24 Mario W. remains controlling. We therefore conclude that
extracting Mitcham’s DNA profile in 2018 from the second vial of blood
taken during his 2015 DUI arrest was a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment. See also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616 (recognizing that the
chemical analysis of a blood sample to obtain physiological data is an
invasion of privacy interests apart from the blood draw itself); State v.
Martinez, 570 S.W.3d 278, 292 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (concluding that
subsequent testing of blood drawn for medical purposes constituted “a
Fourth Amendment search separate and apart from the seizure of the blood
by the State”); People v. Thomas, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 714, 716 (Cal. Ct. App.
2011) (“When an individual is compelled to provide a biological sample for
analysis, the collection and subsequent analysis of the sample are treated as
separate searches because they intrude on separate privacy interests.”).

2. The search was unreasonable.

¶25 Unlike the situation in King, the police here did not extract
Mitcham’s DNA profile pursuant to statutory authority governing routine
booking procedures intended to identify perpetrators. See 569 U.S. at 443;
see also In re Leopoldo L., 209 Ariz. 249, 252 ¶ 14 (App. 2004) (explaining that
“compelled DNA testing of juveniles adjudicated delinquent for
committing sexual offenses is not an unreasonable search” because
statutory procedural safeguards “are more stringent than those required for
issuance of a search warrant based on a probable cause finding”). And the
police did not obtain a warrant to create Mitcham’s DNA profile from the
second vial of blood. Under these circumstances, the warrantless search
was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment absent an exception. See
Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.

¶26 One such exception occurred here if Mitcham freely and
voluntarily consented to the search. See State v. Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. 299,
301 ¶ 1 (2016); see also Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250–51 (“[W]e have long approved
consensual searches because it is no doubt reasonable for the police to
conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so.”). The State

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bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
Mitcham voluntarily consented to the search and that the search fell within
the scope of that consent. See Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. at 302–03 ¶ 11; State v.
Ontiveros-Loya, 237 Ariz. 472, 479 ¶ 24 (App. 2015); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.2(b);
see also Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (“When an official
search is properly authorized—whether by consent or by the issuance of a
valid warrant—the scope of the search is limited by the terms of its
authorization.”).

¶27 The State argues that Mitcham consented to the 2018
warrantless search by consenting to the 2015 DUI blood draw, giving the
State lawful possession of the sample and the freedom to later use it to
create a DNA profile. Mitcham acknowledges he consented to the blood
draw in 2015 to allow the State to determine his alcohol concentration or
drug content. But he argues the State exceeded the scope of that consent
by later creating the DNA profile to determine his culpability for Feldman’s
murder, making the warrantless search unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.

¶28 Courts measure the scope of a consent to search using an
objective standard: “what would the typical reasonable person have
understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” Jimeno,
500 U.S. at 251. The question before us then is whether a reasonable
person would have understood that consenting to a blood draw to
determine alcohol concentration or drug content would include consent to
create a DNA profile from that sample. See id. We do not think so.

¶29 Here, the search authorization terms were simple and
unambiguous. Mitcham consented to the blood draw after an officer
advised him that Arizona’s implied consent law required him to submit to
the blood draw “for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration or
drug content.” 1 See A.R.S. § 28-1321(A). The officer did not tell Mitcham
that his blood could be used to create a DNA profile, and Mitcham did not
consent to the search of his blood for that purpose. Further, it was not

1 The year after Mitcham’s blood draw, we held that “showing only that
consent was given in response to this admonition fails to prove that an
arrestee’s consent was freely and voluntarily given.” Valenzuela, 239 Ariz.
at 301 ¶ 2. Mitcham does not challenge the voluntariness of his consent to
draw his blood for purposes of determining his alcohol concentration or
drug content.
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necessary to create a DNA profile to determine alcohol concentration or
drug content. And Mitcham agreed that his second vial of blood would
be destroyed in ninety days if he did not first retrieve it, further supporting
a reasonable belief that Mitcham’s consent was limited to searching for
evidence pertinent only to the pending DUI charge, not other, future
crimes.

