State of Arizona v. Edwardo Serrato III

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
STATE OF ARIZONA,
Appellee,

v.

EDWARDO SERRATO, III,
Appellant.

No. CR-24-0264-PR
Filed May 14, 2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
The Honorable Billy K. Sipe, Judge Pro Tempore
No. S8015CR201800630
REVERSED AND REMANDED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One
557 P.3d 795 (App. 2024)
VACATED

COUNSEL:

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, Alice M. Jones (argued),
Deputy Solicitor General, Michael T. O’Toole, Assistant Attorney General,
Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona

Chad Joshua Winger (argued), Harris & Winger, P.C., Flagstaff, Attorneys
for Edwardo Serrato, III

Nicholas Bustamante, Ballecer & Segal, LLP, Phoenix, Attorneys for
Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice
 STATE V. SERRATO
Opinion of the Court

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ authored the Opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, JUSTICES BOLICK, BEENE, MONTGOMERY,
KING, and BERCH (Retired) * joined.

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 We consider whether an arsonist’s lone presence at the time
of the crime is sufficient to support a conviction for arson of an “occupied
structure” under A.R.S. § 13-1704. An “occupied structure” is one “in
which one or more human beings either is or is likely to be present or so
near as to be in equivalent danger at the time the fire or explosion occurs.”
A.R.S. § 13-1701(2). The dispositive issue is whether, in committing arson
of an “occupied structure,” an arsonist qualifies as a “human being” under
§ 13-1701(2).

¶2 We hold that, in context, the meaning of “occupied structure”
in §§ 13-1701(2) and -1704 unambiguously excludes arsonists. An
alternative interpretation would render A.R.S. § 13-1703 nearly superfluous
and undermine the tiered arson statutory scheme. Accordingly, we
interpret “occupied structure” in §§ 13-1701(2) and -1704 to mean a
structure in which one or more human beings—other than the arsonist—are
present, likely to be present, or so near as to be in equivalent danger at the
time of the fire or explosion.

BACKGROUND

¶3 On Christmas night in 2007, firefighters in Kingman, Arizona
extinguished a fire engulfing a pickup truck. Investigators smelled gasoline
fumes and discovered a residue of unusual flammable liquids and
remnants of a gas can on the driver’s seat. Based on the evidence,
investigators confirmed that someone had intentionally set the fire inside
the truck.

* Justice Maria Elena Cruz is recused from this matter. Pursuant to article 6,

section 3 of the Arizona Constitution, Justice Rebecca White Berch (Ret.) of
the Arizona Supreme Court was designated to sit in this matter.
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Opinion of the Court

¶4 Officers traced the truck’s registration to Anna Hammond,
who lived about a mile from the fire. When police entered her home, they
found her and her dog lying on the floor in a pool of blood. The dog was
dead, and Hammond later died from her injuries. The kitchen stove was
on, gas fumes filled the home, and someone had tried to start a fire on the
kitchen table. Hammond’s jewelry, gun, coins, and cash were also missing.

¶5 A grand jury indicted Edward Serrato III for these crimes.
After a seven-day trial in 2023, a jury convicted him of second degree
murder, first degree burglary, arson of an occupied structure (the vehicle),
theft of means of transportation, and attempted arson of an occupied
structure (the house). The court imposed consecutive sentences for each of
these charges, totaling 135 years—35 of which stemmed from the vehicle
arson conviction.

¶6 Serrato appealed his convictions and resulting sentences. The
court of appeals, on its own motion, ordered supplemental briefing on the
vehicle arson conviction. The catalyst was the prosecutor’s claim during
closing arguments that “[Serrato] himself was obviously present when he
set the truck on fire, so his presence alone makes the truck an occupied
structure, even if no one was inside the vehicle.”

