State of Arizona v. John Logan Brown

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

STATE OF ARIZONA,
Appellee,

v.

JOHN LOGAN BROWN,
Appellant.

No. CR-24-0143-PR
Filed October 7, 2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
The Honorable Brenden J. Griffin, Judge
No. CR20220381-001
REVERSED AND REMANDED

Memorandum of the Court of Appeals, Division Two
No. 2 CA-CR 23-0138
VACATED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART

COUNSEL:

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, Alice M. Jones, Deputy
Solicitor General, Section Chief of Criminal Appeals, Casey D. Ball
(argued), Amy M. Thorson, Assistant Attorneys General, Phoenix,
Attorneys for State of Arizona

James L. Fullin, Pima County Legal Defender, Alex D. Heveri (argued),
Assistant Legal Defender, Tucson, Attorneys for John Logan Brown

Jared G. Keenan (argued), Attorney at Law, American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Arizona, Phoenix, Attorney for Amici Curiae The American
Civil Liberties Union of Arizona & Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice
 STATE V. BROWN
Opinion of the Court

JUSTICE BEENE authored the Opinion of the Court, in which VICE CHIEF
JUSTICE LOPEZ and JUSTICES BOLICK, MONTGOMERY, KING and
BERCH (Retired) * joined. CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER dissented.

JUSTICE BEENE, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 John Brown was charged with three counts of aggravated
assault. At trial, Brown asserted that he acted in self-defense and requested
several justification jury instructions. The superior court denied Brown’s
request that it instruct the jury on the defense of residential structure, A.R.S.
§ 13-418; the defense of premises, A.R.S. § 13-407; and the presumption that
applies to these defenses, A.R.S. § 13-419.

¶2 In this case, we determine whether a bedroom within a
condominium constitutes a “residential structure.” We also consider the
scope and application of a justification statute that presumes an individual
lawfully uses force when defending against an unlawful entry into a
residential structure.

¶3 After oral argument before this Court, we issued a decision
order finding that the superior court erred in denying Brown’s requested
instructions. We also indicated that this Opinion fully explaining our
decision would follow.

BACKGROUND

¶4 At the time relevant to the events in this case, Brown lived
with J.A., his long-term partner, and their two minor children in a
two-bedroom condominium. Although Brown considered J.A. his wife,
they lived in separate rooms.

¶5 Brown and J.A. met M.H., the victim, in 2020. M.H. was their
neighbor but also occasionally lived with the couple. About a year before
the incident leading to Brown’s charges, Brown told J.A. that he was

∗ Justice Maria Elena Cruz recused herself from this matter. Pursuant to
article 6, section 3 of the Arizona Constitution, the Honorable Justice
Rebecca Berch (Ret.) was designated to sit in this matter.

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Opinion of the Court

“uncomfortable” with M.H. and that he no longer wanted him at their
condominium or around their children. Brown’s concerns about M.H.
stemmed from an altercation between M.H. and other mutual friends.
Brown was also aware that M.H. had a felony conviction for using a knife
against a former roommate. Despite Brown’s apprehension about M.H.,
J.A. continued to maintain a friendship with him.

¶6 In December 2021, Brown and J.A. separated, and he moved
out. A month later, after M.H. told J.A. that he did not want her to reconcile
with Brown, the two men got into a fight during which M.H. assaulted
Brown and broke one of his guitars. Shortly after the fight, Brown moved
back in with J.A., and they agreed that M.H. would not return to their
condominium.

¶7 However, one week later, J.A. invited M.H. over to help her
clean the condominium after Brown left for work. Although Brown knew
that M.H. was coming over, he “wasn’t happy about it.” After returning
from work and noticing that M.H. was still in the condominium, Brown
locked himself in his bedroom. Brown then texted J.A. to “leave him alone
for the evening.”

¶8 Defying this request, J.A. attempted to unlock the door to
Brown’s bedroom. When that effort failed, J.A. forced the door open, but
Brown quickly shut it, telling J.A. that he did not want to talk to her.
Undeterred, J.A. forced the door open again. After seeing J.A. and M.H.
standing in the doorway to his bedroom, and not knowing who forcibly
opened his bedroom door, Brown picked up a microphone stand and began
swinging it around to prevent them from coming into his bedroom. Brown
and M.H. fought over the microphone stand and during this altercation,
M.H. was struck in the face.

¶9 A grand jury indicted Brown on three counts of aggravated
assault. One count was based on his actions involving the microphone
stand. The two other counts involved conduct that occurred later. The jury
found Brown guilty only of the count involving the microphone stand. The
trial court sentenced Brown to five years in prison.

¶10 The court of appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence.
State v. Brown, No. 2 CA-CR 2023-0138, 2024 WL 2263468, at *1 ¶ 1 (Ariz.
App. May 17, 2024) (mem. decision). The court rejected Brown’s argument
that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on defense of

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Opinion of the Court

premises, § 13-407; defense of residential structure, § 13-418; and the
presumption related to those defenses, § 13-419(A). Id. at *2–3 ¶¶ 12–16.

¶11 The court began its analysis with § 13-419(A), a statute that
“would render Brown’s conduct presumptively necessary if he knew or
reasonably believed that M.H. was unlawfully entering—or had unlawfully
entered—Brown’s residential structure.” Id. at *3 ¶ 17. Although the court
noted that M.H. must have been in Brown’s residential structure unlawfully
and without “the right to be in” the structure for § 13-419’s presumption to
apply, the court determined that it did not need to decide whether Brown’s
locked room qualified as a “residential structure.” Id. at *3 ¶¶ 17–18. Thus,
the court assumed, without deciding, that Brown’s bedroom constituted a
“residential structure.” Id. at *3 ¶ 18.

