State of Arizona v. Asalia Guadalupe Alvarez-Soto

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
STATE OF ARIZONA,
Appellee,

v.

ASALIA GUADALUPE ALVAREZ-SOTO,
Appellant.

No. CR-24-0281-PR
Filed November 28, 2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County
The Honorable Jason Holmberg, Judge
No. S1100CR201703501
AFFIRMED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division Two
258 Ariz. 417 (App. 2024)
VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL:

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, Alice M. Jones, Deputy
Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals, Jacob R. Lines
(argued), Assistant Attorney General, Tucson, Attorneys for State of
Arizona

Rosemary A. Gordon Pánuco (argued), Attorney for Asalia Guadalupe
Alvarez-Soto

Seth M. Apfel (argued), Apfel Law Group, P.L.L.C., Phoenix; and David J.
Euchner, Pima County Public Defender’s Office, Tucson, Attorneys for
Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice
 STATE V. ALVAREZ-SOTO
Opinion of the Court

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ authored the Opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER and JUSTICES BOLICK, BEENE,
MONTGOMERY, KING, and CRUZ joined.

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 We consider two issues arising from a search and seizure of

evidence and subsequent litigation to suppress it: (1) whether the trial court

abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence

of narcotics discovered during a traffic stop; and (2) whether State v.

Sweeney, 224 Ariz. 107 (App. 2010), correctly states the appellate standard

of review for video evidence. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion because the trooper who conducted the traffic stop had

reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. We further hold that Sweeney does

not correctly state the appellate standard of review for video evidence

because appellate courts may not independently review evidence.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On December 14, 2018, while patrolling Interstate 10 (“I-10”)

in Pinal County, Trooper Ashton Shewey (“Shewey”) suspected Defendant,

Asalia Guadalupe Alvarez-Soto, violated A.R.S. § 28-721(B) (impeding

traffic flow by failing to drive in the right lane) and conducted a traffic stop.

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Opinion of the Court

¶3 During this stop, while processing a written warning, Shewey

asked Defendant about her travel plans and requested her consent to search

the vehicle, which Defendant declined. Shewey then requested consent to

conduct a canine sniff of the vehicle with his canine, Chili, and Defendant

agreed. Chili, trained to detect narcotics, alerted to the driver-side of the

car, leading to a search that uncovered a suitcase in the trunk of the vehicle

containing fifty-five pounds of marijuana. Shewey arrested Defendant and

the State charged her with possession and transportation of marijuana for

sale.

¶4 Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress all evidence seized

during the stop, arguing, in part, that Shewey lacked reasonable suspicion

for a traffic violation. At the evidentiary hearing, Shewey testified about

his law enforcement experience, decision to initiate the traffic stop, and

conduct during the stop.

¶5 Shewey began his law-enforcement career in 2009 with the

Pinal County Sheriff’s Department (“PCSD”). Before joining the PCSD,

Shewey attended the Southern Arizona Law Enforcement Training Center

Academy, where he received general training on traffic laws, illegal

narcotics, felony codes, and basic traffic investigations. He also attended a

four-week post academy training and then completed an additional

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Opinion of the Court

fourteen-week field training program. During his time with the PCSD,

Shewey became a patrol deputy, working in the Casa Grande, Stanfield,

and Maricopa areas. His responsibilities included making traffic stops,

responding to calls, and investigating criminal violations, thefts, burglaries,

and any other calls made to the 911 dispatch center. While on patrol, he

focused on drug interdiction.

¶6 After working on patrol for two years, the PCSD promoted

Shewey to canine deputy in part due to his drug trafficking enforcement

activities. The promotion required a physical, written, and oral board

exam. Shewey began working as a canine deputy under the High Intensity

Drug Trafficking Area task force. He worked as a PCSD canine deputy for

about three years.

¶7 Shewey then joined the Arizona Department of Public Safety

where he completed its twelve-week trooper academy, which included

training on advanced traffic investigations. After completing his first year

as a highway trooper, a prerequisite to serve as a canine trooper, Shewey

became a canine trooper.

¶8 Shewey also testified that he knew drug-trafficking

organizations often use Chevrolet Malibus, specifically models from 2002

to 2008, as “company vehicles”—vehicles used by narcotics couriers

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Opinion of the Court

operating out of border cities. Often, these company vehicles have a record

of multiple United States–Mexico border crossings and are newly

registered because trafficking organizations typically purchase them in the

name of the person transporting the narcotics.