¶7 The court of appeals issued a memorandum decision
affirming Serrato’s convictions and sentences for second degree murder,
first degree burglary, theft of means of transportation, and attempted arson
of an occupied structure (the house). See State v. Serrato (“Serrato II”), No. 1
CA-CR 23-0384, 2024 WL 4216167, at *1 ¶ 1 (Ariz. App. Sept. 17, 2024)
(mem. decision). The court also issued an opinion on the vehicle arson
conviction acknowledging that there was no evidence that anyone besides
the defendant was in or near the truck when the fire started. State v. Serrato
(“Serrato I”), 557 P.3d 795, 796 ¶ 7 (Ariz. App. 2024). Nevertheless, the court
held that Serrato’s presence alone satisfied the occupancy requirement
under § 13-1704 and affirmed his conviction and sentence. See id. at 796 ¶ 7,
797 ¶ 12.

¶8 Serrato petitioned this Court for review. We granted review
to address an issue of first impression and statewide importance that is
likely to recur: whether an arsonist’s presence alone is sufficient to support
a conviction of arson of an occupied structure under § 13-1704. We have

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Opinion of the Court

jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3), of the Arizona Constitution and
A.R.S. § 12-120.24.

DISCUSSION

¶9 Whether an arsonist’s lone presence is sufficient to support a
conviction under § 13-1704 involves statutory interpretation, a matter we
review de novo. See Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Mayes, 257 Ariz. 137,
142 ¶ 13 (2024). When interpreting statutes, this Court starts with the text.
Franklin v. CSAA Gen. Ins. Co., 255 Ariz. 409, 411 ¶ 8 (2023). “We interpret
statutory language in view of the entire text, considering the context and
related statutes on the same subject.” Nicaise v. Sundaram, 245 Ariz. 566,
568 ¶ 11 (2019). If a statute’s text is clear and unambiguous, it controls
unless it results in an absurdity or a constitutional violation. 4QTKIDZ, LLC
v. HNT Holdings, LLC, 253 Ariz. 382, 385 ¶ 5 (2022). However, “[i]f the
statutory language is ambiguous—if ‘it can be reasonably read in two
ways’—we may use alternative methods of statutory construction,
including examining the rule’s historical background, its spirit and
purpose, and the effects and consequences of competing interpretations.”
Planned Parenthood Ariz., 257 Ariz. at 142 ¶ 17 (quoting State v.
Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 592 ¶ 5 (2014)).

I.

¶10 Section 13-1704(A), which establishes arson of an occupied
structure, provides that “[a] person commits arson of an occupied structure
by knowingly and unlawfully damaging an occupied structure by
knowingly causing a fire or explosion.” As a class 2 felony, arson of an
occupied structure is the most severe arson offense. Compare § 13-1704(B),
with A.R.S. § 13-1702(B) (reckless burning: class 1 misdemeanor) and
§ 13-1703(B) (arson of unoccupied structure: class 4 felony; arson of
property: class 1 misdemeanor or class 4 or 5 felony depending on the
property’s value).

¶11 Hammond’s truck constitutes a structure because § 13-1701(4)
defines “structure” as including “any building, object, vehicle, watercraft,
aircraft or place with sides and a floor, used for lodging, business,
transportation, recreation or storage.” (Emphasis added.) But the pertinent
and closer question is whether Hammond’s truck constitutes an “occupied
structure” under § 13-1701(2). (Emphasis added.)

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Opinion of the Court

¶12 An “occupied structure” is a structure “in which one or more
human beings either is or is likely to be present or so near as to be in
equivalent danger at the time the fire or explosion occurs.” § 13-1701(2).
Under § 13-1701(2), we must consider Hammond’s truck an “occupied
structure” if (1) a human being was inside the truck, (2) a human being was
likely to be inside the truck, or (3) a human being was so near the truck as
to be in equivalent danger. Whether Serrato, as the arsonist, qualifies as a
“human being” for purposes of the occupancy requirement depends on the
statute’s contextual plain meaning.

II.

¶13 Section 13-1701 does not define “human being.” Because the
legislature adopted § 13-1701 in 1977, contemporary dictionary definitions
control. See Garibay v. Johnson, 565 P.3d 236, 243 ¶ 24 (Ariz. 2025) (“Absent
a statutory definition, we may consider dictionaries and written
publications to discern the word’s common meaning and usage,
respectively, at the time the legislature enacted the statute.”). Those
definitions confirm that “human being” encompasses all people. See
Human Being, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language
(1969) (“A member of the genus Homo, and especially of the species Homo
sapiens”); Human Being, Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (1969) (“A person,
male or female.”).