¶12 The court then addressed whether M.H. had the “right to be
in” the property as an “invitee.” Id. at *3 ¶ 19; § 13-419(C)(1). It concluded
that because J.A. had invited M.H. to the condominium and did not ask him
to leave before the incident, “even if the bedroom was a distinct residential
structure, the record suggests no legal limitations on J.A.’s ability
to . . . allow M.H. to enter it.” Id. at *4 ¶ 20. Accordingly, the court held that
§ 13-419’s presumption was not available to Brown because M.H.’s entry
into Brown’s bedroom was lawful. Id. at *4 ¶ 21.

¶13 After determining that the presumption instruction was not
applicable, the court then discussed whether Brown was nonetheless
entitled to an instruction on the defense of premises and the defense of a
residential structure. Id. at *4 ¶¶ 22–23; §§ 13-407(A), -418(A).

¶14 Regarding the defense of premises instruction, the court
reasoned that “Brown could not have reasonably believed that force was
‘immediately necessary to prevent or terminate a . . . criminal trespass’”
because “[a] ‘criminal trespass’ requires that the defendant ‘knowingly
enter[]’ or ‘remain[] unlawfully on a property.’” Brown, 2024 WL 2263468,
at *4 ¶ 22 (alterations in original) (first quoting § 13-407(A), then quoting
A.R.S. §§ 13-1502 to -1504). The court concluded that because Brown knew
that J.A. had invited M.H. to the condominium, no trespass was possible,
and the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Brown’s
request for this instruction. Id.

¶15 The court of appeals similarly concluded that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in declining to give the defense of residential
structure instruction. Id. at *4 ¶ 23. The court also determined that, because

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Opinion of the Court

Brown could not have reasonably believed M.H. was “unlawfully or
forcefully entering” the property and no evidence suggested that Brown
“reasonably believe[d]” he was “in imminent peril of death or serious
physical injury,” this instruction was not warranted. Id.

¶16 We granted review because the issues presented in this case
are of statewide importance and capable of repetition. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

DISCUSSION

I.

¶17 “We review a trial court’s decision to give a jury instruction
for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Ewer, 254 Ariz. 326, 329 ¶ 10 (2023)
(quoting State v. Aragón, 252 Ariz. 525, 528 ¶ 6 (2022)). “An abuse of
discretion occurs when a court commits a legal error by misinterpreting or
misapplying the law.” Voice of Surprise v. Hall, 255 Ariz. 510, 513 ¶ 11 (2023).
But the trial court has discretion over whether to give or refuse an
instruction, and we will not upset that decision “absent a clear abuse of that
discretion.” State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 309 (1995).

¶18 We review de novo whether a trial court properly instructed
the jury. State v. Champagne, 247 Ariz. 116, 130 ¶ 22 (2019). “A defendant is
entitled to a self-defense instruction if the record contains the ‘slightest
evidence’ that he acted in self-defense.” State v. King, 225 Ariz. 87, 90 ¶ 14
(2010) (quoting State v. Lujan, 136 Ariz. 102, 104 (1983)).

II.
¶19 As indicated above, the trial court declined Brown’s request
to instruct the jury on the defense of residential structure and the
presumption related to that defense. §§ 13-418, -419. Both instructions
reference the term “residential structure,” which is defined in
A.R.S. § 13-1501(11). Determining whether the trial court abused its
discretion in declining to instruct the jury regarding these statutes compels
us to interpret § 13-1501(11).

¶20 “We interpret statutes ‘in view of the entire text, considering
the context and related statutes on the same subject.’” Planned Parenthood
Ariz., Inc. v. Mayes, 257 Ariz. 137, 142 ¶ 15 (2024) (quoting Nicaise v.
Sundaram, 245 Ariz. 566, 568 ¶ 11 (2019)). Courts will read each word,
phrase, clause, and sentence in a manner that ensures “no part of the statute
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Opinion of the Court

is void or trivial” and will give meaning to the statute’s clear and
unequivocal language. Id. Under this plain meaning analysis, courts “look
first to the language of the provision, [and] if the statutory language is clear,
judicial construction is neither required nor proper.” Id. (quoting Perini
Land & Dev. Co. v. Pima County, 170 Ariz. 380, 383 (1992)) (citation modified).

¶21 In Arizona, the statutory definition of a “residential
structure” is “any structure, movable or immovable, permanent or
temporary, that is adapted for both human residence and lodging whether
occupied or not.” § 13-1501(11). Section 13-1501(12) then describes a
“structure,” in part, as “any building . . . or place with sides and a floor that
is separately securable from any other structure attached to it and that is
used for lodging.”

¶22 These statutes use three important but undefined terms:
“human residence,” “lodging,” and “separately securable.” When
statutory terms are undefined, “courts generally give words their ordinary
meaning and may look to dictionary definitions.” In re Drummond, 257
Ariz. 15, 18 ¶ 7 (2024). “Residence” is defined as “the place where one
actually lives,” or “a temporary or permanent dwelling place, abode, or
habitation to which one intends to return as distinguished from a place of
temporary sojourn or transient visit.” Residence, Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary (1976); Residence, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed.
1968) (“A factual place of abode.”). Thus, a “human residence” is a
“dwelling place, abode, or habitation” that has been adapted for human
living. Next, “lodging” has been defined in common language as “a place
to live,” “a place in which to settle or come to rest,” “sleeping
accommodations,” or “a room or rooms in the house of another used as a
place of residence.” Lodging, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
(1976). Finally, “securable” has been defined as “capable of being secured.”
Securable, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1976). “Secure,”
in turn, means “to relieve from exposure to danger,” or to “make safe.”
Secure, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1976). Reading these
statutes and dictionary definitions together and in the broader statutory
context provides that a “residential structure” is: (1) any place with sides
and a floor, (2) that is separately securable from any other structure
attached to it, and (3) is adapted for both human residence and lodging.
The statutory text does not require that a residential structure be completely
distinct from any other residential structure, nor does it preclude a
residential structure from being nested within another residential structure,
as in the case of rooms within a boarding house.