¶30 A typical reasonable person in Mitcham’s circumstances
would not have understood that consenting to the blood draw for the
limited purpose of determining alcohol concentration or drug content also
included consenting to the creation of a DNA profile, especially years later.
See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251. The search of the blood to create the DNA
profile therefore exceeded the scope of Mitcham’s consent and cannot serve
as an exception to the warrant requirement. See State v. Billups, 118 Ariz.
124, 126 (1978) (finding that police exceeded the scope of the defendant’s
consent to search his house by searching an unattached shed); United States
v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126, 128, 130 (7th Cir. 1971) (finding that federal
narcotics agents exceeded the scope of the defendant’s consent to search his
home for narcotics by searching for documents); see also People v. Schmoll, 48
N.E.2d 933, 934 (Ill. 1943) (“An arresting officer has no more right to make
a search beyond the limit prescribed in a consent to search, than he has to
exceed the limit prescribed in a search warrant.”). Other courts have
reached similar conclusions in analogous situations. See People v. Pickard, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 686, 687, 689 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2017) (recognizing
that when a driver consents to a blood test under a state’s implied consent
law, further testing of the sample for other substances or DNA may be
beyond the scope of the consent); State v. Binner, 886 P.2d 1056, 1059 (Or.
Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that the defendant who consented to a blood
draw for purposes of determining alcohol concentration did not consent to
having his blood tested for drugs); State v. Gerace, 437 S.E.2d 862, 863 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that consent given to test blood for alcohol
concentration did not include consent to extract a DNA profile).

¶31 In sum, the 2018 creation of Mitcham’s DNA profile from the
second vial of blood taken during the 2015 DUI arrest was a search. That
search was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment because it
was not authorized by a warrant, and the search exceeded the scope of
Mitcham’s consent to analyze his blood to determine alcohol concentration
or drug content. In reaching this conclusion, we emphatically reject the
State’s position that it was free to analyze Mitcham’s blood in any way it
pleased simply because the State lawfully possessed the blood vials. See
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Walter, 447 U.S. at 654 (“The fact that FBI agents were lawfully in possession
of the boxes of film did not give them authority to search their contents.”);
Gerace, 437 S.E.2d at 863 (“The State’s argument that because the blood
sample was obtained with consent it is free to use it for any purpose, paints
the notion of consent with far too broad a brush.”). Although Mitcham
lost his possessory rights to the second vial of blood, he did not lose all of
his privacy rights in that blood. See Mario W., 230 Ariz. at 128 ¶ 27, 129
¶ 31; see also State v. Granville, 423 S.W.3d 399, 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)
(Keller, P.J., concurring) (recognizing that people can have expectations of
privacy in the informational dimension of property separate and apart from
the expectation of privacy in the physical dimension of that property). The
police violated Mitcham’s Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a
search beyond the scope of his consent.

B. The Exclusionary Rule Does Not Require Suppression Of Mitcham’s
DNA Profile.

1. There are exceptions to the exclusionary rule.

¶32 The Fourth Amendment itself does not require courts to
suppress evidence gathered in violation of that amendment. See Davis v.
United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–38 (2011). Instead, courts invoke the
judicially created “exclusionary rule” to suppress evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237
(2016); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963); Valenzuela, 239
Ariz. at 308–09 ¶ 31. The exclusionary rule is a prudential doctrine created
to “compel respect for the constitutional guaranty” by deterring future
violations. See Davis, 564 U.S. at 236 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 217 (1960)); Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. at 308–09 ¶ 31. The rule applies
to evidence obtained directly from an illegal search and to evidence later
discovered because of the illegal search, which is commonly called the
“fruit of the poisonous tree.” Strieff, 579 U.S. at 237 (quoting Segura v.
United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984)). The rationale for the exclusionary
rule is that the prosecution should not be placed in a better position because
of the illegal conduct. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984).

¶33 Importantly, “[s]uppression of evidence . . . has always been
our last resort, not our first impulse.” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586,
591 (2006); State v. Weakland, 246 Ariz. 67, 73 ¶ 20 (2019). We only apply
the exclusionary rule “where its deterrence benefits outweigh its
‘substantial social costs.’” Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591 (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob.
& Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)); Nix, 467 U.S. at 443 (accepting that
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the way to ensure Fourth Amendment protections “is to exclude evidence
seized as a result of such violations notwithstanding the high social cost of
letting persons obviously guilty go unpunished for their crimes”).
Consequently, we have recognized several exceptions to the exclusionary
rule, including the “independent source” and “inevitable discovery”
exceptions. See Strieff, 579 U.S. at 238.

