Cited by

See Acuna Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. at 222 ¶ 109; ¶ 65 (2013); –98 (1998).

-98 (1988) (finding no error where defendant's silence was not used to establish guilt).

Additionally, “[t]he trial court has discretion to determine whether the probative value of evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues; we will not disturb a trial court decision unless the court has clearly abused its discretion.”

-98 (1988) (finding questions permissible where “evidence of defendant’s silence was not used to establish either defendant’s guilt or sanity,” and “[t]he subject of the prosecutor’s inquiry was defendant’s demeanor, not his silence”).

(explaining that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a request for a jury view because the scene might not be in the same condition as the date of the incident and the jury could get the necessary evidence through diagrams, photographs, and testimony).

(“The subject of the prosecutor's inquiry was defendant’s demeanor .

2906 , 97 L.Ed.2d 336 (1987) (when a defendant requests a psychiatric exam or presents expert testimony in support of a psychiatric defense, he has no Fifth Amendment privilege against the admission of statements made during the psychiatric exam); State v. Mauro, 159 Ariz, 186, 195, (holding that “the [F]ifth [Amendment protections ...

See Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 422-23 (1987) (when a defendant requests a psychiatric exam or presents expert testimony in support of a psychiatric defense, he has no Fifth Amendment privilege against the admission of statements made during the psychiatric exam); (holding that “the [F]ifth [A]mendment protections .

Accordingly, we find no error.4 to know.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 305 (Marshall, J., dissenting); (noting “[the Innis] standard clearly involves two prongs: the perceptions of the suspect and the intent of the police”).

P. 32.1(e) (defining claim of newly discovered evidence as not including cumulative or impeachment evidence); (“Evidence relied on must not be merely cumulative or impeaching.”).

(citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)).

Additionally, in considering Cordova’s challenge, we will not speculate or inquire into the jury’s mental processes during deliberations, nor will we speculate about “what the jury ‘really meant’ by its verdicts.” ¶ 20 (App. 2015).

We will reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence only if “there is a complete absence of probative facts to support [the jury’s] conclusion.”

(citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)).

This court will reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence only if “there is a complete absence of probative facts to support [the jury’s] conclusion.”

This court will reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence only if “there is a complete absence of probative facts to support [the jury’s] conclusion.”

We will reverse a defendant’s convictions “only if ‘there is a complete absence of probative facts to support [the jury’s] conclusion.’”

Cf. State v. Mauro, 159 Ariz. 186, 199, (acknowledging that an attorney may cross-examine an expert witness regarding payment for testimony).

And we will reverse a conviction “only if „there is a complete absence of probative facts to support [the jury‟s] conclusion.‟” 13