¶9 Shewey also testified that, in his experience, it is common

practice on I-10 for troopers to stop vehicles traveling in the middle lane

when traffic passes them on the right because § 28-721(B) mandates “all

slower traffic stay to the right.” Troopers enforce § 28-721(B) to deter

collisions and erratic lane changes caused by slower vehicles remaining in

the middle lane.

¶10 In describing Defendant’s traffic stop, Shewey recounted that,

while on patrol, he observed a 2007 Chevrolet Malibu traveling on I-10. He

ran its plate through his license-plate reader and conducted a border

crossings check on it. The results revealed that the vehicle was newly

registered out of Nogales, Arizona, and recently crossed through the United

States–Mexico border multiple times. This information interested Shewey

because, based on his training and experience, it fit the profile for a

company vehicle. Consequently, Shewey decided to follow Defendant and,

if he observed a traffic violation, to initiate a stop.

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Opinion of the Court

¶11 Shewey followed Defendant’s vehicle in the middle lane and

observed it traveling three miles per hour over the posted seventy-five mile

per hour speed limit. After “several minutes” and “several miles,” the

vehicle slowed to seventy miles per hour. When Defendant slowed,

Shewey observed another vehicle, a red SUV, pass her in the right lane.

Shewey’s dashcam video, which was admitted into the evidentiary hearing

record, captured Defendant driving in the middle lane and the red SUV

passing her. Shewey decided to stop Defendant for violating § 28-721(B)

because the red SUV passed her in the right lane, and she was traveling

under the posted speed limit—indicators that she was driving less than the

speed of traffic.

¶12 After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that “the

stop was justified” and denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. A jury

convicted Defendant of both marijuana counts, and the court imposed

concurrent five-year prison terms. Defendant appealed. The court of

appeals, in a split opinion, vacated the convictions, holding that Shewey

lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop under § 28-721(B). State v.

Alvarez-Soto, 258 Ariz. 417, 423 ¶ 22 (App. 2024). The State sought review

in this Court. We granted review because this case presents a recurring

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issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under article 6,

section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 13-4031, -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I.

¶13 We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress for an

abuse of discretion, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to

sustaining the ruling. State v. Adair, 241 Ariz. 58, 60 ¶ 9 (2016). On review,

“we consider ‘only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.’”

State v. Mitcham, 258 Ariz. 432, 437 ¶ 13 (2024) (quoting State v. Thompson,

252 Ariz. 279, 290 ¶ 26 (2022)). We defer to the trial court’s factual findings

if they are supported by the record but review de novo whether those facts

establish reasonable suspicion. See State v. Evans, 237 Ariz. 231, 233 ¶ 6

(2015).

A.

¶14 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const.

amend. IV; Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 303 (2018). Thus, when

a law enforcement officer unreasonably detains an individual in violation

of the Fourth Amendment, the judicially created “exclusionary rule” allows

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a court to exclude evidence obtained during the violation. Mitcham, 258

Ariz. at 441 ¶ 32.

¶15 “Law enforcement officers ‘seize’ individuals by temporarily

detaining them during traffic stops.” Thompson, 252 Ariz. at 290 ¶ 28.

Under the Fourth Amendment, officers “can stop and briefly detain a

person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion

supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if

the officer lacks probable cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). Therefore, an officer only needs

reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. See id.

¶16 An officer’s reasonable suspicion arises from both the

combination of the officer’s perception of the facts and his understanding

of the applicable law. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60–61 (2014).

When determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, courts give

deference to the officer’s trained ability to distinguish between innocent

and suspicious actions. State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 24 ¶ 26 (App. 2007).

¶17 Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer has a

particularized and objective basis for suspecting a violation. Evans, 237

Ariz. at 234 ¶ 8. Courts determine whether an officer had reasonable

suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances, viewed in

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consideration of the officer’s training and experience. Id. “Although a mere

‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the

standard requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a

preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for

probable cause.” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380 (2020) (quoting Prado

Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014) (quotation altered)); see also

Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.

¶18 Relevant here, the Arizona Legislature codified the

reasonable suspicion standard for traffic violations in A.R.S. § 28-1594: “A

peace officer or duly authorized agent of a traffic enforcement agency may

stop and detain a person as is reasonably necessary to investigate an actual

or suspected violation of this title . . . .” (Emphasis added.)

B.

¶19 We begin our de novo review to determine if the record

establishes reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop by considering

Shewey’s understanding of the facts and relevant law. See Heien, 574 U.S.

at 60–61. The traffic statute at issue in this case, § 28-721(B), states that:

On all roadways, a person driving a vehicle proceeding at less
than the normal speed of traffic at the time and place and
under the conditions then existing shall drive the vehicle in
the right-hand lane then available for traffic or as close as
practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway,
except when overtaking and passing another vehicle

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Opinion of the Court

proceeding in the same direction or when preparing for a left
turn at an intersection or into a private road or driveway.