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Opinion of the Court

¶23 Under this definition, Brown’s bedroom constitutes a
residential structure. His bedroom had walls and a floor. It also had a door,
capable of being locked, that rendered his bedroom “separately securable”
from the “other structure attached to it,” i.e., the rest of the condominium.
Even if the front door to the common area was left unlocked or visitors were
admitted to the common area, Brown’s room could still be locked and
closed off from unwanted visitors. Furthermore, a bedroom is inherently
adapted for both human residence and lodging; it is a living area and, much
like a hotel room, is equipped for lodging. The only element distinguishing
a “residential structure” under § 13-1501(11) and a “structure” under
§ 13-1501(12) is that a “residential structure” must be “adapted for both
human residence and lodging whether occupied or not.” That element is
present here given that a bedroom provides “sleeping accommodations”
and is a place where one lives. Thus, the plain meaning of § 13-1501(11)
and -1501(12) supports our conclusion that Brown’s bedroom is a
“residential structure.”

¶24 Our dissenting colleague takes issue with our conclusion that
a residential structure may be nested within another residential structure.
See infra ¶ 59. The dissent argues that we “largely ignore” the portion of
§ 13-1501(12) that requires a “structure” to be “separately securable from
any other structure attached to it.” See infra ¶ 60. We disagree.

¶25 Our interpretation of § 13-1501(12) does not overlook the
statutory language but rather reads the text and necessary dictionary
definitions together, and in context, to reach § 13-1501(12)’s meaning. See
supra ¶ 22. As previously indicated, a “residential structure” is: (1) any
place with sides and a floor, (2) that is separately securable from any other
structure attached to it, and (3) is adapted for both human residence and
lodging. Id. Brown’s bedroom meets the definition of a “residential
structure” and is “separately securable” on its own from the “other
structure attached to it”—the rest of the condominium. The plain meaning
of the statute does not require more.

¶26 The dissent also argues that “[a] residence is generally more
than a place to sleep,” and that a residence “typically includes a kitchen,
bathroom, and other living areas that together make the home suitable and
comfortable for human occupancy,” and concludes that “the entire living
space should be considered the ‘residential structure.’” See infra ¶ 62.
Again, we disagree.

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Opinion of the Court

¶27 Here, the dissent narrows the definition of “residential
structure” by inserting requirements that are absent from the text of the
relevant statutes. Specifically, the dissent maintains that “[a] residence is
generally more than a place to sleep” and “[o]ther than with student
dormitories, hotel rooms, and similar abodes . . . typically includes a
kitchen, bathroom, and other living areas that together make the home
suitable and comfortable for human occupancy.” See infra ¶ 62. The
dissent’s definition of “residential structure” and use of additional
qualifying characteristics is internally inconsistent and incompatible with
the text of the relevant statutes. A residence may generally be more than a
place to sleep and may typically include amenities such as a kitchen and
bathroom, but that is not always so, as is the case with dormitories, hotel
rooms, group homes, boarding houses, and similar abodes. More
importantly, amenities like “a kitchen, bathroom, and other living areas”
are not required by the text of §§ 13-1501(11) and -1501(12). The dissent’s
emendation to the definition of “residential structure” would effectively
rewrite the statute—something we cannot do. See City of Phoenix v. Butler, 110 Ariz. 160, 162 (1973) (concluding that “it is not the function of the courts
to rewrite statutes”). As noted earlier, we derive a statute’s meaning by
“determin[ing] the plain meaning of the words the [L]egislature chose to
use.” In re Drummond, 257 Ariz. at 18 ¶ 5. Here, we have faithfully adhered
to the plain meaning of the Legislature’s words to conclude that Brown’s
bedroom constituted a “residential structure.”

III.

¶28 Section 13-419(A) provides a presumption that the threat or
use of physical force was immediately necessary “if the person knows or
has reason to believe that the person against whom physical force . . . is
threatened or used is unlawfully or forcefully entering or has unlawfully or
forcefully entered and is present in the person’s residential structure.”
Subsection (B) then states that “a person . . . who has unlawfully or
forcefully entered and is present in a residential structure . . . is presumed
to pose an imminent threat of unlawful deadly harm to any person who is
in the residential structure.” 1 § 13-419(B). As previously indicated, we
conclude that Brown’s bedroom comprised a residential structure under
Arizona law. See supra ¶¶ 21–23.

1 Section 13-419’s presumption applies to the justification defenses in
§§ 13-407 and -418. See §§ 13-419(A), (B).
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Opinion of the Court

¶29 But this presumption does not apply when “[t]he person
against whom physical force . . . was threatened or used has the right to be
in . . . the residential structure . . . including an owner, lessee, invitee or
titleholder.” § 13-419(C)(1). Here, the court of appeals concluded that
because J.A. invited M.H. into the condominium, his entry into Brown’s
bedroom was lawful and therefore § 13-419(A)’s presumption did not
apply. Brown, 2024 WL 2263468, at *4 ¶¶ 20–21. We disagree.

¶30 The court of appeals relied on Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103
(2006), for its conclusion that Brown could not “unilaterally exclude
J.A.—or her invitee M.H.—from [Brown’s] bedroom.” Brown, 2024 WL
2263468, at *4 ¶¶ 19–20. This is a misreading of Randolph.