¶14 In line with these definitions, the court of appeals determined
that the “occupied structure” definition under § 13-1701(2) was
“unambiguous” because “[b]y its plain language, ‘one or more human
beings’ encompasses all human beings—including the defendant.”
Serrato I, 557 P.3d at 796 ¶ 10 (quoting § 13-1701(2)). Accordingly, the court
upheld Serrato’s conviction because “[a] defendant’s presence alone is
sufficient to sustain a conviction for arson of an occupied structure” under
§ 13-1704. Id. at 797 ¶ 12.

¶15 But the court of appeals conflated textualism with literalism.
Literalism, also known as strict constructionism, involves “a narrow,
crabbed reading of a text.” See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 355–56 (2012). Textualism, on the other
hand, “does not limit one to the hyperliteral meaning of each word in the

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Opinion of the Court

text.” Id. at 356. We do not interpret a statute’s plain text hyper literally to
determine whether it is unambiguous. See In re Drummond, 257 Ariz. 15,
18 ¶ 5 (2024); see also Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 168–69 (2021)
(noting that “when interpreting this or any statute, we do not aim for
‘literal’ interpretations,” instead, “textual and contextual clues persuade us
of [a] statute’s ordinary meaning”).

¶16 Rather, Arizona courts analyze whether the “statute’s plain
language is unambiguous in context.” Drummond, 257 Ariz. at 18 ¶ 5
(emphasis added). “In context” means reading statutes as a cohesive whole
so that “no word or provision is rendered superfluous.” In re Riggins, 257
Ariz. 28, 31 ¶ 12 (2024). Indeed, “one of the more important [statutory
construction] rules is that effect shall, if possible, be given to every part of a
statute.” Town of Florence v. Webb, 40 Ariz. 60, 64 (1932). The court of
appeals overlooked several contextual clues that inform the meaning of
“human being” in § 13-1701(2).

A.

¶17 Section 13-1704 targets “[a] person” who knowingly damages
“an occupied structure,” signaling a distinction between the actor (the
arsonist) and the object of the offense (a structure occupied by others).
While the legislature used “person” to refer to the arsonist, it used “human
being” in § 13-1701(2)’s definition of “occupied structure,” indicating that
the legislature did not intend for the arsonist to be the “human being”
referenced in § 13-1701(2). This actor-object structure mirrors other title 13
statutes that distinguish the defendant from “human beings” potentially at
risk. For example, A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(9) prohibits a person from
“[d]ischarging a firearm at an occupied structure,” and A.R.S. § 13-3101(6)
defines “occupied structure” as one where “one or more human beings” are
present or in equivalent danger. In these statutes, the term “human beings”
refers to third parties—not the shooter—at risk of harm. So too here. While
§ 13-1701(2) defines “occupied structure” as including “human beings,” it
does not nullify the actor-object distinction in § 13-1704. Instead, § 13-1704
presumes a structure occupied by others, not merely the actor setting it
ablaze.

¶18 The definition of “occupied structure” further supports this
reading. Section 13-1701(2) defines “occupied structure” as including “any
dwelling house, whether occupied, unoccupied or vacant.” (Emphasis

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Opinion of the Court

added.) Because the arsonist is almost always present, if the arsonist’s
presence alone was enough to satisfy the statute, the term “vacant” would
be insignificant. See State v. Deddens, 112 Ariz. 425, 429 (1975) (noting that
we avoid rendering statutory language “superfluous, void, contradictory
or insignificant” (emphasis added)). “[W]hen possible, we interpret statutes
to give meaning to every word.” State v. Gates, 243 Ariz. 451, 454 ¶ 13 (2018)
(quoting State v. Pitts, 178 Ariz. 405, 407 (1994)). We decline to construe
§ 13-1701(2) in a way that would render the term “vacant” mere surplusage.
See Deddens, 112 Ariz. at 429; see also Mussi v. Hobbs, 255 Ariz. 395, 398 ¶ 13
(2023) (stating that courts give meaning to every word in statutes to avoid
rendering any part inert or trivial). Rather, the inclusion of “vacant”
confirms that the statute anticipates scenarios where no one—arsonist or
victim—is present. This language suggests that occupancy requires the
presence or likely presence of others, not the arsonist.

