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¶12 Of course, “[t]he use of a witness’s mental condition for impeachment purposes is proper if there is an indication that the mental condition affected the truth of his testimony.”

-06 (1989) (holding that to obtain reversal of conviction based on nondisclosure of evidence, defendant must establish materiality of undisclosed evidence).

Defendant must show that he suffered prejudice, meaning “the undisclosed material would have created a reasonable doubt had it been presented to the jury.”

“The test for a Brady violation is whether the undisclosed material would have created a reasonable doubt had it been presented to the jury.” ¶ 52 (2003) ().

r places the prestige of the government behind its witnesses, and (2) Where 4 STATE v. MACIAS Decision of the Court the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony.” ¶ 6 (App. 2014) ( ).

As arms of the State, prosecutors must not only disclose exculpatory evidence, they may not knowingly elicit false testimony, ¶ 11 (2005), or use the prestige of the government to improperly vouch for the credibility of the State’s witnesses, ¶ 24 (1998) ().

“Prosecutorial vouching occurs ‘when the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind its witness,’ or ‘where the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony.’” ¶ 23, ( –90, ¶¶ 9-12, -43 (2010)).

¶95 Prosecutors are given “[w]ide latitude” in closing argument and “may comment on evidence and argue all reasonable inferences therefrom.”

“Prosecutorial vouching occurs ‘when the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind its witness,’ or ‘where the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony.’” ¶ 23, ( -90, ¶¶ 9-12, -43 (2010)).

The entitlement arises where an instruction is supported by “‘the slightest evidence.’” ( ).

("[N]o prosecutorial misconduct occurs where the prosecutor merely arranges a favorable plea agreement with one of the several witnesses testifying against the defendant .

See Lujan, 136 Ariz. at 104, 664 P.2d at 648; -05, -97 (1989) (overruled on other grounds).

Further, "[p]rosecutorial misconduct does not require reversal ‘unless the defendant has been denied a fair trial as a result of the actions of counsel.’" Bible, 175 Ariz. at 600, 858 P.2d at 1203 ( ).

Impermissible prosecutorial vouching takes two forms: “(1) when the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind its witness, and (2) where the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony.” ¶¶ 9, 12, -43 (2010).

¶4 The court of appeals reversed the order granting the new trial, holding that King was not entitled to a self-defense instruction because he had not presented sufficient evidence that he acted solely from fear of immediate physical danger

Both parties agree a trial court must give a self-defense instruction only when the defendant has demonstrated that “(1) he reasonably believed he was in immediate physical danger; (2) he acted solely because of this belief; and (3) he used no more force than appeared reasonably necessary under the circumstance.”

“Wide latitude, however, is given in closing arguments, and counsel may comment on evidence and argue all reasonable inferences therefrom.”

¶ 13 A justification instruction is warranted if it is supported by the “slightest evidence.” , ( , ).

9 ¶23 Garza claims that such comments were “impermissible prosecutorial vouching.” Prosecutorial vouching occurs “when the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind its witness,” or “where the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony.”