¶34 The “independent source” exception permits the admission
of evidence discovered during or because of an unlawful search if the
evidence was also obtained independently from activities that were tainted
by the illegality. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537–38 (1988);
State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 263 (1984). For instance, in Segura, the Supreme
Court held that although the police illegally entered private premises, the
exclusionary rule did not apply because police seized property at those
premises pursuant to a search warrant that was based on information
unconnected to the illegal entry. 468 U.S. at 814. The independent
source exception, which applies to violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments, rests on the premise that “while the government should not
profit from its illegal activity, neither should it be placed in a worse position
than it would otherwise have occupied” without the illegal conduct. See
Murray, 487 U.S. at 537, 542.

¶35 The “inevitable discovery” exception applies “[i]f the
prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful
means,” making the reason for applying the exclusionary rule meaningless.
Nix, 467 U.S. at 444. Courts extrapolated this exception from the
independent source exception, reasoning that because “tainted evidence
would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source,
it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered” from
such a source. Murray, 487 U.S. at 539. Importantly, “[t]he exception
does not turn on whether the evidence would have been discovered had
[officers] acted lawfully in the first place,” but instead “applies if the
evidence would have been lawfully discovered despite the unlawful
behavior and independent of it.” Brown v. McClennen, 239 Ariz. 521,
524–25 ¶ 14 (2016) (emphasis added). For example, in State v. Jones, 185
Ariz. 471, 481 (1996), we held that despite an improper warrantless search
of the arrested defendant’s belongings while stowed in a police car, because
police inevitably would have conducted a proper inventory search of those
belongings upon return to the station, the exclusionary rule did not apply
to suppress evidence of the defendant’s bloody clothing.
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¶36 In sum, the distinction between the independent source
exception and the inevitable discovery exception rests on whether the
evidence was discovered through an independent, untainted source
(independent source exception), or whether the evidence would have been
discovered through an independent, untainted source despite the illegal
search (inevitable discovery exception). See State v. Boll, 651 N.W.2d 710,
716–17 ¶¶ 20–26 (S.D. 2002) (similarly distinguishing these exceptions).

2. The inevitable discovery exception applies here.

¶37 Turning to this case, we agree with the State that the police
would have inevitably obtained Mitcham’s DNA profile from an
independent, untainted source despite the warrantless search of the second
vial of blood taken after the 2015 DUI arrest. To prove the inevitable
discovery exception, the State cannot speculate but must instead “focus[]
on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or
impeachment.” Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5. The court “view[s] affairs as
they existed at the instant before the unlawful search” and then determines
“what would have happened had the unlawful search never occurred.”
United States v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting United
States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854, 861 (2d Cir. 1992)).

¶38 Here, the verifiable facts demonstrate inevitable discovery of
Mitcham’s DNA profile. At the time of the illegal search in 2018, Mitcham
was facing charges unrelated to Feldman’s murder. In 2016, the state
charged him with committing a narcotic drug violation, a class four felony.
The next year, the state charged him with two counts of aggravated DUI,
class six felonies. In June 2022, about six months before the suppression
hearing in this case, Mitcham pled guilty to all charges in the narcotics/DUI
cases, and the court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment in the Arizona
Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry (“ADCRR”).

¶39 Arizona law requires ADCRR to take a sample of blood or
other bodily substance for purposes of DNA profiling from every person
convicted of a felony and sentenced to prison. See A.R.S. § 13-610(A), (O). 2

2 Section 13-610(A) refers to the “state department of corrections.” That
agency has changed its name to the “Arizona Department of Corrections,
Rehabilitation and Reentry.” See ADCRR Home Page,

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Opinion of the Court

Thereafter, ADCRR is required to transmit the sample to DPS, which must
extract a DNA profile and enter the results into Arizona’s DNA
identification system and CODIS. See Mario W., 230 Ariz. at 124 ¶ 5;
§ 13-610(H); § 41-2418(A). The profile can then be used for “law
enforcement identification purposes” and in any criminal prosecution.
See § 13-610(I)(1)–(2). ADCRR must extract the sample for DNA profiling
within thirty days of sentencing but is prohibited from doing so if DPS “has
previously received and is maintaining a sample sufficient for [DNA]
testing.” See § 13-610(A), (G).