B.

¶19 The court of appeals also ignored the context of the broader
arson statutory scheme. Courts read statutes in harmony to avoid leaving
any provision “superfluous, void, contradictory or insignificant.” Deddens,
112 Ariz. at 429; see also City of Phoenix v. Yates, 69 Ariz. 68, 72 (1949) (noting
that we give meaning to “[e]ach word, phrase, and sentence . . . so that no
part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial”). We are also guided by A.R.S.
§ 13-104, which instructs us to interpret statutes to “promote justice and
effect the objects of the law,” and A.R.S. § 13-101, which requires us to
distinguish between serious and minor offenses and to ensure
proportionality.

¶20 Arizona’s criminal code defines three tiers of arson. The least
severe offense, reckless burning, is a class 1 misdemeanor and applies when
someone “recklessly” causes a fire or explosion that damages an “occupied
structure, a structure, wildland or property.” § 13-1702. The next tier, arson
of a structure or property, a class 4 felony depending on property value,
occurs when a person damages “a structure or property by knowingly
causing a fire or explosion.” § 13-1703. The most severe offense, arson of
an occupied structure, is a class 2 felony and applies when a defendant
“knowingly” causes a fire or explosion to an “occupied structure.”
§ 13-1704. The primary difference between the crimes delineated in
§§ 13-1703 and -1704 is the “occupied” requirement.

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Opinion of the Court

¶21 Serrato argues that, under the court of appeals’ reasoning,
nearly every instance of arson involving a structure would automatically
fall under § 13-1704 since the arsonist’s presence alone would satisfy the
statutory definition of “occupied.” We agree. Under that reading,
§ 13-1703 would retain only modest remaining application. To be sure,
§ 13-1703 would still cover arson of property that is not a structure. But, as
for arson to structures, § 13-1703 would conceivably only apply to remote
arsonists—those who start a fire while at a safe distance from the structure.

¶22 Perhaps even this assessment overstates § 13-1703’s residual
application under the court of appeals’ interpretation. Under § 13-1701(2),
an “occupied structure” also includes a structure where a human being is
“likely to be present.” So, even if a remote arsonist is not physically present
or near enough to be in equivalent danger, a court could deem the arsonist
“likely to be present” at the time of ignition because setting a remote
incendiary device may result in a premature ignition. Thus, the court of
appeals’ interpretation does not merely broaden § 13-1704—it effectively
displaces § 13-1703 as a viable, independent offense concerning arson of
structures.

¶23 This outcome is at odds with the legislature’s tiered approach,
which assigns greater penalties to arson offenses that create heightened
risks to innocent human life. See § 13-101(4) (providing that the public
policy of this State is “[t]o differentiate on reasonable grounds between
serious and minor offenses and to prescribe proportionate penalties for
each”). Indeed, while arson of a “structure” is a class 4 felony, arson of an
occupied structure is a class 2 felony, with the latter resulting in harsher
sentencing. Compare § 13-1703(B), with § 13-1704(B). And, as Serrato
argues, arson of an “occupied structure” is a more serious offense because
of the inherent danger to property and persons. In State v. Gatliff, 209 Ariz.
362, 366 ¶ 18 (App. 2004), the court of appeals held that arson of an occupied
structure justifies a “greater term of imprisonment” precisely because it
involves the risk of serious injury to a person inside. As such, we decline
to strip § 13-1703, a separate crime, of its meaning and vitality without
express instruction from the legislature.