Based on the evidentiary hearing record, Shewey derived his

understanding of § 28-721(B) from his training and nearly decade of law

enforcement experience. From Shewey’s perspective, Defendant’s speed

fluctuation—from seventy-eight to seventy miles per hour—while traffic in

the right lane advanced, suggested that she was traveling below the normal

speed of traffic. On these facts, combined with Defendant’s failure to move

into the right lane, Shewey’s conclusion that a violation of the traffic statute

“may be afoot” satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s minimal reasonable

suspicion threshold. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.

¶20 Defendant contends that Shewey did not have the requisite

reasonable suspicion to lawfully stop Defendant’s vehicle because he

misconstrued § 28-721(B)’s requirements. After an extensive analysis of the

traffic laws, the court of appeals’ majority determined Shewey lacked

reasonable suspicion because his interpretation of § 28-721(B) “cast too

wide a net.” Alvarez-Soto, 258 Ariz. at 422 ¶ 21 (quoting Sweeney, 224 Ariz.

at 107 ¶ 22). The court reasoned that Shewey’s application of the statute

was not objectively reasonable because it would subject all travelers to

“virtually random seizures.” Id. Specifically, it explained that Shewey

lacked reasonable suspicion because he failed to sufficiently account for the

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judicially discerned legislative intent to “provide some measure of

flexibility in certain traffic statutes.” Id. at 421 ¶ 17 (citing State v. Livingston,

206 Ariz. 145, 148 ¶ 10 (App. 2003), for the proposition that statutory

language in A.R.S. § 28-729(1) “requiring drivers to remain ‘as nearly as

practicable’ within a single lane, reflects an ‘express legislative intent to

avoid penalizing brief, momentary, and minor deviations outside the

marked lines.’”).

¶21 We are unpersuaded that Livingston supports the court of

appeals’ conclusion that Shewey lacked reasonable suspicion merely

because Defendant’s driving involved a “brief, momentary, and minor

deviation” from § 28-721(B)’s requirements. We concur with the conclusion

in the court of appeals’ dissenting opinion that the record reflects

Defendant’s continued violation of the statute “rather than a brief and

momentary one.” Alvarez-Soto, 258 Ariz. at 425 ¶ 32 (Gard, J., dissenting).

We need not revisit Livingston’s holding because this case is factually

distinguishable.

¶22 We similarly reject the majority’s assertion that Shewey’s

interpretation of § 28-721(B) would require drivers to violate our speeding

laws to comply with the statute. Id. at 421–22 ¶¶ 18–19. As the dissent

notes, Defendant had “multiple ways to adjust her driving in the minutes

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leading up to the stop to ensure compliance with all laws including, at a

minimum, by immediately falling in behind the vehicle in the right-hand

lane when it became obvious that its speed exceeded hers.” Id. at 424 ¶ 30

(Gard, J., dissenting).

¶23 The court of appeals also incorrectly reframed the question

before it as one of statutory interpretation rather than constitutional

reasonableness. Id. at 421 ¶ 16 (“We address whether drivers on Arizona’s

highways are compelled by § 28-721(B) to move from the middle lane to the

right lane if they are passed by a lone vehicle on the right when the state

has failed to elicit any testimony as to the speed of that vehicle.”). Whether

Defendant in fact violated § 28-721(B) is a question for a traffic court; it is

not dispositive of the validity of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

See Evans, 237 Ariz. at 234 ¶ 7 (“The Fourth Amendment requires ‘some

minimal level of objective justification’ for making the stop.” (quoting

Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7)).

¶24 The Fourth Amendment does not require an Arizona officer

to interpret every traffic provision with “some measure of flexibility” before

initiating an investigatory stop; it requires only that the officer have a

particularized and objective basis to suspect that a violation may have

occurred. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22; Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7. An officer’s

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reasonable mistake about the facts or the relevant law does not preclude

reasonable suspicion. Heien, 574 U.S. at 60–61 (“To be reasonable is not to

be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the

part of government officials, giving them ‘fair leeway for enforcing the law

in the community’s protection.’” (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.

160, 176 (1949)) (citation modified)). In fact, reasonable suspicion may rest

on an objectively reasonable mistake of law when the statute’s application

“requires hard interpretive work.” Id. at 70 (Kagan, J., concurring); State v.

Stoll, 239 Ariz. 292, 296 ¶ 15 (App. 2016). Therefore, the question before us

is whether Shewey’s understanding of § 28-721(B) was objectively

reasonable. See generally Heien, 574 U.S. at 66.