¶40 Pursuant to § 13-610, the State would have inevitably
discovered Mitcham’s DNA profile despite the illegal search of the second
vial of blood taken in 2015. The narcotics/DUI convictions and resulting
sentences were unrelated to and thus untainted by the illegal searches.
Had those searches not occurred, § 13-610(A) would have required ADCRR
to collect samples of Mitcham’s blood or bodily substances, and DPS would
have obtained the same DNA profile that was extracted from the second
vial of blood. As Mitcham acknowledged at oral argument, the only
reason this did not occur was because DPS already had Mitcham’s genetic
sample and DNA profile from the searches conducted in 2018, 3 and was
therefore prohibited from taking new samples. See § 13-610(G).
Suppressing the DNA evidence in these circumstances would not fulfill the
exclusionary rule’s purpose of preventing the prosecution from being in a
better position due to the illegal search. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 443. Instead,
suppression would put the prosecution in a worse position than it would
have been in without the illegal search. See Murray, 487 U.S. at 537, 542.

¶41 We are not persuaded by Mitcham’s arguments against
application of the inevitable discovery exception. First, he argues that the

https://corrections.az.gov (last visited Dec. 9, 2024). We therefore refer to
the agency using its current name.
3 We could not determine from the record whether the Scottsdale Police
transferred Mitcham’s blood sample to DPS and uploaded the DNA profile
into Arizona’s DNA identification system. But the police were required to
transmit a sample of buccal cells or other bodily substances for DNA testing
to DPS when Mitcham was arrested for Feldman’s murder in 2018. See
§ 13-610(K) (requiring transmittal of a sample for persons arrested for listed
offenses, including first degree murder). Mitcham acknowledges that in
2018 DPS had a sample of his genetic material and his DNA profile.
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Opinion of the Court

DNA profile would not have been inevitably discovered from his 2022
felony convictions because DPS never received a blood or bodily substance
sample from which to create a DNA profile. See § 13-610(A). This
argument places form over substance, and we reject it. As explained,
§ 13-610(G) prohibited ADCRR from extracting a new sample because DPS
already had a sample and a DNA profile. The point here is that had the
illegal search not occurred, ADCRR would have provided a sample to DPS,
which would have extracted Mitcham’s DNA profile. And no purpose
would be served by suppressing Mitcham’s DNA profile only to have
ADCRR provide DPS with a new sample so the same profile could again be
extracted.

¶42 Second, Mitcham asserts that the inevitable discovery
exception applies only when “regular police work already in progress” at
the time of the illegal search demonstrates that the evidence would have
been inevitably discovered. Mitcham contends that because “the possible
‘future’ acquisition of [his] DNA from his 2022 convictions is not evidence
that ‘inevitably’ emerged during the homicide investigation,” and the
police “had no way of knowing that [he] would plead guilty over four years
later” to the narcotics/DUI charges, the police investigating at the time of
the illegal searches would not have inevitably discovered his DNA profile.
Applying the inevitable discovery exception in these circumstances, he
argues, would “rel[y] solely on speculation, and such speculation alone
cannot sustain the State’s burden” under Nix. We disagree.

¶43 Relying exclusively on investigative facts and procedures
available to police at the time of the illegal search to assess inevitable
discovery is unnecessarily restrictive. Nix did not confine the examination
of “historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment” to facts
existing before an illegal search. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5. Notably,
“Arizona has adopted the broad view of the inevitable discovery rule,” and
so “the State is not required to demonstrate that police initiated lawful
means to acquire evidence prior to its seizure.” State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz.
191, 204 ¶ 37 (2004). Similarly, we see no reason to require the State to
prove the exception by projecting investigative outcomes using only facts
available to the police before the illegal search. The key inquiry is whether
verifiable facts exist from which the court can find, at the time of the
suppression hearing, that the evidence would have been lawfully
discovered despite the illegal search and independent of it. See Brown, 239
Ariz. at 525 ¶ 14.