¶24 We rejected a similarly problematic interpretation in City of
Mesa v. Killingsworth, 96 Ariz. 290, 294–95 (1964), where reading “fuel” to
include all liquids used in motor vehicles would have rendered another tax

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provision on motor vehicle fuel meaningless. There, this Court reasoned
that “if by A.R.S. § 28-126 the legislature meant to include all liquids used
in motor vehicles on highways other than kerosene, then the language used
in A.R.S. § 28-1551, taxing liquids used in internal combustible engines to
propel motor vehicles on highways, is surplusage” and “meaningless.” Id.
at 294 (“If it were intended that all liquids were to be taxed under § 28-126,
then there are no liquids to be taxed under § 28-1551.”).

¶25 Just as we concluded in Killingsworth that the legislature could
not have intended to enact a provision with no operative effect, the same
principle applies here. Reading “human beings” in § 13-1701(2) as
including the arsonist significantly circumscribes the lesser offense of arson
of a structure under § 13-1703. And we presume the legislature did not
intend to do a “futile thing” by including a provision that largely serves no
purpose regarding arson of structures. See Killingsworth, 96 Ariz. at 294–95;
see also In re M.N., 563 P.3d 136, 142 ¶ 30 (Ariz. 2025) (interpreting two
statutes to avoid creating “multiple requirements” rendering one of the
statute’s provisions “superfluous”).

¶26 Our decision in State v. Ewer, 254 Ariz. 326, 329 (2023), also
buttresses our contextual statutory analysis. In Ewer, the question was
whether “the reference to ‘person’ in [A.R.S.] § 13-404(A) is necessarily
limited to a defendant, as reflected in Arizona’s self-defense jury
instruction,” or whether it could also include the victim. Id. ¶ 12. To resolve
that question, we considered “the context of § 13-404(A) and related
statutes on the same subject to properly discern the statutory definition.”
Id. ¶ 13. Upon considering “the related justification statutes . . . for
context,” we held that “person” reflects a focus on the defendant as “an
individual accused of a crime and subject to criminal prosecution.” Id.
at 330 ¶ 14.

¶27 Similarly, here, analyzing the term “human beings” in
§ 13-1701(2) in context with the related arson statutes “provides the
framework to decide this issue.” See id. ¶ 17. The focus of the term is on
persons other than the arsonist. We accordingly hold that the meaning of
“occupied structure” in §§ 13-1701(2) and -1704 is unambiguous when read
in pari materia with § 13-1703. Although an arsonist is a human being as that
term is commonly defined and understood, the arsonist does not fall within
the meaning of “one or more human beings” in § 13-1701(2).

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Opinion of the Court

C.

¶28 The court of appeals did not consider whether its literal
interpretation of §§ 13-1701(2) and -1704 yielded an absurd result. See
Serrato I, 557 P.3d at 796–97 ¶¶ 9–11. Serrato argues that the “court of
appeals’ overly strict construction of singular words divorced from
statutory context in the arson statutes leads to absurd results.” The State
counters that the court of appeals’ holding does not result in absurdity
because it is not irrational for the legislature to protect all life, including the
lives of arsonists.

¶29 Because we agree with Serrato that the statutory text
unambiguously excludes arsonists from the meaning of “occupied
structure” in §§ 13-1701(2) and -1704, we need not decide whether the court
of appeals’ interpretation violates the absurdity doctrine. See Perini Land &
Dev. Co. v. Pima County, 170 Ariz. 380, 383 (1992) (noting that the absurdity
doctrine applies only if application of the plain meaning of the statute is “so
irrational, unnatural, or inconvenient that it cannot be supposed to have
been within the intention of persons with ordinary intelligence and
discretion” (alteration in original) (quoting Bussanich v. Douglas, 152 Ariz.
447, 450 (App. 1986))).

D.

¶30 The State and the court of appeals also invoke § 13-1701’s
pre-enactment history to bolster their interpretation. Serrato I, 557 P.3d
at 797 ¶ 11. On January 17, 1977, the House Committee on the Judiciary
originally introduced a version of § 13-1701 that defined “occupied
structure” as one in which “one or more human beings, other than a
participant in the crime, unless such participant is the owner or occupant of the
structure, either is or is likely to be present or so near as to be in equivalent
danger at the time the fire or explosion occurs.” H.B. 2054, 33d Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess. (as introduced by House Comm. on Judiciary, Jan. 17, 1977)
(emphasis added). This version made clear that the arsonist’s presence
alone did not make a structure “occupied” unless they also owned or lived
in it.