¶31 In Randolph, the United States Supreme Court considered
whether an evidentiary seizure was lawful when one occupant to the
premises granted permission to search despite the other occupant’s
presence and express refusal to consent to the search. 547 U.S. at 106. In
analyzing this issue, the Court stated:

Since the co-tenant wishing to open the door to a third party
has no recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail over
a present and objecting co-tenant, his disputed invitation,
without more, gives a police officer no better claim to
reasonableness in entering that the officer would have in the
absence of any consent at all.

Id. at 114 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court concluded that law
enforcement could not lawfully enter and search a shared residence based
on the consent of one occupant when the other occupant was also present
and contemporaneously objected to the search. Id. at 120.

¶32 The court of appeals’ reliance on Randolph to support its
conclusion that a co-tenant has the authority to prevail over the express
wishes of another co-tenant was erroneous. In fact, Randolph supports the
opposite conclusion—that J.A. had no authority to invite M.H. into Brown’s
bedroom against his express wishes.

¶33 Moreover, the court of appeals’ error regarding Randolph’s
holding was heightened when it incorrectly concluded that M.H.’s entry
into Brown’s bedroom was lawful because he was J.A.’s “invitee.” See
Brown, 2024 WL 2263468, at *3–4 ¶¶ 19–21. Although Brown acknowledged
that J.A. was “allowed to invite people over,” an invitee can become a

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Opinion of the Court

trespasser if that individual exceeds the scope of the invitation. Nicoletti v.
Westcor, Inc., 131 Ariz. 140, 143 (1982). It is uncontroverted that Brown did
not invite M.H. into his bedroom; thus, M.H. was not an “invitee” for this
purpose and had no “right to be in” Brown’s bedroom.

¶34 In sum, the evidence in this case supports a conclusion that
M.H. forcefully entered Brown’s bedroom—a residential structure—and
that M.H. did not have the “right to be in” Brown’s bedroom. See
§ 13-419(C)(1). Accordingly, because there was “the slightest evidence” on
which to base the giving of the instruction, the trial court erred by denying
Brown’s request for a jury instruction under § 13-419.

IV.

¶35 Section 13-418 outlines the justification defense of a
residential structure. The statute reads, in relevant part:

[A] person is justified in threatening to use or using physical
force or deadly physical force against another person if the
person reasonably believes himself or another person to be in
imminent peril of death or serious physical injury and the
person against whom the physical force or deadly physical
force is threatened or used was in the process of unlawfully
or forcefully entering, or had unlawfully or forcefully entered,
a residential structure.

§ 13-418(A).

¶36 The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the jury regarding defense of
residential structure because “no evidence suggested that Brown
‘reasonably believe[d]’ he was ‘in imminent peril of death or serious
physical injury’” and “Brown could not have reasonably believed M.H. was
‘unlawfully or forcefully entering’” a residential structure. Brown, 2024 WL
2263468, at *4 ¶ 23 (alteration in original) (quoting § 13-418(A)).

¶37 Because we conclude that § 13-419(B)’s presumption applies,
M.H. is “presumed to pose an imminent threat of unlawful deadly harm”
to Brown while he was in Brown’s bedroom. Brown was therefore justified
in “using physical force or deadly force” against M.H. See § 13-418(A).
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the
jury regarding § 13-418.

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Opinion of the Court

¶38 But even without applying § 13-419’s presumption, the trial
court erred in denying Brown’s request for an instruction under § 13-418.
Although Brown testified that he did not feel threatened by M.H. during
the microphone stand incident, this admission does not excuse the trial
court’s refusal to give this instruction. As previously noted, a defendant is
entitled to an instruction “if the record contains the ‘slightest evidence’”
supporting a claim of self-defense. King, 225 Ariz. at 90 ¶ 14. Here, Brown
went to his bedroom, locked the door “to keep [J.A. and M.H.] out,” and,
after the door was forcibly opened, began swinging the microphone stand
to prevent J.A. and M.H. from entering his bedroom. Additionally, Brown
testified that he sustained injuries from a fight with M.H. a week before this
incident occurred and also stated that he was aware M.H. had a felony
conviction for his involvement in a knife fight. Regardless of the fact that
Brown did not feel threatened by M.H. when he swung the microphone
stand, the circumstances surrounding the forced entry into his bedroom in
addition to Brown’s previous encounters with M.H. and his knowledge of
M.H.’s prior felony conviction are sufficient for a jury to potentially
conclude that Brown was “in imminent peril of death or serious physical
injury” when M.H. entered Brown’s bedroom. Thus, even without
§ 13-419’s presumption, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing
Brown’s requested instruction under § 13-418.

V.
¶39 Under Arizona law, an individual is justified in threatening
or using force to defend their “premises.” Section 13-407(A) addresses this
defense, and provides in part that:

A person . . . in lawful possession or control of premises is
justified in threatening to use deadly physical force or in
threatening or using physical force against another
when . . . a reasonable person would believe it immediately
necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or
attempted commission of a criminal trespass by the other
person in or upon the premises.

§ 13-407(A).

¶40 Section 13-407(C) defines “premises” as “any real property
and any structure, movable or immovable, permanent or temporary,
adapted for both human residence and lodging whether occupied or not.”

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Opinion of the Court

Applying the statute’s clear and unequivocal language here reveals that
Brown’s bedroom qualifies as a “premises”—it is a permanent, immovable
structure adaptable for both human residence and lodging. See supra ¶23.
Thus, we conclude that Brown’s bedroom satisfies the definition of
“premises” under § 13-407(C).