¶25 The phrase “normal speed of traffic at the time and place and

under the conditions then existing” in § 28-721(B) provides no quantitative

metric. Thus, reasonable minds may differ about its interpretation and

application. Indeed, the fact that the court of appeals’ majority and

dissenting opinions, as well as the parties in this case, each offered

competing interpretations confirms that the statute’s application is subject

to legitimate debate. Accordingly, we conclude that if trial and appellate

judges cannot reach consensus on the statute’s proper application even after

exhaustive statutory analysis—“hard interpretive work”—we cannot deem

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an officer’s real-time literal interpretation of the law to be objectively

unreasonable. Heien, 574 U.S. at 70 (Kagan, J., concurring); cf. State v.

Weakland, 246 Ariz. 67, 73 ¶ 20 (2019) (applying the good faith exception to

the exclusionary rule because “[i]t is unreasonable to require the police to

predict a shift in the law when our trial and appellate courts failed to do

so”).

¶26 The statutory phrase “normal speed of traffic” may be

ambiguous and perhaps provides fodder for a spirited defense against a

§ 28-721(B) citation in traffic court. But the issue before us is not whether

Shewey’s stop would result in an adjudicated traffic offense. Even if

Shewey misinterpreted the law, reasonable suspicion survives if his

mistake was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. See Heien, 574

U.S. at 61 (“[R]easonable men make mistakes of law, . . . and such mistakes

are no less compatible with the concept of reasonable suspicion.”). Shewey

routinely enforced § 28-721(B) and testified it was common practice for

troopers to stop vehicles traveling in the middle lane when traffic passes

them on the right. He observed Defendant traveling below the speed limit,

which prevented him from traveling the speed limit in the middle lane, and

then witnessed the red SUV pass her in the right lane, after which she failed

to move to the right. The court of appeals’ conclusion that Defendant was

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penalized solely for being passed is inaccurate. Alvarez-Soto, 258 Ariz.

at 421–22 ¶ 18. These facts establish that Shewey’s belief was grounded in

experience and a reasonable interpretation of the statute. Thus, further

inquiries into alternative statutory bases for the stop or potentially innocent

explanations for Defendant’s conduct, such as her slowing below the speed

limit upon noticing Shewey’s vehicle, are unnecessary.

¶27 Defendant nevertheless argues that Shewey’s pre-traffic-stop

knowledge of her vehicle’s border crossings and registration in Nogales

cannot justify the seizure. We agree that those background factors—shared

by many lawful motorists—are too generalized to constitute reasonable

suspicion on their own. See Sweeney, 224 Ariz. at 113 ¶ 22 (“[C]ircumstances

or factors that do not reliably distinguish between suspect and innocent

behaviors are insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion . . . .”). But the

State does not justify Shewey’s stop on this basis. Indeed, as Defendant

conceded at oral argument before us, Shewey’s motive for the traffic stop is

immaterial under the Fourth Amendment because the constitutional

inquiry is whether his justification for the stop was reasonable. Jones v.

Sterling, 210 Ariz. 308, 311 ¶¶ 10–11 (2005) (“[E]vidence seized as a result of

a traffic stop meeting ‘normal’ Fourth Amendment standards is not

rendered inadmissible because of the subjective motivations of the police

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who made the stop.”). Shewey’s consideration of these factors in deciding

to follow Defendant’s vehicle does not undermine his objectively

reasonable basis for the stop under § 28-721(B).

¶28 Viewing the totality of the circumstances, Shewey’s decision

to initiate a brief investigatory stop was reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment. His interpretation of § 28-721(B) was objectively reasonable,

his observations of Defendant’s driving supported his suspicion that she

was traveling “less than the normal speed of traffic,” and his actions

reflected his professional judgment rather than arbitrary enforcement. See

Glover, 589 U.S. at 380; Evans, 237 Ariz. at 234 ¶ 7. Accordingly, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s motion to

suppress.

II.

¶29 We next consider whether State v. Sweeney, which implies that

appellate courts should conduct de novo review of video evidence,

correctly states the appellate standard of review. 224 Ariz. at 111 ¶ 12

(positing that appellate courts should conduct an “independent review” of

video evidence because “the trial court is in no better position to evaluate

the video than the appellate court”). We hold Sweeney conflicts with this

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Court’s long-standing principle that appellate courts may not

independently review evidence.

¶30 We briefly note that Sweeney’s novel departure from our

appellate standard of review is premised entirely on two inapposite

cases—Danielson v. Evans, 201 Ariz. 401, 406 ¶ 13 (App. 2001), and State v.