¶31 But, on March 3, 1977, the House amended the definition of
“occupied structure” as it is defined today. See H.B. 2054, 33d Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess. (as amended by House Comm. on Judiciary, Mar. 3, 1977). The court

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Opinion of the Court

of appeals reads this omission as an invitation to include arsonists in the
term “human beings.” See Serrato I, 557 P.3d at 797 ¶ 11. But that
conclusion relies on unenacted statutory language—a notoriously “unsure
and unreliable guide” to statutory meaning. City of Flagstaff v. Mangum, 164
Ariz. 395, 401 (1990); cf. Scalia & Garner, supra ¶ 15, at 256 (“Statutory
history—the statutes repealed or amended by the [enacted] statute under
consideration”—“form[s] part of the context of the statute.”). In any event,
the statute’s history is unhelpful where, as here, the statute is unambiguous
in context. See Ewer, 254 Ariz. at 331 ¶ 20 (“We do not consider legislative
history when the correct legal interpretation can be determined from the
plain statutory text and the context of related statutes.”).

¶32 Even if we were to consider the pre-enactment evolution of
the statutory language, it would not compel the State’s desired outcome.
At most, this record is ambiguous. The reason for the legislature’s change
is unclear, and nothing in the amended language compels the court of
appeals’ interpretation. It is just as plausible that the revision aimed to
simplify the text rather than expand its scope. We decline to speculate
about the meaning of language the legislature chose not to enact. See State
v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 85 (1989) (discussing separation of powers and
noting that “courts as an institution are not involved in the wisdom of the
legislation”); see also Scalia & Garner, supra ¶ 15, at 388–89 (“Rather than
resolving uncertainty, legislative history normally induces it. Predicting
when it will be entirely ignored, on the one hand, or considered dispositive,
on the other, is—not to put too fine a point on it—a crapshoot.”).

E.

¶33 Finally, Serrato and Amicus invoke the rule of lenity. But
“absent ambiguity, the rule of lenity does not apply.” State v. Fink, 256 Ariz.
387, 389 ¶ 9 (App. 2023); see also State v. Pena, 140 Ariz. 545, 549–50 (App.
1983) (noting that “where the statute itself is susceptible to more than one
interpretation, the rule of lenity dictates that any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the defendant”), aff’d, 140 Ariz. 544 (1984); Scalia & Garner,
supra ¶ 15, at 299 (noting that the rule of lenity applies only if “after all the
legitimate tools of interpretation have been applied, ‘a reasonable doubt
persists’”). Because §§ 13-1701(2) and -1704 are unambiguous in context,
this Court need not apply this “construction principle of last resort.” See
State v. Bon, 236 Ariz. 249, 253 ¶ 13 (App. 2014).

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CONCLUSION

¶34 We interpret “occupied structure” in §§ 13-1701(2) and -1704
to mean a structure in which one or more human beings—other than the
arsonist—are present, likely to be present, or so near as to be in equivalent
danger at the time of the fire or explosion. See Ewer, 254 Ariz.
at 330 ¶¶ 14–17 (harmonizing statutory language by interpreting “person”
in the justification statutes to refer to criminal defendants rather than
victims based on contextual clues). Our interpretation reflects the
contextual meaning and operation of “occupied structure” in §§ 13-1701(2)
and -1704, harmonizes §§ 13-1703 and -1704, and preserves the legislature’s
tiered arson punishment scheme.

¶35 We therefore vacate the court of appeals’ opinion, 1 vacate
Serrato’s conviction and resulting sentence for arson of an occupied
structure under § 13-1704, and remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.

1 Our decision does not affect the court of appeals’ separate memorandum
decision on Serrato’s other convictions and sentences, Serrato II, 2024 WL
4216167.
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