¶41 The court of appeals determined that the defense of premises
instruction was not warranted because “Brown could not have reasonably
believed that force was ‘immediately necessary to prevent or
terminate . . . a criminal trespass.’” Brown, 2024 WL 2263468, at *4 ¶ 22
(alteration in original) (quoting § 13-407(A)). The court also reasoned that
“[n]o trespass was possible given that Brown knew J.A. had allowed M.H.
to be present.” Id. Not so.

¶42 As noted above, an individual is justified in threatening or
using force to defend their premises if “a reasonable person would believe
it immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or
attempted commission of a criminal trespass by the other person.”
§ 13-407(A). A person commits “criminal trespass” by “knowingly entering
or remaining unlawfully” in or on another’s property. See §§ 13-1502 to
-1504.

¶43 Here, Brown was in lawful control of the premises—his
bedroom—when M.H. unlawfully entered without his consent. Under
§ 13-419(A), Brown’s use of physical force against M.H. is presumed to be
necessary once the bedroom door was forcibly opened over Brown’s
objection and M.H. entered the bedroom. See supra ¶¶ 28–34. Thus, the
trial court abused its discretion by denying Brown’s requested instruction
under § 13-407(A).

¶44 Furthermore, the court of appeals erroneously concluded that
the facts, absent § 13-419’s presumption, were insufficient to support a
defense of premises instruction. Brown, 2024 WL 2263468, at *4 ¶ 22. The
court determined that an instruction under § 13-407 was not warranted
because “[n]o trespass was possible given that Brown knew J.A. had
allowed M.H. to be present.” Id. This was error. See supra ¶ 33. Although
J.A. may have invited M.H. into the condominium, Brown did not invite
M.H. into his bedroom; in fact, he specifically prohibited him from entering
before J.A. and M.H. forcefully breached Brown’s bedroom door. M.H.
therefore had no legal right to be there. Section 13-407(A)’s elements were
established here: Brown was in lawful control of his bedroom, and a
reasonable person could conclude that force was necessary to prevent M.H.

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Opinion of the Court

from unlawfully trespassing into the bedroom. Accordingly, the trial court
abused its discretion by denying Brown’s requested instruction.

VI.

¶45 The State argues that the discrepancy between Arizona’s
burglary statutes and the model burglary provisions within the Model
Penal Code (“MPC”) expressly indicates the Legislature’s intent to exclude
individual rooms from the definition of “residential structure.” We are not
persuaded by the State’s argument.

¶46 The Legislature largely relied on the MPC when drafting and
revising Arizona’s criminal statutes. State v. Bowsher, 225 Ariz. 586, 587–88
¶¶ 9–10 (2010); State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 540 (1997). Thus, this Court has
stated that the Legislature’s deviation from the MPC provisions may
indicate the Legislature’s rejection of that language. Bowsher, 225 Ariz.
at 588 ¶ 10; see King, 225 Ariz. at 90 ¶¶ 10–12 (concluding that the
Legislature’s adoption of an objective standard for self-defense rather than
the MPC’s subjective standard indicates that self-defense “no longer turns
on the defendant’s subjective motivations”). However, when the
Legislature fails to adopt the applicable MPC provision but also does not
enact a statutory provision with directly contrary language, this Court is
not bound to infer legislative rejection of the MPC’s language. See State v.
Willoughby, 181 Ariz. 530, 538 (1995) (adopting the MPC’s approach
requiring the state to prove jurisdictional facts when the Legislature had
neither adopted the relevant MPC provision nor enacted language contrary
to the MPC).

¶47 Here, the Legislature did not enact the MPC’s burglary
provision but also did not enact a provision with directly contrary language
indicating that it rejected the idea that individual bedrooms could
constitute residential structures. Section 221.1 of the MPC defines burglary
as entering a “building or occupied structure, or separately secured or
occupied portion thereof” with a “purpose to commit a crime therein.” In
contrast, Arizona defines burglary as “entering or remaining unlawfully”
in or on different types of structures “with the intent to commit any theft or
any felony therein.” See A.R.S. §§ 13-1506 to -1508. Although Arizona’s
burglary statutes deviate from the MPC’s definition of burglary, they do
not reflect a specific legislative intent to exclude bedrooms from the
definition of residential structures. Unlike the MPC—which requires entry
into an occupied structure—occupancy is not a basic element of burglary in
Arizona; rather, whether a structure is occupied affects the degree of the

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Opinion of the Court

burglary charge. See § 13-1501(11) (expressly stating that the nature of a
residential structure remains the same “whether occupied or not”);
§§ 13-1506 to -1508 (stating that entry into residential structures may
support charges of first or second degree burglary while entry into
nonresidential structures, fenced commercial structures, and residential
yards may only support a charge of third degree burglary). Given
Arizona’s approach to defining the elements of burglary and the differing
classifications, which vary significantly from the MPC’s approach, there is
no indication that the Legislature intended to specifically reject the MPC’s
treatment of individual bedrooms as residential structures. Accordingly,
we conclude that the differences in the language used by the Legislature
and the MPC do not sufficiently indicate legislative intent to exclude
bedrooms from the broader category of residential structures within the
context of justification defenses.