McCoy, 692 N.W.2d 6, 29 (Iowa 2005). Sweeney, 224 Ariz. at 111 ¶ 12.

Danielson did not involve video evidence, but rather the interpretation of

statutes and a divorce decree—both subject to de novo appellate review.

201 Ariz. at 406 ¶ 13. In McCoy, the Iowa Supreme Court reviewed video

evidence and affirmed the trial court’s factual findings. 692 N.W.2d at 29.

The court applied de novo review, not as a departure from appellate

deference to trial court fact-finding, but as the requisite standard of review

for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. Neither case justifies

Sweeney’s call for “independent” appellate review.

¶31 Sweeney’s “independent” appellate review standard also

conflicts with our jurisprudence. In Adair, we reaffirmed that appellate

courts review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of

discretion, viewing the evidence presented at the suppression hearing in

the light most favorable to sustaining the ruling. 241 Ariz. at 60 ¶ 9. We

defer to the trial court’s factual findings if they are reasonably supported

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by the record but review de novo the ultimate constitutional question

presented in the motion to suppress. Id. (citing Evans, 237 Ariz. at 234 ¶ 6).

The State argues that Sweeney improperly allowed the court of appeals to

substitute its view of the evidence for the trial court’s credibility findings,

while Defendant contends that a purely visual record warrants

independent appellate review. Both arguments misinterpret the standard

stated in Adair. Adair’s framework already incorporates video evidence

within the ordinary standard of review and reflects Arizona’s

long-standing rule that distinguishes deference to factual findings from de

novo review of legal conclusions.

¶32 Sweeney’s approach, and the court of appeals’ reliance on it

here, rests on the erroneous premise that an appellate court conducts de

novo review of the trial court’s fact-finding when the record includes a

video. Alvarez-Soto, 258 Ariz. at 420 ¶ 10. Although it is obvious that both

courts can view the same recording, the trial court remains uniquely

situated to evaluate video evidence in context. For example, after hearing

testimony explaining what a video depicts, the trial court is in a superior

position to resolve disputes about perspective, timing, or events occurring

beyond the scope of the video, to assess witness credibility and demeanor,

and to integrate those findings with any other evidence presented. The

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Opinion of the Court

appellate court’s role is to review whether the trial court’s findings are

reasonably supported by the record, not to reweigh the credibility or effect

of visual evidence itself. Designating video recordings as a unique class of

evidence, subject to de novo review, erases that distinction and vitiates

appellate courts’ deference to trial court fact-finding.

¶33 Appellate courts may, of course, view video evidence to

determine whether a factual finding is clearly unsupported by the

record—that authority already exists within Adair’s two-tier framework.

For example, if a trial court found that a car was blue, but the video plainly

shows it was red, the appellate court may correct that error without

abandoning the deferential standard. However, when a video is open to

differing interpretations or requires contextual testimony, appellate courts

must defer to the trial court’s findings if reasonably supported by the

evidence. See State v. Steinle, 239 Ariz. 415, 418 ¶ 10 (2016) (recognizing that

a “complete understanding of the total tenor and effect” of video evidence

may depend on accompanying testimony (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v.

Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 171 (1988))).

¶34 Under Adair, appellate courts may reconcile any clear

inconsistency between a trial court’s factual findings and what the video

evidence plainly depicts while continuing to review factual findings for

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reasonable support in the record and legal conclusions de novo. Adhering

to one unified standard promotes uniformity across evidentiary formats,

reinforces the trial court’s role as the primary factfinder, and prevents

appellate reweighing of evidence under the guise of “independent” review.

See Eric J. Magnuson & Samuel A. Thumma, “Same as It Ever Was”: Why

Audio-Video Recordings in and of Trial Court Proceedings Should Not Change the

Standard of Appellate Review, 24 J. App. Prac. & Process 213, 233 (2024) (“The

format of evidence being challenged on appeal should not alter the

standard of appellate review. Audiovideo [sic] evidence should be treated

the same way that appellate courts treat every other type of evidence, with

the standard of review being clearly erroneous (for factual findings) or an

abuse of discretion (for rulings on admissibility).”). Therefore, to the extent

Sweeney suggests that appellate courts may engage in de novo or

“independent” review of video evidence, we disapprove that standard and

clarify that the Adair standard governs review of all suppression rulings,

including those involving video evidence.

III. CONCLUSION

¶35 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s

motion to suppress based on the traffic stop’s reasonableness, vacate the

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court of appeals’ opinion, and remand to the court of appeals to address

Defendant’s claim that Shewey unlawfully extended the traffic stop.

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