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Opinion of the Court

¶44 We find the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Sutton v. Pfister, 834
F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2016), persuasive. There, the State of Illinois unlawfully
collected a sample of defendant Sutton’s blood during his prosecution for a
1991 attempted sexual assault and extracted his DNA profile. Id. at 818.
The state did not introduce DNA evidence at trial, but Sutton was
nevertheless convicted and sentenced to prison. See id. Meanwhile, law
enforcement matched Sutton’s illegally obtained DNA profile to physical
evidence collected from a 1990 sexual assault. See id. The Seventh Circuit
held that the inevitable discovery exception permitted the trial court to
admit the DNA evidence in Sutton’s 1990 sexual assault trial. See id. at 822.
It found that the state would have lawfully obtained Sutton’s blood sample
upon his conviction for the 1991 attempted sexual assault pursuant to an
Illinois law that required blood and saliva samples from convicted sex
offenders. See id. Conspicuously, the decision did not turn on whether
police in the 1991 case had any way of knowing at the time of the illegal
search that Sutton would be convicted without the DNA evidence and then
lawfully required to submit blood and saliva samples.

¶45 The cases cited by Mitcham do not persuade us to view the
inevitable discovery exception more restrictively. In State v. Lamb, 116
Ariz. 134, 138 (1977), this Court agreed with other courts that “evidence
obtained as a result of an unlawful search need not be suppressed where,
in the normal course of the police investigation and absent the illicit
conduct, the evidence would have been discovered anyway.” Although
the events demonstrating inevitable discovery there had occurred at the
time of the illegal search, nothing in Lamb precluded application of the
inevitable discovery exception if new events had occurred after the illegal
search. The key consideration was whether the means of discovery was
untainted by the illegal search. See id.

¶46 The cases Mitcham cites from other jurisdictions admittedly
use language suggesting that the inevitable discovery exception applies
only when investigative facts existing before an illegal search demonstrate
inevitable discovery. See United States v. Lang, 149 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir.
1998) (stating that application of the exception requires a court “to
determine whether a reasonable probability of discovery existed prior to
the unlawful conduct, based on the information possessed and
investigations being pursued at such time” (quoting United States v. Drosten,
819 F.2d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 1987))); Eng, 971 F.2d at 861 (“[T]he alternate
means of obtaining the evidence must at least be in existence and, at least
to some degree, imminent, if yet unrealized.” (alteration in original)
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Opinion of the Court

(quoting United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1205 n.10 (5th Cir. 1985))).
Neither case, however, dealt with identification evidence like the DNA
evidence here, which can be extracted from different sources and at
different times. Rather, they concerned physical evidence that was the
subject of the illegal search. See Lang, 149 F.3d at 1046 (concerning “crack
cocaine found in a cereal box hidden inside the engine compartment” of a
vehicle); Eng, 971 F.2d at 857 (regarding the contents of defendant’s safe).
Thus, it is unsurprising that these courts required the government to show
that an active investigation, independent from and untainted by the illegal
search, would have uncovered the evidence. Regardless, to the extent
these cases categorically preclude assessment of events occurring after the
illegal search to decide whether to apply the inevitable discovery exception,
we disagree for the reasons previously explained. See Part B(2), ¶¶ 38–40,
43–44.

¶47 In sum, the inevitable discovery exception applies here, and
the trial court therefore erred by suppressing Mitcham’s DNA profile. If
the police had not created a DNA profile from the second vial of blood in
2018, DPS would have done so after his 2022 felony convictions. This is
certain, not speculative, so it easily satisfies the preponderance standard
adopted in Nix. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5. In light of this conclusion,
we do not address whether other exceptions to the exclusionary rule apply
here. And we do not address Mitcham’s arguments based on the Arizona
Constitution’s Private Affairs Clause, as they were neither raised at the trial
court nor sufficiently developed here. See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 8.

CONCLUSION

¶48 For the foregoing reasons, although we agree with the court
of appeals’ holding, we vacate its opinion to replace its reasoning with our
own. We also reverse the trial court’s suppression order and remand for
further proceedings.

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