¶48 Additionally, the State argues that State v. Gardella, 156 Ariz.
340, 342 (App. 1988), established precedent that a bedroom cannot be a
residential structure on its own because it is necessarily a smaller
component of a larger residential structure. Gardella is distinguishable. In
Gardella, the court of appeals considered whether an attached motel laundry
room—a nonresidential area—could be considered a residential structure.
156 Ariz. at 340. The court created a two-step test based on interpretations
of the word “residence” from other jurisdictions. Id. at 340, 342. In its
analysis, the court first considered whether the main building was used for
commercial or residential purposes. Id. at 342. The court then stated that if
the main building is residential, “lesser included structures” are
“subsumed” into the greater residential structure if they “make[] the
building more suitable, comfortable or enjoyable for human occupancy”
but that lesser included structures of commercial buildings must be
independently assessed for their purpose. Id. Applying its test, the court
concluded that the motel was used for commercial purposes and that the
laundry room, standing alone, was not a residential structure. Id.

¶49 The State seeks to expand the scope and applicability of
Gardella’s holding. The Gardella court was tasked with determining
whether a clearly nonresidential laundry area could be considered part of a
motel, which it ultimately determined was a commercial structure.
Accordingly, the court’s analysis on “lesser included structures” attached
to or located within the residential structure—including its determination
that the greater residential structure would “subsume” any lesser
structure—was dicta that was unnecessary to its outcome, and we decline
to adopt such an analysis here. See Ariz. Corp. Comm’n v. Mountain States

14
 STATE V. BROWN
Opinion of the Court

Tel. & Tel. Co., 71 Ariz. 404, 412 (1951) (defining dicta). In fact, subsequent
opinions applying Gardella’s reasoning were largely concerned with
whether clearly nonresidential areas, such as garages or storage units, could
be deemed “attached” to a connected residential structure such as an
apartment or house. See, e.g., State v. Browning, 175 Ariz. 236, 237 (App.
1993) (determining whether a separate but attached garage constituted a
residential structure); State v. Ekmanis, 183 Ariz. 180, 181 (App. 1995)
(considering whether a storage room of a patio home was a residential
structure). Because the facts in Gardella are distinguishable from the
circumstances here, the State’s reliance—as well as the dissent’s—on
Gardella is misplaced.

¶50 The Legislature’s declaration of policy offers further evidence
suggesting that a securable bedroom is included within the definition of
residential structure. In the Legislature’s declaration of policy, articulated
when it adopted §§ 13-418 and -419 in 2006 as emergency measures, the
Legislature expressed its intent that “[a] person should be entitled to safe
and peaceful enjoyment within the home even from residents of the same
household.” 2006 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 199, § 4 (2d Reg. Sess.). Although
the 2006 declaration of policy addressed the justification defense regarding
another statute—§ 13-411’s use of force in crime prevention—the
Legislature’s primary concern in its declaration of policy was for:

[T]he justification in use of force . . . [to be] applicable to all
victims in domestic violence . . . whether such domestic
violence occurs in a private or public place and whether or
not the victim and the perpetrator of domestic violence are
residents of the same home.

Id. The broad language in the legislative declaration of policy supports our
conclusion that the terms “residential structure” and “structure” as used in
the justification statutes at issue in this case include an individual’s right to
defend oneself when another person invades their separately securable
bedroom. Cf. Grand Canyon Tr. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 210 Ariz. 30, 40 ¶ 43
(App. 2005) (“When . . . the [L]egislature specifies its purpose in the session
law that contains the statute, it is appropriate to interpret the statutory
provisions in light of that enacted purpose.”).

¶51 This declaration emphasized the Legislature’s recognition of
an individual’s right to the “safe and peaceful enjoyment” of their own
home, even against encroachment from residents of the same household,
and underscores that all individuals within a shared residence enjoy legal

15
 STATE V. BROWN
Opinion of the Court

protections against intrusion. “We presume that the [L]egislature knows
the existing law when it enacts or modifies a statute.” State v. Garza
Rodriguez, 164 Ariz. 107, 111 (1990). Thus, given the Legislature’s intent to
permit victims to use defensive force against other household members, we
believe that characterizing Brown’s separately securable bedroom as a
residential structure will not produce “absurd results,” lead to the
“practical problems” raised by the dissent that would frustrate the
Legislature’s intent, or run afoul of our existing criminal statutory scheme.
Rather, we agree that allowing Brown to assert a justification defense based
on his ability to exclude others from his bedroom aligns with the
Legislature’s intent to protect individuals in their private living space and
our interpretation also gives effect to what we have recognized as “the
fundamental right of self-defense.” State v. Jackson, 94 Ariz. 117, 122 (1963).

VII.

¶52 Finally, we reject the State’s argument that any error created
by the failure to give Brown’s requested justification jury instructions was
harmless. “When an issue is raised but erroneously ruled on by the trial
court, this court reviews for harmless error.” State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549,
588 (1993). The state bears the burden of showing harmless error, and we
consider whether the error was harmless under the totality of the
circumstances. Id.; State v. Strong, 258 Ariz. 184, 200 ¶ 45 (2024). An error
is harmless if the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had
no influence on the jury’s judgment. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567
¶ 18 (2005); Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 294 (2017). In essence, the
state must demonstrate that even with the error, no reasonable jury could
have found that the state failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
See State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 561 ¶ 82 (2003).

¶53 The State argues that no reasonable jury could have
concluded “that an objectively reasonable person in Brown’s position
would believe it was immediately necessary to use physical force against
[M.H.] to prevent criminal trespass or to prevent imminent peril of death
or serious physical injury.” It asserts that because Brown testified that he
did not feel threatened by M.H. before he swung the microphone stand and
because he knew that M.H. was an invitee to the condominium, no
reasonable jury could have concluded that he was justified in using force
even with the benefit of § 13-419’s presumptions. The State further claims
that because the testimony shows that J.A. forced Brown’s door open,
Brown could not have believed that M.H. was in the process of unlawfully
or forcefully entering the room. We disagree.

16
 STATE V. BROWN
Opinion of the Court

¶54 As discussed above, Brown’s knowledge that J.A. invited
M.H. to the condominium does not alter or affect his right to exclude M.H.
from his private bedroom. See supra ¶ 33. Because Brown had the right to
exclude M.H. from his bedroom, a jury could conclude that Brown
reasonably believed force was necessary to prevent a criminal trespass. See
§ 13-407(A). Additionally, even though Brown testified that he did not feel
threatened by M.H., § 13-419’s presumption establishes that M.H. is
presumed to pose an imminent threat. See supra ¶ 37. A reasonable jury
could also conclude that Brown’s previous knowledge regarding
M.H.—including M.H.’s prior felony conviction involving the use of a
knife, the prior altercation between Brown and M.H., and M.H.’s prior
physical altercations with others—would cause a reasonable person to
anticipate harm.

¶55 We have previously concluded that a trial court’s decision to
give a jury instruction is not harmless error if it “eliminat[ed] the state’s
burden of proof” and permits a reasonable jury to conclude that the state
did not have to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Slemmer, 170 Ariz. 174, 178 (1991). It logically follows that a failure to give
an instruction is also not harmless if it removes the state’s burden of
proving that the defendant was not justified in using force against the
victim. Had the trial court instructed the jury as Brown requested, the State
would have needed to demonstrate the absence of such justification beyond
a reasonable doubt. Because the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on
Brown’s justification defenses eliminated the State’s burden of proof
regarding these defenses, the error was not harmless.

CONCLUSION

¶56 We vacate paragraphs 12 through 23 and 35 of the court of
appeals’ memorandum decision, affirm the remainder of the decision,
reverse the trial court, vacate Brown’s conviction and sentence, and remand
the case to the trial court for a new trial consistent with this Opinion.

17
 STATE V. BROWN
Chief Justice Timmer, Dissenting

TIMMER, C.J., Dissenting.

¶57 The trial court instructed the jury on three justification
defenses: self-defense, defense of a third person, and defense of property.
See A.R.S. §§ 13-404, -406, -408. Nevertheless, Brown argues the court
incorrectly declined to additionally instruct the jury on defense of premises
and defense of a residential structure. See A.R.S. §§ 13-407, -418. Brown
was entitled to those instructions only if his bedroom qualified as a
“residential structure.” I agree with the trial court that a bedroom, when
only one part of an occupant’s entire residence, is not itself a residential
structure under the justification statutes. The majority’s contrary
conclusion lacks statutory support and, in my view, invites confusion in
future cases. With great respect for my colleagues, I dissent.

¶58 Both § 13-407 (defense of premises) and § 13-418 (defense of a
residential structure) hinge on whether the place at issue qualifies as a
“residential structure.” 2 Section 13-1501(11) defines “residential structure”
as “any structure . . . that is adapted for both human residence and lodging
whether occupied or not.” Section 13–1501(12), in turn, defines “structure,”
as relevant here, as “any building . . . or place with sides and a floor that is
separately securable from any other structure attached to it and that is used
for lodging.”

¶59 After examining the ordinary meanings of “residence,”
“lodging,” and “securable,” the majority defines a “residential structure”
as “(1) any place with sides and a floor, (2) that is separately securable from
any other structure attached to it, and (3) is adapted for both human
residence and lodging.” See supra ¶ 22. Because this definition “[does not]
preclude a residential structure from being nested within another
residential structure,” the majority concludes that “a residential structure
[does not have to be] completely distinct from any other residential
structure.” See id. Thus, my colleagues conclude Brown’s bedroom

2 Section 13-407 does not itself use the phrase “residential structure” when
authorizing force to stop a criminal trespass. That phrase instead appears
in the statutes that define criminal trespass. See A.R.S.
§§ 13-1501(11), -1504(A)(1). The definition in § 13-1501(11) describes a
“residential structure” in the same way § 13-407 describes premises
adapted for human residence and lodging, and it is also the definition
applied in § 13-418. See § 13-418(C)(1). At bottom, both §§ 13-407
and 13-418 rest on the same statutory definition of “residential structure”
in § 13-1501(11).
18
 STATE V. BROWN
Chief Justice Timmer, Dissenting

constitutes a “residential structure” because it has walls and a floor, it is
adapted for residential use, and it is securable from the rest of his
condominium. See supra ¶ 23.

¶60 I disagree that a “residential structure” under §§ 13-407
and -418 includes a bedroom within the occupant’s residence. First, the fact
a bedroom can be locked is insufficient to make it a “structure.”
Section 13-1501(12) does not require that a place with “sides and a floor”
merely be “securable” to be a “structure.” Instead, it requires that the place
be “separately securable from any other structure attached to it.” § 13-1501(12)
(emphasis added). My colleagues largely ignore these italicized words. But
to give them meaning, as we must, I conclude that a place must be capable
of being secured on its own separately from an attached structure. See
Nicaise v. Sundaram, 245 Ariz. 566, 568 ¶ 11 (2019) (“A cardinal principle of
statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and
provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”). And
because the attached “structure” must itself be capable of being “separately
securable” from the place at issue, see § 13-1501(12), the rest of an occupant’s
own residential living space—which is not separately securable from the
occupant’s bedroom—cannot constitute the “attached structure,” as the
majority asserts. See supra ¶ 23. An “attached structure” within the same
building must be a space that can itself be “separately secured”—such as
another condominium unit, a hotel room, a dormitory room, an exercise
room, or a laundry room. A bedroom within the occupant’s larger
residential unit, by itself, cannot be secured from those spaces; only the
entire residence can. See State v. Bon, 236 Ariz. 249, 252 ¶ 10 (App. 2014)
(interpreting § 13-1501(12) as applying “[not to] all parts of a single
structure” but to “two ‘separately securable’ structures that are attached”).
This “separately securable” requirement “help[s] distinguish between
residential and commercial structures found within or attached to another
structure.” Id.

¶61 The court of appeals’ decision in State v. Gardella, 156 Ariz. 340
(App. 1988), is illustrative. The issue there was whether the defendant
committed burglary of a non-residential structure by entering a motel’s
laundry room through an outside door. Id. at 340–41. The defendant
unsuccessfully argued that the laundry room was part of the motel and
therefore a residential structure, so he was wrongly convicted of
burglarizing a non-residential structure. See id. at 341–42. The court
implicitly recognized that if the defendant had entered a motel room, he
would have burglarized a “residential structure” because the room was
separately securable from any other attached structure—like another motel

19
 STATE V. BROWN
Chief Justice Timmer, Dissenting

room—and was adapted for lodging. See id. at 342. But because the
defendant entered the laundry room, which was not adapted for lodging or
residence, the defendant committed a non-residential burglary. See id.

¶62 Second, the majority’s narrow focus on a bedroom’s use
ignores that the room can form part of an occupant’s greater residence. See
supra ¶ 23. Section 13-1501(11) defines “residential structure” as a structure
“adapted for both human residence and lodging.” A residence is generally
more than a place to sleep. Other than with student dormitories, hotel
rooms, and similar abodes, a structure “adapted for both human residence
and lodging” typically includes a kitchen, bathroom, and other living areas
that together make the home suitable and comfortable for human
occupancy. Gardella recognized as much, explaining that “‘residence’
includes everything connected with the residential structure to make it
more suitable, comfortable or enjoyable for human occupancy.” See 156
Ariz. at 342; see also State v. Ekmanis, 183 Ariz. 180, 182–83 (App. 1995)
(relying on Gardella’s description and concluding an attached storage room
was part of the home); State v. Browning, 175 Ariz. 236, 237 (App. 1993)
(concluding that “an attached garage with a connecting door to the living
quarters of a private home” is part of the residence for purposes of
aggravated assault). In short, the entire home is the castle from which the
lawful possessor may justifiably make a stand against intruders. See Castle
Doctrine, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (describing the “castle
doctrine” as a theory that there is no duty to retreat before using deadly
force to protect one’s own home or inhabitants from attack). Sometimes
that castle will be a single bedroom (e.g., a hotel or boarding house room),
but most often it will be a larger residence with multiple rooms. Thus, for
this additional reason, where an occupant’s residence or lodging transcends
a bedroom and is self-contained, the entire living space should be
considered the “residential structure.”

¶63 This interpretation does not “effectively rewrite” the
statutory definitions of “residential structure” and “structure,” as the
majority asserts. See supra ¶ 27. To the contrary, the statutory text supports
my view. The definitional statutes contemplate a single structure adapted
for residency or lodging and do not address components of those
structures. See § 13-1501(11) (“’Residential structure’ means . . . .”);
§ 13-1501(12) (“’Structure’ means . . . .”). Thus, in my view, to determine
what constitutes a “residential structure,” we should identify what
constitutes the occupant’s entire space “adapted for both human residence
and lodging.” Sometimes, that will be a single room—a kitchen, bathroom,
and other living areas are not required. But often it is a larger living space.

20
 STATE V. BROWN
Chief Justice Timmer, Dissenting

¶64 Third, applying the majority’s decision creates practical
problems. See State v. Agundez-Martinez, 256 Ariz. 445, 447 ¶ 10 (2024)
(interpreting text by examining, in part, “its effects and consequences”). Is
a bedroom both part of a “residential structure” (the home) and its own
“residential structure” (the room)? Does a burglar who enters multiple
bedrooms, storage rooms, or even locking closets commit one or several
burglaries? And if a home office is entered, is that a non-residential
burglary because that “structure” is not used for human residence and
lodging? Recognizing that individual rooms within either a stand-alone
residence, a residential unit inside a multi-unit building, or even a hotel
room are not themselves “residential structures” avoids these issues.

¶65 Fourth, and finally, I disagree with the majority that the
Legislature’s declaration of policy concerning domestic violence has any
bearing on the interpretation of “residential structure.” See supra ¶¶ 50–51.
The definitions of “residential structure” and “structure” are set forth in the
criminal trespass and burglary statutes and were neither enacted nor
altered in the session law containing the Legislature’s policy declaration.
Compare §§ 13-1501(11)–(12) with 2006 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 199, § 4 (2d Reg.
Sess.). Regardless, the policy declaration is specific to A.R.S. § 13-411,
which provides a justification defense for use of force in crime prevention
and clarifies that the defense applies to domestic violence victims, even if
they reside with their abusers. See 2006 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 199, § 4 (2d
Reg. Sess.). If anything, the fact the Legislature excluded §§ 13-407 and -418
from its policy statement supports my view that these defenses do not
apply to defending separate rooms within a single residence. If they did,
the Legislature surely would have clarified that a domestic violence victim
sharing the same residence as an abuser could raise these defenses.

¶66 Turning to the record here, I conclude Brown was not entitled
to the defense-of-premises or defense-of-a-residence jury instructions. He
resided in the entire condominium, including his bedroom. Because the
bedroom was not itself separately securable from other structures attached
to the condominium, it is not a “structure.” See § 13-1501(12). And because
it is not a “structure,” it cannot be a “residential structure.” See
§ 13-1501(11). The “residential structure” here was the entire
condominium. M.H. was an invited guest, so he was lawfully present in
the condominium, making §§ 13-407 and -418 inapplicable. I would
therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.

21